



**INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE
AND INNOVATIONS IN DIPLOMACY
AND DIPLOMATIC TRAINING**

Dubrovnik Diplomatic Forum
2011, 2012, 2013

ISSN 1334-7659
Vol. 10, No. 1, 2016

DIPLOMATIC ACADEMY
PROCEEDINGS

INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE
AND INNOVATIONS IN DIPLOMACY
AND DIPLOMATIC TRAINING

Dubrovnik Diplomatic Forum
Dubrovnik, Croatia
2011, 2012, 2013

Diplomatic Academy
Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs
Republic of Croatia
Zagreb, 2016

Diplomatic Academy Proceedings
Papers from International Conferences*
Organized by the Croatian Diplomatic Academy

Publisher

Diplomatic Academy
Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs
Republic of Croatia

For the Publisher

Mladen Andrić

Editors

Mladen Andrić
Tihana Bohač
Stjepan Špoljarić

Cover Design

Tiskara Zelina d.d.

Printed by

Tiskara Zelina d.d.

Address

Diplomatic Academy
Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs
Republic of Croatia
Trg Petra Petretića 2
Croatia – Zagreb, 10000
Tel. +385 1 4599 200
Fax: +385 1 4599 458
E-mail: diplomatska-akademija@mvep.hr

Visit our Web site

<http://da.mvep.hr/>

* This issue of ‘Diplomatic Academy Proceedings’ contains a set of selected papers from international conferences of the 14th, 15th and 16th CEI Dubrovnik Diplomatic Forum, organised by the Croatian Diplomatic Academy: ‘EU and Its Neighbours: Prospects and Challenges’ (2-4 June 2011), ‘Diplomacy and Intercultural Dialogue’ (24-26 May 2012) and ‘Innovations and Changing Roles of Diplomacy and Diplomatic Training’ (23-25 May 2013).

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface	5
OPENING ADDRESSES	7
The 14 th CEI Dubrovnik Diplomatic Forum	
Gerhard Pfanzelter	9
Davor Vidiš	17
The 15 th CEI Dubrovnik Diplomatic Forum	
Andreja Metelko-Zgombić	19
Joško Klisović	23
The 16 th CEI Dubrovnik Diplomatic Forum	
Mladen Andrić	27
KEYNOTE ADDRESSES	31
The UN Alliance of Civilizations: A Soft Power Tool to Address the Challenges of Cultural Diversity in the 21 st Century	
Jorge Sampaio	33
European Neighbourhood Policy: the EP View	
Gianni Pittella	37
Parliamentary Diplomacy and Cultural Constraints	
Michael Frendo	43
Cultural Diplomacy and Diplomatic Training	
Ku Jaafar Ku Shaari	55
Emerging Patterns in Diplomacy	
Nabil Ayad	61
SELECTED PAPERS AND DISCUSSIONS	69
Hans Winkler	
Factors and Contents of Public Diplomacy	71
Daryl Copeland	
Digital Diplomacy: From Gutenberg Galaxy Gives to Cyberspace	77
Jasna Jelisić	
Intercultural Dialogue as a Tool of Public Diplomacy: the Emerging Al Jazeera Balkans	85

Martina Borovac Pečarević	
Rethinking Cultural Diplomacy: European Cultural Policy and Intercultural Dialogue.....	101
Jovan Tegovski	
The Role of the Regional Cooperation Council in Promoting Intercultural Dialogue in South East Europe.....	115
Zdravko Sančević	
Cultural-Historical and Diplomatic Relations of the Republic of Dubrovnik with West Indies and (since 1811) with Venezuela, Colombia and Panama.....	121
Lisen Bashkurti	
European Union, Mediterranean Relations and Current Crises.....	127
Nives Malenica	
Union for the Mediterranean and Croatia.....	135
Tatiana Zvereva	
Russia – EU Relations.....	141
Oleksandr Poltoratskyy	
The European Integration Policy of Ukraine in the Context of Social Modernization.....	149
Alexandru Codreanu	
Improving the Eastern Partnership: A View from Moldova.....	155
Dubravko Žirovčić	
Theoretical Principles of Economic Diplomacy.....	159
Davor Čutić	
Military Aspects of International Relations.....	173
APPENDICES	181
Programmes, Lists of Participants, Family Photos	
14 th CEI Dubrovnik Diplomatic Forum 2011	183
15 th CEI Dubrovnik Diplomatic Forum 2012.....	191
16 th CEI Dubrovnik Diplomatic Forum 2013.....	199
<u>Activities of the Diplomatic Academy, MFEA, Croatia</u>	
Dubrovnik Diplomatic Forum (1998-2015).....	207
International Francophone Diplomatic Seminars (2002-2015).....	208

Preface

This issue of Diplomatic Academy Proceedings on “**Intercultural Dialogue and Innovations in Diplomacy and Diplomatic Training**” is a collection of papers presented at three international conferences organised in Dubrovnik, Croatia, by the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Republic of Croatia in cooperation with the University of Zagreb and its International Centre of Croatian Universities, Dubrovnik.

The conferences have been continuously held under the auspices of the Central European Initiative (CEI), enabling regular exchange of views of diplomatic experts from the CEI member states at least once a year, attracting also participation of others interested in international relations, foreign policy and diplomacy.

The contents, continuity and even the tradition of these gatherings resulted also with a generic name of the Dubrovnik Diplomatic Forum, while this issue is related to the following:

- “EU and Its Neighbours: Prospects and Challenges” (2-4 June **2011**),
- “Diplomacy and Intercultural Dialogue” (24-26 May **2012**) and
- “Innovations and Changing Roles of Diplomacy and Diplomatic Training” (23-25 May **2013**).

The aim of Dubrovnik Diplomatic Forum is to provide an effective international discussion, from academic and practical point of view, namely to present, promote and foster various effective concepts, methods, skills and techniques of diplomacy and diplomatic training. Each forum deals with a specific topic, with an open approach to all domains of modern public diplomacy; from economic and cultural diplomacy to particular aspects of development, regional cooperation, education and civil society. Providing a discussion on diplomatic strategies and policies by senior experts, it also offers an interactive programme and specialised workshops for junior diplomats.

In this respect, the proceedings are prepared not only as a fine reminder of the conferences, but more as an additional serious contribution to diplomatic literature.

Editors

OPENING ADDRESSES

The 14th CEI Dubrovnik Diplomatic Forum

Gerhard Pfanzelter*

The CEI Secretariat is very proud of the fruitful cooperation with the Diplomatic Academy of Croatia and the University of Zagreb. The Dubrovnik Diplomatic Forum has become a very important CEI feature event and represents a consolidated tradition. The CEI has been investing in this cooperation since 1998 by establishing a CEI Diplomatic Training Network with the Croatian Diplomatic Academy at the core. The Academy has acted as the focal point with great success in bringing together diplomats and experts in international relations from Central and South Eastern Europe.

Central European Initiative

The CEI is the oldest regional forum for intergovernmental cooperation: established in November 1989, it has become the largest regional initiative comprising 18 Member States of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. The current CEI Membership, that includes 9 EU and 9 non-EU countries, puts the CEI in a privileged position to act as a bridge between EU and non-EU Member States, thus helping non-EU countries in fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria and the conditions required by the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP).

Since 1989, the CEI has successfully adapted to major historical changes in Europe and has become a champion of ***Regional Cooperation for European Integration***: therefore, the European perspective of its Member States remains the CEI core mission.

The origin of the Central European Initiative lies in the creation of the Quadrangolare in Budapest on 11 November 1989 whose founding fathers were Italy, Austria, Hungary and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). The Initiative aimed at overcoming the division in blocks by re-establishing cooperation links, among countries of different political orientations and economic structures. At the first Summit in Venice in 1990, Czechoslovakia was admitted and the Initiative was renamed Pentagonale. In 1991, with the admission of Poland, it became the Hexagonale.

The Organisation was renamed Central European Initiative (CEI) in 1992. On the same occasion, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia were admitted

* Ambassador, CEI Secretary General, CEI Executive Secretariat, Trieste, Italy.

as Member States. The Czech Republic and Slovakia were admitted to the CEI in 1993 following the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. In 1996 Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania and Ukraine joined the CEI as full-fledged members. The current membership derives from the adhesion of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (afterwards State Union of Serbia and Montenegro and later on Serbia) in 2000 and of Montenegro in 2006. And the CEI headquarters are based in Trieste (Italy) since 1996.

The Central European Initiative also serves as *a bridge between macro-regions*: the Baltic, the Danube, the Adriatic and the Black Sea. It connects the macro-regions of Europe. In this context the CEI has been mentioned in the European Union Strategy for the Danube Region action plan and holds regular consultations with its priority area coordinators.

In the last 20 years, the CEI has supported various initiatives with the ultimate aim to enhance regional cooperation and contribute to the EU integration process. Its member countries have benefitted from the CEI financial instruments and other cooperation tools, in particular: a) the CEI Cooperation Fund (a multilateral financial facility, funded by all Member States, for small scale regional projects such as seminars, workshops or short training courses); b) the Italian Trust Fund at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development - EBRD (funding technical assistance assignments setting the ground for EBRD investments). Since 1992, total allocation of €34.5 million with a Multiplier effect for TC projects: 189; c) the Know-How Exchange Programme KEP (funding capacity building and transfer of good practice to non-EU CEI Member States). The CEI countries took also advantage of the CEI Science & Technology Network (supporting mobility of researchers across the CEI area) and the CEI University Network (promoting academic cooperation).

2011 and 2012 were successful years for the CEI, many important initiatives were taken, among which the **obtainment of the observer status at the General Assembly of the UN** should be singled out: this will open a global perspective to the CEI work and provide further involvement in the region.

The CEI competitive advantage relies on its long-standing knowledge of, and involvement in, multilateral regional cooperation in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, as well as on its project-oriented approach, through the involvement in different EU funded project, particularly appreciated by its Member States.

The EU and its Neighbours: Prospects and Challenges

a) Enlargement Policy Towards the Western Balkans

The enlargement policy of the EU has been pursued for more than four decades. Successive accessions have seen a gradual increase in the members, from the

original six to 27. The policy has brought nations and cultures together, enriching and injecting the EU with diversity and dynamism. The recent enlargement to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe not only has united the East and the West, after decades of artificial separation, but has also provided mutual benefits of deeper trade integration, a larger internal market, economies of scale and has expanded investment and job opportunities.

The accession of Croatia, as 28th EU member on July 1, 2013, the start of accession negotiations with Montenegro in June and candidate status for Serbia in March show that the EU delivers on its commitments once the conditions are met. These positive developments act as an incentive and encouragement to all the countries of the region to step up their own preparations for EU membership. In addition, positive results have been achieved in Macedonia and in Albania.

Regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations are essential elements of the Stabilisation and Association process and represent one of the core objectives of the CEI.

In the context of good regional neighbourly relations, open bilateral issues need to be addressed with determination, taking into account the overall EU interests.

b) European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Countries

To the East and South of the European Union (EU) lie sixteen countries¹ whose hopes and futures make a direct and significant difference to the EU. Recent events have brought this into sharper relief, highlighting the challenges to face together. The overthrow of long-standing repressive regimes in Egypt and Tunisia; the on-going military conflict in Libya, the recent violent crackdown in Syria, continued protests in Belarus and the lingering protracted conflicts in the region, including in the Middle East, require looking afresh at the EU's relationship with its neighbours.

The encouraging progress made by other neighbours, for example by the Republic of Moldova in its reform efforts, Ukraine in its negotiations of the Association Agreement or Morocco and Jordan in their announcement of constitutional reform, also need to be supported. The Lisbon Treaty has enabled the EU to strengthen the delivery of its foreign policy: cooperation with neighbouring countries can now be broadened to cover the full range of issues in an integrated and more effective manner. Since its inception in 2004, the European Neighbourhood Policy has promoted a variety of important initiatives, in particular on the trade and economic front, which have allowed the EU and its neighbours to develop stronger relation in

¹ This ENP framework is proposed to the 16 of EU's closest neighbours – Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine.

virtually all policy fields, from energy to education, from transport to research. The ENP, which is chiefly a bilateral policy between the EU and each partner country, is further enriched with regional and multilateral cooperation initiatives: the Eastern Partnership (launched in Prague in May 2009), the Union for the Mediterranean (the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, formerly known as the Barcelona Process, re-launched in Paris in July 2008), and the Black Sea Synergy (launched in Kiev in February 2008) and the recent adopted Danube Strategy. Within the ENP the EU offers to its neighbours a privileged relation, building upon a mutual commitment to common values (democracy and human rights, rule of law, good governance, market economy principles and sustainable development). The ENP goes beyond existing relation to offer political association and deeper economic integration, increased mobility and more people-to-people contacts. The ENP remains distinct from the process of enlargement although it does not prejudice, for European neighbours, how their relationship with the EU may develop in future, in accordance with Treaty provisions.

c) Eastern Partnership

Concerning the Eastern Partnership (EaP) – which represents the major instrument of the EU’s foreign policy towards Eastern Europe and Southern Caucasus countries as part of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and launched in May 2009 at the Prague Summit - the EaP fosters the necessary conditions to accelerate political association and further economic integration between the European Union and Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. The Partnership foresees stronger political engagement, namely: the prospect of a new generation of Association Agreements; integration into the EU economy with deep free trade agreements; easier travel to the EU through gradual visa liberalisation, accompanied by measures to tackle illegal immigration; enhanced energy security arrangements; increased financial assistance; deeper cooperation on environment and climate issues; increased people-to-people contacts and greater involvement of civil society.

These objectives are pursued through:

- The bilateral track, which aims to deepen the relations between the EU and each partner country through the conclusion of bilateral agreements such as the Association Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, and
- The multilateral track, which advances the EaP objectives through four policy (thematic) platforms, namely: democracy, good governance and stability; economic integration and convergence with EU sectorial policies; energy security; contacts between people.

d) CEI and EU

In this context one can argue that any scenario of development of regional cooperation today has to be in tune and in close partnership with the European Union. Therefore, the CEI has strengthened and is deepening its relations with the EU.

At the project level, the CEI continues to promote the partnership with the EU in the framework of EU-funded projects where the CEI often acts as Lead Partner, attracting additional resources to complement and expand its project-oriented action. Some of these projects are of particular relevance to the development of transport in the Adriatic-Balkan area, such as SEETAC (South East European Transport Axis Cooperation) that involves Ministries of Transport from Western Balkans region, the ADRIA-A (Accessibility and Development for the Re-launch of the Inner Adriatic Area) a cross-border project between two Adriatic States, Italy and Slovenia and the recently approved project ACROSSEE (Accessibility improved at border CROSSings for the integration of South East Europe).

At the political level, the CEI makes special efforts to monitor existing and upcoming EU strategies focused on macro-regions in order to offer our expertise and added value. The final aim of this effort is to pave the way to a substantial involvement of the CEI in these macro-region strategies as well as in other EU initiatives. It is worthwhile to mention that the CEI has been mentioned in the EU Strategy for the Danube Region Action Plan in the business and energy sector. Moreover, the CEI is working closely with the EC in order to strengthen the relations within the Eastern Partnership.

In view of the enormous regional and global challenges, training of diplomats has become more complex than ever. However, new opportunities appear on the horizon with the establishment of a European External Action Service.

Diplomacy and Intercultural Dialogue

‘Diplomacy and Intercultural Dialogue’ fits very well with the CEI activities. In fact, the CEI pays strong attention to promotion of intercultural dialogue and to the respect of cultural diversity. Efforts have been made to support actions in order to counter cultural, linguistic and ethnic divisions as well as to enable people to deal with different identities, constructively and democratically, on the basis of shared values.

The CEI combines several instruments and resources made available by the CEI members, by the European Commission and other European Financial Institutions. The CEI designs, finances and implements proposals of interest for its Member States.

Through its Cooperation Fund in particular, which is contributed by all member countries, the CEI supports the implementation of multilateral small-scale projects, so called CEI Cooperation Activities, mainly seminars, workshops and short training courses. Great majority of such activities is related to one of the CEI priority areas – Intercultural cooperation including minorities. Since the establishment of the Fund, 189 cooperation activities have been approved for co-financing with a total CEI contribution reaching almost 2 million Euros.

Furthermore, from the very beginning the CEI Member States have been devoting particular attention to issues related to national minorities. The Working Group on Minorities was actively involved in drafting the CEI Instrument for the Protection of Minority Rights, a political document based on internationally accepted principles. Opened for signature in 1994, so far the Instrument has been signed by 13 CEI Member States (Albania, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Hungary, Italy, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia and Slovenia) and translated in 10 languages. Although not a legally-binding document, the Instrument introduced innovative approach to the issue and provided the CEI with a benchmark for regular overviews of the state of protection of minority rights in its member countries.

With the CEI repositioning in 2007 and the streamlining of areas of CEI activities an overall area was created “Intercultural cooperation including minorities”.

The current Plan of Action (2010-2012) envisages three priority issues under this area:

- Intercultural Dialogue and Conservation of Cultural Heritage (including storage, protection and renewal of audio-visual heritage),
- Know-how Transfer in the Field of Cultural Management, and
- ‘Diversity Management’ including Protection and Promotion of Minority Languages and Cultures.

In the course of time, a special category of CEI activities has been created, the CEI Feature Events and the Dubrovnik forum is one of them. These events and activities are recurrent in nature and aim at promoting intercultural dialogue:

- CEI Youth Forum,
- CEI Forum on Human Resources Development and Training,
- CEI Special Event within the Trieste Film Festival,
- CEI Venice Forum for Contemporary Art, and
- CEI Literary Round Table at Vilenica.

In order to honour and encourage initiatives and activities of talented and often young people from the CEI Member States, several CEI Awards are offered, in

particular in the cultural, areas. A number of them are presented on the occasion of the CEI Feature Events, while the others could be considered as self-standing initiatives:

- CEI Award at the Trieste Film Festival,
- CEI Awards at the International Short Film and Debut Works Festival ‘Maremetraggio’,
- CEI Award in the framework of the International Design Contest ‘Trieste Contemporanea’,
- CEI Fellowship for Writers in Residence, and
- CEI Award for Outstanding Merits in Journalism.

An active intercultural cooperation through inter-faith dialogue, cultural exchange, and inter-communal understanding across borders embracing all diversities represents a strong diplomatic tool for overcoming and preventing new fault-lines.

The 14th CEI Dubrovnik Diplomatic Forum

Davor Vidiš*

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,
Dear Ambassador Dr. Gerhard Pfanzelter,
Honourable Mayor of the City of Dubrovnik Dr. Andro Vlahušić,
Distinguished lecturers,

Ladies and gentlemen,

It is my honour to greet you all here today, in the world-famous, ancient city of Dubrovnik, on behalf of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of the Republic of Croatia, Mr. Gordan Jandroković, who asked me to use this opportunity to convey his best wishes for the success of this important gathering. It is my special honour to greet and welcome Honourable Mr. Gianni Pittella, Vice-President of the European Parliament, who is here with us at the CEI Dubrovnik Diplomatic Forum for the first time.

I would also like to extend my greetings and special thanks to the CEI Secretary General Ambassador Dr. Gerhard Pfanzelter for the CEI support for this project, which is for years jointly organized by the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration and the Executive Secretariat of the Central European Initiative.

Furthermore, special greetings go to Prof. Illan Chet, Deputy Secretary General of the Union for the Mediterranean, as well as to the Euro-Mediterranean University and its highly esteemed President Prof. Dr. Joseph Mifsud and Dr. Nabil Ayad, Director of the London Academy of Diplomacy, University of East Anglia.

Ladies and gentlemen,

This year we mark the 14th anniversary of the CEI Dubrovnik Diplomatic Forum, which started as a pioneer project and has now grown into a traditional, annual event. Over the course of years, the CEI Dubrovnik Diplomatic Forum ‘covered’ various topics which triggered interest of numerous experts that deal with issues of diplomacy, foreign policy and international relations, as well as those engaged in education and training skills. This Forum also acknowledged the importance of

* Ambassador, Director-General for Neighbouring Countries and South-Eastern Europe, Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, Zagreb, Croatia

adapting to the changing environment through continuous strengthening of wider regional cooperation, based on shared values and knowledge-powered societies. This year's topic **'EU and Its Neighbours: Prospect and Challenges'** – is no exception.

The aim of this year's Forum is to stress particular regional and inter-regional components of a broader European and EU setting, with knowledge, research and education at its very centre.

Ladies and gentlemen,

In the course of the past 14 years, Europe and the EU itself have seen important changes, both in terms of its internal regulations, enlargement processes that encompassed several European countries to the East and South of the continent, as well as designing mechanism for enhancing cooperation with other countries through the Union for Mediterranean and Eastern Partnership.

Parallel to this process, countries of the Stabilization and Association Process in the South Eastern Europe continued to pursue with its internal reforms and managed to reach, each according to its own merit and capacity, various status in terms of the EU integration process.

Croatia, as a country that is soon to join the European Union, intends to actively participate and contribute to the Common European Foreign and Security Policy, especially within the context of the EU Neighbourhood Policy. Furthermore, Croatia also intends to continue encouraging internal reforms and, accordingly, advocate further enlargement processes in the South-East Europe – here I would like to reiterate Croatia's readiness to share its experience, not only with the countries in its immediate surroundings, but also wider European neighbourhood.

Ladies and gentlemen,

The Forum will bring about several topics: regional and inter-regional aspects of deepening and widening of the EU policies; six axes of priority cooperation within the Union for Mediterranean; Russia, EU and its neighbourhood; three of four freedoms for EU Eastern Partners; the European Neighbourhood Policy.

I hope such interesting, as well as timely discussions on so many important topics would contribute to one of the goals of the CEI Dubrovnik Diplomatic Forum – which is to serve as an instrument for developing better understanding among the CEI member states, as well as with the countries in its neighbourhood through an in-depth exchange of views and experiences.

Finally, I would like to use this opportunity to wish all the participants lot of success, and pronounce this Forum officially opened.

Thank you.

The 15th CEI Dubrovnik Diplomatic Forum

Andreja Metelko-Zgombić*

Excellencies, Ladies and gentlemen,
Honourable Mayor of the city of Dubrovnik,
Distinguished participants,
Dear colleagues,

It is my honour to greet you on behalf of the Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of the Republic of Croatia Prof. Dr. **Vesna Pusić** and wish you a warm welcome to the city of Dubrovnik and the 15th Dubrovnik Diplomatic Forum.

It is my special honour to greet the CEI Secretary General H.E. Dr. Pfanzelter, and President of the EMUNI Professor Joseph Mifsud.

At the outset, I would like to thank the able and innovative organizers of this event: **Diplomatic Academy** of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Republic of Croatia and their partners as follows: **Central European Initiative, Euro-Mediterranean University (EMUNI), United Nations Alliance of Civilizations, London Academy of Diplomacy of the University of East Anglia** and, last but not least, **the University of Zagreb and its Centre for Advanced Academic Studies (CAAS) in Dubrovnik.**

Dubrovnik Diplomatic Forum was incepted in 1998 as a pioneer project of Croatian Diplomatic Academy within the framework of the Central European Initiative (CEI). This Forum has grown to be an international annual event that gathers state officials, experts, academics and young diplomats. It always deals with topics of diplomacy and diplomatic training. The objectives of 2012 Forum are to enlighten particular role of diplomacy in an on-going intercultural dialogue, as well as to discuss potentials and benefits of better understanding and intercultural communication in regional, interregional and global context, where knowledge, research, innovation, education and training stand in the very center of international cooperation and development in general.

Modern diplomacy today requires a wide public dialogue that involves not only diplomats but also experts in numerous fields – from academics, journalists to scientists and public personalities. It requires appreciations of personal professional

* Director-General for EU and International Law and Consular Affairs, Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, Zagreb, Croatia

experiences of cultural, public, sport, tourist and other activities; experiences of all those who by performing their day-to-day tasks are actually building contents of public diplomacy, or so called **soft diplomacy**. No one is granted any exclusivity in this process, no special position in this process is drawn merely from one's function. There is only argumentation and synergy of arguments that can lead us to conclusions on forms and directions of further development of public diplomacy. Now, **public diplomacy** is relatively a new idiom, but by no means a new phenomenon. Activities we today brand as public diplomacy can be traced actually centuries back in history. The same applies to intercultural dialogue. Some of the early travels from centuries ago promoted intercultural dialogue without even knowing their activities would eventually be branded as such. Such visionaries were not sent to promote **inter-cultural dialogue**, but first and foremost to promote interests of the countries that sent them to their journeys. So, what made them different from other travellers that were preoccupied mainly or exclusively with their primary task – promoting political agendas of their courts, churches or governments?

They differed because they respected the countries, cultures and traditions of the new worlds they were sent to serve in. They served as bridges between their own cultures and the cultures they were sent to. They realised that as much as their own culture could contribute to the new worlds, the cultures of these worlds and civilisations could contribute to their own cultures.

One such early traveller was Croatian missionary and scientist **Filip Vezdin**, who was sent to the Indian Malabar coast to spread Christianity and who in return – besides performing his primary task – introduced Indian culture to Europe. His major contribution to the Christians of the Malabar Coast was his unique translation of the Bible to the Malayalam, but at the same time he compiled the first grammar of Sanskrit that was published in Europe.

In this manner, Vezdin laid foundation on which Linguistics developed as a separate academic discipline. It was his work that finally established a direct link between Sanskrit and most of the contemporary European languages. This example shows how important it is not only to promote our own cultures, but also to respect and learn from other cultures, and that **inter-cultural dialogue** is the vehicle and the means for mutual development of cultural patterns.

So, if classical diplomacy is defined as the art and practice of communicating and negotiating between two or more states, then public diplomacy, as a form of intercultural dialogue, is a way of communicating aimed at informing both foreign and domestic public, in order to foster the cooperation and appreciation of each other.

Therefore I warmly welcome forums and gatherings such as the one we are hosting today here in Dubrovnik. The fact that our forum is dealing with intercultural dialogue is recognition of necessity to achieve better understanding of cultural

identities. It obviously goes for the Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, but should be seen in the wider context as well, particularly in the Mediterranean area and this time also in the most dynamic area of the South-East Asia, namely Indonesia and Malaysia.

The participation of esteemed diplomats and other experts who will in the next few days discuss the issues related to **inter-cultural dialogue** will – I am sure – elevate our present knowledge of issues being discussed, paving the way to a better understanding and cooperation, all for benefit of the peoples we serve in our professional lives.

Thank you.

The 15th CEI Dubrovnik Diplomatic Forum

Joško Klisović*

Excellencies, Ladies and gentlemen,
Dear Ambassador Pfanzerter,
Dear professor Mifsud,
Dear professor Ayad,
Distinguished lecturers,
Dear participants,
Ladies and gentlemen,

It is my pleasure to greet you here today, in the historic city of Dubrovnik, on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Republic of Croatia and our Foreign Minister Mrs. Vesna Pusić.

I am, indeed, honoured to briefly address you at the Closing Session of the **15th Dubrovnik Diplomatic Forum**. The Forum, has, over the past 14 years, grown into an important annual regional event that has gathered distinguished experts and diplomats from all around the world, providing them with an opportunity to discuss a wide scope of issues pertaining to diplomacy and diplomatic training – as well as other important, contemporary topics that belong to the sphere of foreign policy and international relations in general.

I am particularly pleased that the significance of this event, **traditionally** organized by the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Republic of Croatia in cooperation with Central European Initiative and the University of Zagreb, was also **recognized** by other prominent academic institutions, that have, for the second time now, decided to join Dubrovnik Diplomatic Forum as partners – Euro-Mediterranean University (EMUNI) and London Academy of Diplomacy of the University of East Anglia.

I am especially pleased that in 2012, for the **first** time, Dubrovnik Diplomatic Forum can extend a most warm welcome to **another** new partner – the United Nations' Alliance of Civilizations, whose participation coincides with an, indeed, special occasion – marking of Croatia's 20th anniversary of its membership in the United Nations.

* Deputy Minister, Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, Zagreb, Croatia

Distinguished guests, dear participants,

This year's topic of the Forum – '**Diplomacy and Intercultural Dialogue**' – is, in my opinion, a topic that in today's globalized world, deserves much attention of not only academics, but also state officials and diplomats alike.

Diplomacy and culture are two concepts that can be, to some extent, perceived as intertwined, as they share certain common characteristics. One of the most prominent features of both diplomacy and culture is the ability to **address** and **communicate** with broad public. It is also important to note that their specific means of **communication that transcend** national borders, greatly contribute to the promotion of better understanding among different peoples and nations through an interactive **dialogue**.

However, intercultural communication alone – has **never** been enough in itself. **Only** intercultural communication that gradually evolves into an intercultural **dialogue**, based on mutual respect, has a power to produce closer and stronger ties among peoples from most culturally diverse parts of the globe. Universal nature of culture, understandable to all, plays an ever growing role in promoting countries and their non-material national values. That is the reason why **cultural diplomacy** is becoming an increasingly important part of **public diplomacy**, which, unlike traditional diplomacy (which still primarily relies on communication among governments), **cultural diplomacy** addresses the broadest public possible – foreign as well as domestic.

Today, cultural diplomacy is **recognised** as an effective soft power tool for diplomatic practice, which does, indeed, require adequate, additional professional training. This year too, Dubrovnik Forum echoed views and experiences related to diplomatic education from different parts of the world – from the Mediterranean countries and member-countries of the European Union, to Croatian neighbouring countries and other countries of the Central, East and South East Europe.

(Moreover, the very participation of the Director General of the Malaysian Institute for Foreign Relations and Diplomacy, Ambassador Ku Jaafar as well that of the dear Indonesian colleagues has provided a wider frame for understanding the global intercultural dialogue.)

The topic of '**Diplomacy and Intercultural Dialogue**' was thus approached through various international contexts – from Euro-Mediterranean cooperation and the role of small states in general, to different global and EU standards in the domain of education. Special attention was also paid to the issue of transition processes in changing of mindsets.

I hope that our Forum, with its rich and comprehensive agenda, as well as the training exercise for junior diplomats, served as a valuable contribution to the overall further development of good practices in this increasingly changing and relevant domain.

(I was told that this year's workshop for junior diplomats, chaired by the experts from London and Zagreb Diplomatic academies and EMUNI, has provided an additional asset.)

Hoping that this year's Dubrovnik Diplomatic Forum **has**, once again, succeeded in broadening and enriching the existing professional expertise **of all** the participants, I would like to use this opportunity to thank you **all** for coming to Dubrovnik, from which, I hope, you **will**, apart from new professional experiences, also take good memories.

Finally, allow me also to thank the Centre for Advanced Academic Studies (CAAS) of Dubrovnik for their most valuable help and traditional, excellent hospitality, for which Dubrovnik, that we so fondly often refer to as the 'Pearl of the Mediterranean', has always been known and praised for.

The 16th CEI Dubrovnik Diplomatic Forum

Mladen Andrić*

Excellences,
Ladies and gentlemen,
Distinguished participants,
Dear colleagues,

It is my honour to greet all of you on behalf of the Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of the Republic of Croatia, Dr Vesna Pusić, and give you a warm welcome at **16th Dubrovnik Diplomatic Forum**.

It is my special honour to greet the high representatives of our partner institutions and co-organizers - Professor Nabil Ayad, Director of the London Academy of Diplomacy and Ms Vlasta Brunsko, Head of the Centre for Advanced Academic Studies (CAAS) in Dubrovnik of the University of Zagreb. Let me also express my sincere thanks to the most important partner of the Forum – the Central European Initiative (CEI). The CEI Alternate Secretary General HE Ms Margit Waestfelt is joining us tomorrow. I would also like to thank other supporting institutions, namely the UN Alliance of Civilizations and the Euro-Mediterranean University (EMUNI), as well as the Dubrovnik-Neretva County and the City of Dubrovnik. Some of you have taken part in the Forum many times, but let me put in the picture those who are here for the first time. The Dubrovnik Diplomatic Forum has always been organized by the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Republic of Croatia in cooperation with the CEI.

The **Diplomatic Academy** was founded in Zagreb (1994), as a part of Croatian MFA with the aim of training and educating Croatian diplomats and other state officials responsible for international relations and cooperation. The activities are intended to improve knowledge, skills and techniques in the fields of diplomacy, foreign policy and international relations. They include a variety of courses, conferences, seminars, round-tables and workshops. Other forms of basic and specialized diplomatic training encompass foreign language courses, pre-posting programs, with tailor-made programmes for ambassadors, career diplomats, consular officers and administrative personnel, as well as publishing activities and coop-

* Ambassador, PhD, Director, Diplomatic Academy, Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, Zagreb, Croatia

eration with corresponding institutions and individuals in Croatia and abroad. For additional information please contact www.mvep.hr.

The **Dubrovnik Diplomatic Forum (DDF)** started in 1998 as a pioneer project of the Croatian Diplomatic Academy within the CEI framework, becoming also one of the CEI feature events. It has grown into an international event, each year tackling a different topic relevant to diplomacy and diplomatic training.

The general aim of the Forum is to promote better understanding among the CEI member states and contribute to their development by in-depth exchange of views related to different aspects of diplomacy and diplomatic training. According to its tradition, the Forum puts together the directors of diplomatic academies and institutes, as well as other diplomats and experts in the fields of international relations, foreign policy and diplomacy from CEI member states, countries of the Southern Mediterranean, the Gulf and ASEAN, as well as other interested countries. The framework of the conference includes the presentation of the panel of moderators followed by the presentation of the key topics at the plenary session, with introductory speakers presenting their papers. After each presentation adequate time is allowed for a moderated discussion. Junior diplomats are assigned tasks at the Forum, from drafting the summaries of the sessions to participating at the specialized workshops.

Ladies and gentlemen,

The topic of our Forum this year is *Innovations and Changing Roles of Diplomacy and Diplomatic Training*, as previously discussed, agreed and announced at the closing session of the previous 15th DDF held in 2012. The interest for the topic, namely the impact of innovations and changing roles of diplomacy, its concepts, contents and techniques and consequently of diplomatic training, recurrently appeared as relevant in a number of presentations and discussions last year, has also become the objective of 2013 Forum that we are just opening today.

It is our sincere hope that this year's Forum will once again prove itself to be an effective format for discussing and analyzing different issues of diplomacy and diplomatic training. As previously mentioned the 2013 DDF is focused on influences and consequences of innovations and experimenting on diplomatic practice and training. In this context, it will obviously tackle evolutionary impacts of the information technologies and communication techniques and the potential of the new media. It would also complement traditional foreign policy tools with newly innovated and adopted instruments, networks and concepts, particularly with different aspects of public diplomacy such as citizens, academic and parliamentary diplomacy.

A variety of issues has been announced in the programme. We will discuss a series of new forms and fields of contemporary diplomacy and diplomatic training, such as: impact of global trends and globalization; links and interlinkages of innovations, diplomacy and diplomatic training; emerging patterns and changing

diplomatic communication fifty years after introducing the Vienna Conventions on diplomatic and consular relations; different approaches towards innovating education standards and standardizing diplomatic training, as well as improving links between academic education and diplomatic training; national experiences and cases in diplomatic training.

Special session on ‘E-tools in Diplomacy’ will be introduced by Dr Stefano Baldi, Director of Diplomatic Institute, MFA of Italy from Rome via video link.

The topic itself will hopefully provide significant and valuable strategic and immediate benefits for all the actors. Or, to be more precise, such a theme will allow us to discuss both conceptual and practical aspects of conducting diplomacy and diplomatic training in the CEI and EU area, not only the Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, but also its immediate and wider neighbourhood of the Southern Mediterranean, the Gulf and even ASEAN as regions of utmost importance today. Moreover, as a part of the programme as usual, there are also two specially designed workshops for junior diplomats. This time under the title of ‘Innovations and New Role for Diplomats’ they will bring together junior diplomats from approximately twenty countries and experienced diplomats, this time from London and Zagreb Diplomatic Academy, as well as from the Faculty of Economy of the University of Zagreb.

Distinguished colleagues,

Let me also mention that the programme and agenda have been discussed thoroughly in a series of contacts and exchange of views with a number of experts worldwide, particularly with diplomatic academies and other related diplomatic training circles. It encompassed related institutions at the MFAs of the CEI member states, as well as in a wider EU and Mediterranean area. Due to the specific expertise needed, cooperation continued with the ASEAN area as the fastest growing world region of a paramount importance in today’s globalised world, with continuous participation of the Institute of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations, MFA, Kuala Lumpur.

It is my real pleasure to announce that we have gathered here more than fifty participants from more than twenty countries and international organisations. You have arrived from sixteen CEI member states, namely from Albania, Austria, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Ukraine, as well as from Azerbaijan, Canada, Israel, Jordan, Malaysia, Palestine and UK. Your precious skills, dedication and expertise are obviously seen as additional guarantees of the factual and well directed exchange of views and knowledge, which paves the way to better understanding and cooperation, all for benefit of the people we serve in our professional lives.

Having said this, I declare the **16th Dubrovnik Diplomatic Forum**, open.

Thank you.

KEYNOTE ADDRESSES

The UN Alliance of Civilizations: A Soft Power Tool to Address the Challenges of Cultural Diversity in the 21st Century

Jorge Sampaio*

**

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, dear participants in the Summer School, Much to my regret, due to last minute agenda constraints, I am not able to join you on time in Dubrovnik as I would like to. However, I am more than happy that the organisers have accepted that I share with you some thoughts on *Alliance of Civilizations* through this video message. Therefore, let me start by thanking Ambassador Mladen Andrić, director of the Diplomatic Academy for his proposal to United Nations' *Alliance of Civilizations* to be part of this initiative, and, indeed, for inviting me to address this seminar on diplomacy and intercultural dialogue. The *Alliance of Civilizations* matters to you because it focuses on cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue and cooperation, and this is all about, after all, diplomacy.

Excellencies, as diplomats, you know much better than me that we live at a time of big changes and a paradigm shift in international life. We live in one world where forces of globalization are making *out-states societies* and people are more interconnected and more interdependent than ever. As a result of interdependence, some issues, for example, threats but also challenges and opportunities, that were formerly considered domestic, are now redefined as international, and their resolution requires not only national, but also multilateral and global action. This also means that many of the most intractable problems are nowadays transnational in scope, and that they easily become global, at least at the public cause of contention.

Moreover, it is past time when boundaries of diplomacy were fairly well defined and its actors clearly identified. Today the picture is increasingly blurred. No neat boundaries between foreign policy and other policies, no clear frontiers between bilateral, multilateral and regional fields of diplomatic endeavour, no well allocated roles for the values new emerging actors in international relations.

Therefore, diplomatic practice today faces a triple challenge: it has to deal with transformations in the relations between states; it needs to take into account the

* Ambassador, President, UN High Representative for the Alliance of Civilizations

** Keynote Address at the 2012 CEI Dubrovnik Diplomatic Forum

changing fabric of transnational relations and the complex network of non-state actors; it has to deal with new issues and shape a new agenda.

So, in my view, a new wave of making diplomacy is rising. It challenges traditional diplomatic culture; it has probably removed some of the certainties of foreign policy's practice, but it has already opened up many new opportunities.

Therefore, no doubt that we are living at a time when the traditional paradigm of diplomacy (as well as that of foreign policy), is shifting.

Cultural diplomacy, as we could call the field of action of the *Alliance of Civilizations*, is part of this new emerging paradigm. It expresses the major role that culture, as a broad concept, explained in inter-state relations and in relations between people. Indeed, long before the term *cultural diplomacy* was employed, countries have developed instinctive and diversified cultural exchanges and relations. But nowadays, cultural diplomacy has a much wider scope and it includes new priorities, charters, for instance, the promotion of human rights, tolerance and understanding, good governance, the role of religious movements in world affairs and the role of the media in civil society, and the fight against extremism; security and peace.

Secondly, as it deals with soft power, cultural diplomacy is clearly a key dimension of this new paradigm for international relations, diplomacy and the new model of governance.

Excellencies, in this new *One World*, it seems to be that governments will gain an increase *glocal* dimension, and that the relevance of soft-power-tools will be decisive because of the nature of the challenges that have to be addressed.

In this regard, let me focus on cultural and religious diversity issues that have acquired an ever-growing prominence in the political agendas at all levels for a rather good number of reasons. Let me mention just two.

On one hand, the increasing diversity of our societies, the ethnic, linguistic, religious or cultural, is generating growing anxiety among populations, driving communities apart and putting democracies under mounting pressure. On the other hand, if we look at the world in 2009, we realise that out of a total of 143 conflicts, a 108 had a cultural dimension.

However, please note, by stressing dimension of some conflicts, I am in no way of making the case for the, so called, *culturalization* of political conflicts. Indeed, political problems have to be solved by political means. But it is also quite clear, that to be sustainable protracted problems, even when settled by a binding political agreement between political actors and governments, focused on the issues of contention, in fact it must always be embedded in a much broader process, involving people at all levels of society.

This is why, even in major political harsh conflicts, soft power has a powerful, although often neglected role to play because, after all, reconciliation, as a part of peace-building, depends highly on cultural and identity issues, narratives and

stories built and exchange around conflicts, stories that influence their resolution or contribute to their perpetuation.

Your Excellencies let me now say a few words on the *Alliance of Civilizations*. What is the UN AoC all about? As some of you may know, the *Alliance of Civilizations* is a United Nations' initiative, launched in 2005 by the former Secretary General of the United Nations, Mr Kofi Annan, co-sponsored by the Prime Ministers of Spain and Turkey, with precise aim of improving understanding and cooperative relations among nations and peoples across cultures and religions, and, in the process, helping to count the forces that fuel polarisation and extremism. But what's new about the *Alliance*? The novelty of the UN *Alliance of Civilizations* is based on, what I usually like to call, its three 'A's: aims, agenda, approach.

Regarding its **aims**, let's think of them as a *double-helix*. On one hand, the United Nations' *Alliance of Civilizations*, the UN AoC, is focused on promoting democratic governments' on course of diversity at large, as the fourth pylon of sustainable development, which complements its economic, social and environmental dimensions, and as a human dimension of security and peace. On the other hand, the UN AoC must was created to address, in particular, the sins of the widening gap and lack of mutual understanding between the Muslims and so called Western societies, heightened by a number of events of recent years.

Therefore, the UN AoC is aimed at building bridges within and among societies by countering the stereotypes and misconceptions that deepen patterns of hostility and destruct and by promoting intercultural dialogue, understanding and cooperation. In doing so, its ultimate goal is also to count the rise of extremism and contribute to on-going efforts to combat racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, including discrimination against persons based on their religion or belief.

With regards to its **agenda** now, the *Alliance's* main fields of action are: education, youth, media and migration. The UN AoC develops and also supports initiatives in these areas and invites its members to develop national plans and regional strategies for intercultural dialogue and cooperation covering these four issues. By experience these four approaches, namely breaking down walls, building bridges and sharing spaces, national plans and regional strategies for intercultural dialogue and cooperation should cover the four areas of action of the *Alliance* and develop concrete programs and projects involving a wide range of state-holders. Regional strategies are intended to generate the process of giant ownership among members, partners and state-holders of the *Alliance* regarding its goals, and to create a **culture of peace** by shaping and enhance framework for policy development, providing new opportunities and impetus to projects on the ground leading innovative initiatives within and across the regions, promoting people to people contacts and intercultural dialogue among countries and peoples also. So far, two regional strategies have already been approved: one for South-Eastern

Europe, adopted in Sarajevo in 2009, the other for the Mediterranean region, indorsed in Malta in November 2010. Now, by the way, we are now preparing the *Second Action Plan*, implementing the *Regional Strategy for South-East Europe*. As United Nations' results oriented-initiative with the global scope, the *Alliance* cannot deliver if it does not develop at local level. What do I mean by that? By that I mean both national and regional levels as a platform for cooperation. This is why the UN AoC develops two formed **approaches**, my third 'A', in fact, combining *bottoms-up* and *top-down* dynamics. Its strengths rely on a virtuous combination, creating two-way process, bringing together government and civil society, global players and local actors.

Excellencies, dear diplomats, in my view, the United Nations *Alliance of Civilizations* is a good example of soft-power initiatives, that are greatly needed in times such as ours, that are marked by great uncertainty because of mounting tensions and conflicts that no hard-power tools are able to mitigate.

This is why I want to conclude. My strong calling upon you all, diplomats here present, to become advocates of the *Alliance*, many, many thanks and good work.

***video message transcribed by Tihana Boháč, the Editor**

European Neighbourhood Policy: the EP View

Gianni Pittella*

**

Europe: Neighbourhood in Change

1. In full awareness of today's meeting we have to remember that on the basic topic of 'Arab spring' and the battle for freedom it constantly produces some important communication on the part of the EU, US and G8 has already been sent. From the new speech of President Obama to the Arab world, announcing the new strategy for European Union Neighbourhood, to first concrete decisions brought by G8 in Deauville, there is an awareness of the new phase, providing an enter for the entire Mediterranean region as well as new responsibility towards its nations, new generation in particular. These are extremely positive developments which we do not want to undervalue.

The launching of such historical and cultural prospects need to account for the new actions taken by the Arab world population, particularly by the young who make the majority, and who demanded the end of the long-time authoritarian regimes on the basis of powerful yet simple and essential quest for freedom and democracy.

It is important to affirm here that we share a common destiny with the countries from the Mediterranean region, as well as with those from the Balkans and our Eastern neighbours. When we talk about North Africa, Tunis, Egypt, Libya, we need to see the prospects for further integration and cooperation in this area in a completely different light, in the same way in which the fall of the Berlin wall has been seen by the Central Europe.

2. These last few weeks have brought lots of new paradigms, political and economic shifts that need to be confronted by serious and renewed European neighbourhood policy. It is enough to see the delays in the effort to create an ambitious project with the countries of the Southern Mediterranean (the Barcelona process, started in 1995, with the failed objective to create the free commercial zone in 2001) as well as the incapacity of the international community to find the solution for regional conflicts, in the first place those between Israelites and Palestinians. All of this is a reflection of the European policy which today we can define as reticent and full of ambiguities towards the profound needs coming from these societies.

* Hon., (Ambassador), Deputy President and First Vice President, European Parliament

** Keynote Address at the 2011 CEI Dubrovnik Diplomatic Forum

In order to leave this situation and not repeat the past mistakes, we need to contribute and consolidate the processes at hand in many of these countries, above all in Tunis and Egypt, where all the conditions for democratic transition have been in place, to be followed by the free elections in the following months.

This is the summary of the statement issued in the last few days: from the US Representatives to the Katy Ashton European High Representative and the Commission Representative Stefan Fülle.

3. From the position of the EU, there is no doubt that new strategic position is sought out in order to introduce novelty to the Neighbourhood Policy after the past events. This time we need to solidify it more concretely on the policy of economic development of our partners and on the means to finance it towards positive ends.

We have worked long enough on the institutional architecture, we have spent a lifetime on the complex networks and diplomatic relations, which, on the way, made us loose contact with reality and in the end it contributed too many excuses for the governing class which have not been able to respect need for freedom and democratic participation of their population. In the European Parliament we have had many discussions on the topic and have made precise instructions towards solutions which have significantly contributed to definition of new strategy towards neighbourhood.

Because of this we need to share the message with which the EU has launched its new strategy towards neighbourhood on 25th of May: more for more, which means stabilization of relationships with our partners based on 'reciprocal responsibility'. Financial cooperation might improve if we start with these reforms. With these new propositions the European Neighbourhood Policy wish to arrive to more precise definition of democratic character objectives of the partner countries (not only free elections but also freedom of the media, independent justice system, etc.) which will give concrete form to conditions of belonging.

At the same time, we know that such relations must be found on consistent improvement in economic and social conditions of the partner countries and their citizens. In such a context of recent propositions there is **3M** at the center: Money – Market – Mobility. All of these three factors are most decisive for the success of the new strategy. It is yet to be seen how this offer should be translated into a political, economic and financial project.

Market: Euromed Zone of free commercial exchange from 2010 has been a sad failure for European cashiers and for Southern Mediterranean governments to structurally change their societies on the political and economic level. Is it possible to fix this? What should the European policy towards weak sectors such as agriculture be? Is it possible to consolidate, in South and the East, regional initiatives coherent for the key sectors such as energy and transportation?

Money: The talk is still about the long gone days of the Marshall Plan. The volume of intervention comparable to this plan should be milliards of Euro. The sum of money announced to support ‘Arab spring’ (2 milliards of US dollars, a little bit less on the part of the EU, and help from G8 which may amount to 20 milliards) makes the first response to the situation defined by serious economic and financial crisis which have hit the developed countries in 2008. We have to see it only as a first step. We need to think about long- term investments (hope is given to new financial prospects discussed within the EU) comparable to those applied to Central and Eastern Europe Countries after the ‘89.

Mobility: problem with mobility needs to be affronted in a positive way becoming a *win-win* project. It is wrong to associate migrations with security. Europe has a need for immigrants (and not only for those less qualified). Mediterranean countries as well as our Eastern neighbours have to live up to dramatic need for occupation also for sustaining of the level of their country income (In Morocco 10 % of the population depends on the immigrants’ contribution).

We need to promote the idea of circular mobility which will value professional formation, entrepreneurial capacity, and intercultural dialogue. The cooperation to formulate middle and high levels of university is decisive here. We need to pursue along this road which requires prolonged work conditions, along with creative initiatives from many actors, non-government as well. It is an objective which puts valorization of human resources in partner countries at its heart as well as modernization of their administrative and entrepreneurial structures. We need to affront immigration problems with bilateral and multilateral agreements without exclusively being concentrated on regulation of flows and illicit migrations, consider the development of active labour policy and free circulation of human beings respecting their human rights.

4. In order to pursue Europe need to give the proof of its goodwill to offer a true political partnership to its new partners. We need to overcome traditional divisions within economy as well as security and re-launch prospects for the development of neighbourhood countries, favouring their more intense integration with the EU, based on regional and sub-regional cooperation. This should become an objective of the European Neighbourhood Policy towards both South and the East.

Today we can interrogate the future of the EU for the Mediterranean (Union for the Mediterranean). This proposal has had initial value to confront a situation which was calling for serious consideration. Many lines of actions have been individualized for their strong regional impact (energy, environment, transportation, education) whose realization needs to be based on development of multilateral dimensions and true partnership of the equal.

Unfortunately, not one of these propositions, political or operative has seen minimal success in realization. The failure lies within open regional conflicts, but also with poor credibility of the partners, from both Mediterranean coasts. We

need to re-assess the Union for the Mediterranean. If we want this institution to work, we need to find the means which will enable it.

It is not without aim that the Communication of the European Commission is distributed on 25th of May to all the institutions of the EU, with the scope to construct the *Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity in the Southern Mediterranean*, insisting on:

- Programs of institution-building similar to those realized in the past with Eastern partners of the EU,
- Dialogue on migration, mobility and security with Tunis, Morocco and Egypt,
- Reinforcement of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation in the industrial field,
- Pilot programs and support to agriculture and rural development,
- Concentration on efforts of the EU for the Mediterranean on concrete projects which will bring clear benefits for the population of the Mediterranean region,
- Development of sub-regional cooperation, and
- Reinforcement of the social policy and occupational policy dialogues.

5. The specific reflection needs to be made on our closer neighbourhood. It has not been enough to state in the past years that the future of the Balkans is the future of the European Union. We are still in front of the process full of contradictions and tensions btw the countries of the region and their internal processes. The fact that new conflicts will not reopen is the primary result of the EU, and yet we cannot keep silent about the complex realities.

The capture of Ratko Mladić, the possibility of victim justification in one of the greatest tragedies of the past century is a step forward which can change relations btw the countries of the region. The European Union is doing well in putting an accent on regional cooperation, based on trust and reciprocal understanding. There is no space left for these tensions to be resolved as a part of their relations with the EU. It is not possible to think that freedom of choice (mobility) can become the surrogate for the progress in social and economic re-organization in a democratic context of the Balkan region.

6. With the entrance in power of the Lisbon Agenda the EU has the opportunity to work towards the enforcement of the political dimension of the neighbourhood, without being limited to simply update the Association Agreements that already exist with the countries in mention.

According to High Representative of the PESC / Vice president of the Commission and European Service for the activities abroad, the EU is implementing new responsibilities with the aim to define new strategies in a more efficient and coherent way. It is not yet that the results have come to realization but the hope of new signposts and political will can make a serious progress in this area.

7. In conclusion I want to say clearly that nothing is more wrong and dangerous than feeling condemned to failure of our role to change which is still in progress. Europe needs to look at new realities face to face and with renewed hope, it needs to demonstrate its capacity to 'live up to its responsibilities in a globalized world'. The ambition is needed to re-launch the Neighbourhood Policy based on shared values, in the first place on the values of democracy and respect of human rights. It is necessary to think of creation of a large space, of reciprocal benefits, to overcome the fears of globalization. This policy cannot concentrate only on economic and commercial aspects, leaving behind of those political. All of these aspects are interconnected and need initiatives expressed by institutional (EU, governments, parliaments of the partner countries), economic and social (entrepreneurs, unions, universities, NGOs and civil associations) actors.

The credibility of the European policy depends on strong and visible support for civil society in our neighbourhoods in order for them to consolidate new democratic systems and promote human and peace rights.

Parliamentary Diplomacy and Cultural Constraints

Michael Frendo*

**

Excellencies, Dear Friends,

A Historical Context

1. First of all I would like to express my great pleasure at being back at the same University of Zagreb's Inter-University Institute in Dubrovnik where I studied some thirty-five years ago under the direction of the late Professor Eugen Pusić.

2. I have to admit that when I was Foreign Minister of Malta Parliamentary Diplomacy looked very different to how it looks to me today that I am Speaker of the Maltese Parliament. At the time, as Foreign Minister, parliamentary diplomacy at least initially looked like an intrusion into the exclusive area of diplomacy reserved to the State and to the national diplomatic corps led by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. This, of course, was a simplistic view and a wrong one for I later realised that what could be summarily perceived as a competitor could also be turned into a powerful ally. Still, this tension between the executive and parliament with regard to diplomacy remains a leit motif of any discussion relating to parliamentary diplomacy and has been, and continues to be, a source of much debate. Does not diplomacy belong to the executive and therefore there should be no autonomous parallel diplomacy run by another institution of the State?

3. In this regard it is important to note that parliamentary diplomacy is not new to history. An early example could be the case when the Roman Senate, at the request of the Roman Generals, played a role in “suing for peace and then sanctioning war with Philip V of Macedon after the failure of the Treaty of Phoenice (205BC)”¹.

Even after the French Revolution, at the first Assembly emerging following that momentous event, a proposal was tabled in 1790 for the setting up of a parliamentary committee “chargé de prendre connaissance des traites et des relations extérieures de

* Dr. LLD LLM (Exon) MP, Speaker, House of Representatives, Parliament of Malta, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Malta

** Keynote Address at the 2012 CEI Dubrovnik Diplomatic Forum

¹ Daniel Fiott, “On the Value of Parliamentary Diplomacy”, Madariaga Paper, April 2011, p.1

la France pour en rendre compte à l'Assemblée"². Although set up this committee of six members actually never met in view of two major objections: (a) the risk of impinging on the powers of the executive and (b) the risk of making public, through the Assembly, "secrets dont ne profiteraient que nos ennemis"³.

4. Closer to our times, and closer to this region of south east Europe, one can recall the Cetinje Parliamentary Forum when, as the current Speaker of the Parliament of Montenegro Ranko Krivokapic puts it, "during the difficult process when reconciliation in the Balkans was still looking like a glimpse on the horizon, parliamentarians from former Yugoslav republics had chosen to accept our invitation to come to Cetinje and make a first step towards that horizon. Cetinje Parliamentary Forum, as an autochthonous regional initiative of the parliamentary cooperation of South east European countries has been alive and active ever since. It represents an important form of encouragement and promotion of parliamentary dialogue between the countries of the region and the wider area."⁴

5. Yet another example relates to the period after the Portuguese Carnation Revolution when it was unclear, in the midst of superpower rivalry at the time, whether Portugal would fall to the Communist Party or the more moderate Socialist Party, whether it would choose communism or social democracy. European socialist parties, including the German SPD, the Swedish SAP and the British Labour Party joined forces to assist the PSP in the transition from dictatorship to democracy and it is recorded that this party political diplomacy was instrumental in the successful achievement of this transition.⁵

6. Additionally we must not underestimate the function of parliamentary diplomacy in challenging special political and legal situations. This would be the case, for example, with parliamentarians dealing with colleagues from other countries where the traditional diplomatic channels would be debarred or would find it difficult to make and retain such contact. In this regard, as an example, it is interesting to see the comment reported in the Taipei Times of the Taiwan Legislative Yuan Speaker Wang Jin-ping some years back where he said that parliamentary diplomacy can help Taiwan pave an alternative path in carving out its role in the international arena and that therefore this type of diplomacy deserves more credit, attention and resources. He described **parliamentary diplomacy** as having the potential of assisting Taiwan to develop its 'smart power', stating that "Taiwan can take

² Assemblée Nationale Report on 'Les Activités Internationales de l'Assemblée Nationale', prepared by the Interparliamentary Cooperation Division of the Service des Affaires Internationales et de Défense, December 2007.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ranko Krivokapic, Parliamentary Diplomacy as a Powerful Tool for Change, in: Newsletter 17/2011 In focus, Regional Cooperation Council (www.rcc.int)

⁵ Daniel Fiott, op.cit. supra at page 25

advantage of parliamentary diplomacy to develop relations with other countries, especially those that do not have diplomatic ties with Taiwan”⁶.

A Paradox Defined

7. These examples serve to illustrate from the outset that parliamentary diplomacy is a reality and not some academic debate about possible new developments in the field of diplomacy. Even so, it remains functioning with a paradox: while diplomacy remains essentially a function of the executive yet it is a field from which parliament is not totally excluded. A paradox is because while a diplomat is at the service of the government of the day, a parliamentarian is free to express him or herself, without being bound by executive obligations. Where does this place parliamentary diplomacy in relation to traditional diplomacy?

8. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Report entitled *Promoting Parliamentary Diplomacy*⁷ describes parliamentary diplomacy “as a complementary tool to traditional diplomacy. Participation of parliamentarians in external affairs is today a crucial aspect of international cooperation and of the development of democracy, both in Europe and worldwide.” Furthermore it states that “Parliamentary diplomacy and its methods often achieve results that are hard to achieve through other conventional channels. Constant contacts with parliaments abroad help to share experiences between members of parliament and foster understanding between political elites in the countries concerned. They also help to establish and build up trusting relationships between individuals.”

9. As well put in the French Assembly’s report on parliamentary diplomacy, Parliament can often constitute a precious ally for the diplomacy of the State. “Celle-ci ne peut pas toujours s’exposer et est heureuse de disposer à ses cotes d’un organe politique lui permettant selon les cas de maintenir des contacts avec certains pays, de rencontrer des opposants aux regimes en place, d’explorer des voies nouvelles pour les relations bilaterales, voire de porter des messages.”⁸

An Increasing role for Presidents

10. In this context there is an increasing role for the President of Parliament as a figure of diplomacy. This is an extension of the role of Parliaments, the Head of the Parliamentary Institution being a conduit of the diplomacy of parliaments and parliamentarians. This role is also complemented by the President of the Foreign Affairs Commission who also has regular contact with the diplomatic corps in the

⁶ Taipei News (*online*) Wednesday, June 23, 2010, page 3 (www.taipeitimes.com)

⁷ Doc. 12428 Parliamentary Assemble of the Council of Europe (PACE) 26 October 2010, Political Affairs Committee, Rapporteur: Mr Joao Bosco Mota Amaral, Portugal, Group of the European People’s Party

⁸ Assemblée Nationale Report, op.cit supra at footnote 2.

country and with major personalities visiting the country. Indeed the meeting with the Speaker or President of Parliament has become a regular part of the protocol programme of foreign personalities who visit a country and this is a trend on the increase.

11. This role of Speakers is further enhanced through bilateral and multilateral visits abroad. These cater for the development of bilateral relations between the Parliaments of countries placing relations between countries on a multi-level relationship, where the Government-to-Government relationship is complemented with a Parliament-to-Parliament relationship. It also often illustrates that the parliamentary diplomacy can be an important facet of a country's public diplomacy, enhancing image, opening new channels and deepening the bilateral relationship. On a multilateral level one can mention the meeting of Presidents of Parliaments of EU member states, of the Council of Europe countries, of the Small States of Europe, of the 5+5 formation (Western Mediterranean Dialogue), just to mention a number of multilateral groupings that hold a meeting of the Speakers of the Parliaments of their constituent member countries in the European and Mediterranean region.

12. In this regard, allow me to mention one example of parliamentary diplomacy which I witnessed in person at the Plenary Session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean (PAM), a grouping of parliamentarians from the legislatures of all the littoral countries of the Mediterranean Sea, including from Israel and Palestine. This is one place where, notwithstanding the situation on the ground in Israel and the Palestinian territories, the delegations from the parliamentary assemblies of these two peoples engage in debate within the context of this relatively recently set up multilateral parliamentary institution.

In the Morocco Plenary Session of PAM⁹ in December of 2010, for example, one could witness engagement in debate between the Speaker of the Israeli Knesset and the Deputy Speaker of the Palestinian Parliament in the Chamber of the Moroccan Parliament. Perhaps equally important was the witnessing, on the margins of the meeting and in the other events associated with the meeting, of friendly and engaging discussions between the members of both delegations attending the PAM Plenary Session. Clearly an example of how parliamentarians can engage in 'soft diplomacy' while the traditional diplomatic channels stand fully or almost fully clogged.

13. In all this the figure of the Speaker as the head of the Parliamentary Institution (or of one of the Chambers constituting it) remains pivotal to parliamentary diplomacy. Speakers can ignore the phenomenon or they can embrace it. If they embrace it, they will permeate the institution with a spirit of parliamentary

⁹ 5th PAM Plenary Session (Morocco, 2010)

diplomatic service, encouraging parliamentarians to address their international exposure as a means of service to the country through the practice of parliamentary diplomacy.

Perhaps no one has put it better than former French Prime Minister Jacques Chaban-Delmas and who also served as President of the Assembly for several years: “La fonction est assez representative pour que celui qui l’exerce puisse parler au nom de la France. Elle garde suffisamment de distance vis-a-vis de l’exécutif pour que ses propose n’engagent pas le gouvernement plus loin qu’il ne coudrat aller.”¹⁰.

The Facets of Parliamentary Diplomacy

14. The current practice of parliamentary diplomacy has many facets and it is important that we highlight them for the purpose of understanding it better and understanding the cultural constraints which it has to address.

15. An interesting concise listing of the facets of parliamentary diplomacy is provided in the Report of the Inter-Parliamentary Union to the Second World Conference of Speakers of Parliaments in New York in 2005 entitled *Parliamentary Involvement in International Affairs*¹¹. It is worth reproducing this listing in brief:

- Bilateral Friendship Groups,
- Bilateral Cooperation Agreements between Parliaments,
- Institutionalised and regular encounters between Parliamentarians,
- Receiving and Sending Parliamentary Delegations, for example headed by the Speaker,
- Hosting meetings of Inter-Parliamentary organisations,
- Sub-regional conferences with parliamentary committees from neighbouring countries,
- Conflict resolution through bilateral meetings and meetings of inter-parliamentary organisations,
- Organisation of international colloquia and other confidence-building measures to promote common understanding in conflict situations,
- Work carried out by individual parliamentarians such as envoys to peace processes,
- Work carried out by parliamentarians as election observers,
- Parliamentarians protect parliamentarians project where parliamentarians from one country intervene on behalf of parliamentary colleagues in other countries on human rights or parliamentary rights issues,
- Meetings between accredited ambassadors and parliamentarians,

¹⁰ Ibid, page 14.

¹¹ “Parliamentary Involvement in International Affairs”, A report of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) to the Second World Conference of Speakers of Parliament, New York, 7-9 September 2005.

- Exchange of *know-how* between Parliaments and MOUs relating to this aspect, and
- Parliamentarians joining government delegations in conflict settlement ad hoc committees.

16. One should add that this list provides examples of a number of facets of parliamentary diplomacy which include parliamentary bilateral diplomacy, parliamentary multilateral diplomacy, Friendship Groups, International Conferences, Permanent delegations of Parliament to international organisations including international parliamentary organisations, Visits of parliamentary delegations and promotion of democracy by Parliaments and Parliamentarians.

17. For countries which are members of the European Union, parliamentary diplomacy also takes on the vest of intra-European Union parliamentary diplomacy with national parliamentarians joining European Parliamentarians in joint committee meetings or with national parliaments engaging with the European Institutions in the light of the new powers for the national parliaments granted by the Treaty of Lisbon.

Parliamentarians of national parliaments can communicate with the Commission, can together act on the issue of subsidiarity in accordance with the procedures adopted in their parliaments. In this context there is also an increased togetherness of national parliaments of the European Union member states. As a result of the new powers of EU national parliaments as guardians of the principle of subsidiarity, there is a growing trend for Speakers of national parliaments to communicate also to each other the reasoned opinions on subsidiarity that they address, on behalf of their Chambers, to the Presidents of the European Institutions¹².

These are practical examples of parliamentary diplomacy which, within the context of the architecture of Europe, gains ground with the enhancement of the role of the European Parliament and of the National Parliaments of the member states. The European Parliament in particular provides many examples of parliamentary diplomacy in its extensive international activities monitoring the development of democracy worldwide and engaging on issues of development.

Value Added and Best Practice

18. Parliamentary Diplomacy provides added value to the diplomatic effort and, as we shall consider further below, provides traditional diplomacy with an opportunity of strengthening the process and the results. The Council of Europe report quoted above already throws light on this added value provided by the diplomatic work of parliamentarians. There are other aspects we should point out.

¹² The Presidents of the European Parliament, Commission and Council

19. Parliamentarians can operate further away from the public eye than members of the Executive. They can ‘break the ice’ more easily and can prepare and open the way forward. Moreover of their nature Members of Parliament are freer to express their own views: to take different stances, to suggest new ideas, to carry out formal and informal diplomacy. Parliamentarians therefore have greater flexibility in their mode of operation.¹³

The development of parliamentary networks based on personal friendships between Members of Parliament are not only easier to develop, they are also particularly important for situations of crises, tension and possible conflict. When traditional diplomacies are at loggerheads in the public realm, parliamentary channels across frontiers are especially important in keeping heads cool and in lowering the temperature of diplomatic discourse.

20. Parliamentary diplomacy forms part of the toolbox of pre-emptive dialogue so important to the development of meaningful and deep diplomatic relations bilaterally and multilaterally, addressing issues within a space devoid of prejudice and misunderstanding and occupied by a spirit of goodwill and understanding. In this regard constant and long-term parliamentary diplomacy is a way of keeping a constant dialogue between parliamentarians and peoples complementary to that provided by traditional diplomacy and the work of the executive. Parliamentary diplomacy “tends to take a more pragmatic long-term approach to dialogue by building trust and understanding”¹⁴.

21. However all this value added is best achievable, the best practice that can bring about the highest value added, lies when parliamentary diplomacy and traditional diplomacy of the Executive are well aligned, well connected and collaborate together. This is possible only on issues where there is common political vision in the country and quickly dissolves when an international matter becomes a local political issue. However, considering that many international issues are matters of national consensus, there is ample space for collaboration between parliamentary diplomacy and traditional diplomacy.

Quintessentially, parliamentary diplomacy forms an integral part of the whole diplomatic effort working in liaison with Government-to-Government diplomacy. In this regard, parliamentary diplomacy is very effective in bilateral issues where parliamentarians and diplomats are on the same page in their diplomatic message and where parliamentarians can be an important source of backdoor diplomacy at its best.

¹³ Frendo, Michael, Parliamentary Diplomacy – Paper for Discussion, unpublished, used as a paper for discussion on the subject of Parliamentary Diplomacy in the Meeting of Speakers of the Small States of Europe, Parliament of Malta, March 2011.

¹⁴ Fiott, Daniel, op.cit. Fiott coins the term ‘**Parlomacy**’ to describe parliamentary diplomacy.

22. The challenge of traditional diplomacy is to consider parliamentary diplomacy not as a necessary nuisance or, at worse, a competitive exercise but to believe in it as a resource and a means of strengthening the effectiveness of the national diplomatic effort as a whole. In order to achieve this in the best way, in my opinion, it is necessary for the Executive and Parliament to seek, as far as possible, a broad consensus on the Strategic Objectives of the Foreign Policy of the country. When I served as Foreign Minister of Malta one of the pillars of my diplomatic action was the adoption of a document which set out the Strategic Objectives of Foreign Policy giving clear direction to diplomats within the ranks of government. However, prior to their formal adoption, these Objectives were submitted for debate by Parliament's Foreign and European Affairs Committee and this debate allowed parliamentarians also to 'own' this exercise and the ensuing document.

23. Best practice for the effectiveness of parliamentary diplomacy therefore, in my opinion, requires the setting out of Strategic Objectives of Foreign Policy which would not only be a document for government but would also be a document which is endorsed or at least (even passively) accepted by Parliament or its Foreign Affairs Commission. This document can serve as a framework for both aspects of diplomacy: traditional and parliamentary. Naturally while accepting, at all times, that parliamentarians, even those forming part of the governing party or parties, cannot be expected to be "indistinguishable from their own governments"¹⁵. One author asserts that "Indeed, the strength of parplomacy is its independence from governments and other establishments"¹⁶. It would be absolutely wrong, therefore, to expect that building a consensus around the Strategic Objectives of Foreign Policy would produce at all times and without fail a monotonous repetition of the government's views by parliamentarians. However, it should be able to provide, at best, a written set of Objectives around which everyone, traditional diplomats and parliamentarians alike, can rally.¹⁷ This exercise would provide any Foreign Minister with the invigoration of broad parliamentary support for the Strategic Objectives to be pursued, and in turn, would be a practical example of "the broader political role of Parliaments in the implementation and formulation of a country's foreign policy"¹⁸.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Perhaps, in the context of the paradox of parliamentary diplomacy mentioned earlier, one should recall the famous words of the late Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro who, in describing how the Christian Democrats would work together with the Communists in Italy, had used the term 'convergenze parallele', converging parallels, a geometrical impossibility that however describes a situation where two strands can stand next to each other converging in their objectives!

¹⁸ Noulas, George, *The Role of Parliamentary Diplomacy in Foreign Policy*, in: www.foreignpolicyjournal.com, October 22, 2011, pp.1-3, at page 1.

24. This process of consensus building around a set of Strategic Objectives of Foreign Policy would however not be enough. In order to tie up and reconcile these two strands of diplomacy, one should strive to have them work together more effectively in the common interests of the country. One way of doing this is the setting up of a robust two-way information infrastructure between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Parliament in particular, but not only its Foreign Affairs Commission and, in a context of EU membership, also its European Affairs Committee. This has to include regular briefings by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for parliamentarians on bilateral and multilateral issues in particular when parliamentarians are meeting with foreign dignitaries or other parliamentarians from abroad. It also has to cater for reporting by parliamentarians with regard to their meetings in the course of their parliamentary diplomacy and, as far as possible, for information sharing: parliamentarians can often pick up useful information which remains beyond the reach of traditional diplomats and this can be very useful to the common diplomatic effort of the country.

25. Foreign Offices also need to give particular attention to the relations between their diplomats and parliamentarians. Guidelines need to be spelled out to Ambassadors and other diplomats as to their relations with parliamentarians and the assistance which they are bound to provide to parliamentarians in general and in particular when parliamentarians are participating in events within the Ambassador's jurisdiction.

26. On the part of Parliaments, clear objectives and guidelines for parliamentary diplomacy can also be an example of best practice. The Canadian Parliament provides us with an example of this. In a joint document¹⁹ by Noel A. Kinsella and Peter Milliken, Speaker of the

Senate and Speaker of the House of Commons respectively, lay out the approach to “fostering diplomatic relations with other parliaments and countries” and “how we, as Speakers, and all members of the Senate and the House of Commons, contribute to interparliamentary relations, specifically the promotion of democracy, good governance and of the Canadian parliamentary system on the international scene”. In the same document they state categorically that “In our view, Canadian parliamentary diplomacy must be an important complement to the diplomatic initiatives undertaken by the government in our federal political system.”²⁰

The Cultural Underpinning

27. Parliamentary Diplomacy is underpinned by a commitment to developing a culture of dialogue within a milieu of respect for cultural diversity and identity. A

¹⁹ *Parliamentary Diplomacy: the Canadian Approach*, Final version, May 4, 2007.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

culture of dialogue within the context of a dialogue of cultures – This is one of the strengths which parliamentary diplomacy has as a type of ‘soft’ diplomacy which is not jaw-jaw but which keeps an open line of dialogue underpinned by intercultural respectful and meaningful dialogue. Parliamentarians are particularly equipped to undertake such intercultural dialogue as an integral part of their diplomacy.

28. Notwithstanding this, cultural constraints are always an issue to be addressed with attention, study and appreciation of the context within which ‘the other side’ lives and operates. In this regard parliamentary diplomacy is no different from traditional diplomacy. What is different however, is the way in which such cultural constraints can be overcome: parliamentary diplomacy is in its very nature an inter-personal exercise in networking, friendship and confidence-building. That is indeed why it is important that it a continuing exercise bilaterally and unilaterally providing parliamentarians with particular expertise and knowledge of certain countries and societies strengthened by the friendships and discourse developed with their counterparts.

29. The greater the isolation, as sometimes results from particular political situations, the greater the propensity for friction. In this regard, it is important to recognise that pre-emptive parliamentary dialogue is a means in developing cultural understanding, an important item in the diplomatic toolbox that can be utilised to achieve this.

30. Recognising that cultural restraints challenge any type of diplomacy, it is important to understand that regional inter-action is the best approach to overcoming the issue of cultural diversity. Regional parliamentary diplomacy in this context can be the most effective and can illustrate ‘**parlomacy**’ at its best. To give a practical example, in my view, parliamentary diplomacy addressed at assisting the new democracies of North Africa to make a success of this new revolutionary experience is best carried out by parliamentarians from well functioning pluralist democracies in the Mediterranean region. In this regard allow me to promote my country’s Maltese parliamentarians as well equipped to be of service to the promotion of democracy especially in North Africa – who best can empathise with fellow parliamentarians from that region than a Maltese parliamentarian who, though European, speaks an Arabic-based language, though Christian, prays to ‘Alla’!²¹ Similar reasoning can be applied to other regions worldwide recognizing that proximity and history are essential elements of facilitating cultural understanding of the ‘other’, in particular where common experiences have been shared over centuries.

²¹ The Maltese language, an official language of the European Union, is an Arabic-based language; the Maltese are predominantly Catholics who pray to God using the term ‘Alla’.

Formation and Development of Parliamentary Diplomacy

31. The growing importance of parliamentary diplomacy and its importance in the context of intercultural dialogue demands of us not to leave it to chance. There is a clear need for parliamentarians to be continually formed and educated in parliamentary diplomacy, its best practice and in how it can be rendered most effective. There is therefore need for more training and capacity building for parliamentary diplomacy directed at parliamentarians and their assistants, and other staff, in Parliament. This is a challenge and an opportunity for Diplomatic Academies and other higher formational institutions.

32. Additionally there is a need for scholars and parliamentarians to study and to develop best practices in parliamentary diplomacy so that there can be a sharing of experience and expertise directed at achieving better and more effective results.

33. The soft diplomacy which parliamentary diplomacy represents is a diplomacy which reaches where traditional diplomacy is often unable to reach.²² It also represents an opportunity to overcome, or at least soften, the cultural constraints that all diplomacy faces.

34. Let us give it a role which is as central as that of traditional diplomacy, fostering an integrated relationship between them that strengthens both while allowing each the freedom to develop its own particular strand.

Thank you.

²² With due recognition and apologies to the famous Heineken advert “Heineken refreshes the parts other beers cannot reach” developed by Heineken’s long-time agency Lowe.

Cultural Diplomacy and Diplomatic Training

Ku Jaafar Ku Shaari* **

First of all, I would like to thank the organizers namely the Central European Initiative (CEI), Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Republic of Croatia, the University of Zagreb and its Centre for Advanced Academic Studies (CAAS), for inviting me to this Forum and giving me this opportunity to speak to you today.

Incidentally, coming back to Croatia rekindles my memories of my posting here from 1994 to 1995 when I was entrusted to set up our mission at Zagreb. It was a difficult time then with Croatia recovering from war. To see the progress made since then is very heartening indeed. This visit is also an opportunity for me to reconnect with the friends I made during that time.

When I received the invitation, I noted that Malaysia is one of only two countries from ASEAN that have been invited to this event. To me, it signifies the close diplomatic relations that exist between our two countries. On the same issue, I was pleased to hear that the Institute of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations (IDFR) is quite popular with the officers of the Foreign Ministry here for attending short course. Since 2010, we have received a total of 10 participants from the Ministry for our courses.

On the theme chosen for this year's forum, namely "diplomacy and inter-cultural dialogue", I feel it is very relevant indeed not only to this region but also to other parts of the world that aspires to forging more fruitful interaction and coexistence amongst their people of diverse racial, religious and cultural backgrounds.

Cultural diplomacy can be best described as the initiation or facilitation of the exchange of ideas, values, traditions and other aspects of culture or identity, whether they promote national interests, build relationships or enhance socio-cultural understanding. No longer relegated to the periphery of the international relations discipline, cultural diplomacy today is a vibrant and innovative field of research and has successfully established itself as a stand-alone theory and practice.

In an increasingly globalised, interdependent world, in which the proliferation of mass communication especially ICT ensures that we all have greater access to

* Ambassador, Dato', Director General, Institute of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations (IDFR), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia

** Keynote Address at the 2012 CEI Dubrovnik Diplomatic Forum

each other than ever before – cultural diplomacy is critical to fostering peace and stability throughout the world. Cultural diplomacy, when learned and applied by communities, cultures or nations, can accelerate the realisation of the following five principles, ie: **1.** Respect and Recognition of Cultural Diversity and Heritage, **2.** Global Intercultural Dialogue, **3.** Justice, Equality and Interdependence, **4.** The Protection of International Human Rights, and **5.** Global Peace and Stability.

Cultural diplomacy is the ability to persuade through culture, values and ideas, as opposed to ‘hard power’, which conquers or coerces through military might. In the case of the more volatile countries and regions, intercultural dialogue can be a tool for the prevention and resolution of conflicts and for enhancing respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law.

In my talk today, I will be speaking mainly on the approaches taken by Malaysia to promote cross-cultural understanding within the country and on the efforts being undertaken by the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). I will also be speaking on the role played by IDFR, the training arm of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia, in equipping our diplomats and representatives abroad on cross-cultural issues and for promoting the country’s culture overseas.

As you probably know, Malaysia is a multiracial country – we are a country of many different races living in peace and harmony. They freely practice their own religions, cultures and traditions. In terms of the population, Malaysia has three major racial groups – that is, the Malays, Chinese and Indians who together constitute about 80% of the population while the smaller ethnic groups and non-citizens make up the rest. We also have a fairly large number of migrant workers coming from different parts of Asia living in the country.

As can be expected, culturally speaking Malaysia is a very colorful country that can be aptly called a melting pot of diverse cultures and traditions. Mosques, temples and churches exist side by side and one gets the opportunity to see a plethora of different religious festivals being celebrated by the various religious and ethnic groups very often with the participation of the rest of the people in the spirit of ‘1 Malaysia’. Thus it should not be a surprise to you that our tourism tagline is “Malaysia Truly Asia”.

As Malaysia has a multiracial population, promoting racial and religious tolerance and understanding, in the interest of achieving national unity, is the central theme of all our development efforts. And, in ensuring that national unity gets the government’s undivided attention, a separate department called the Department of National Unity and National Integration has been set up to promote racial harmony in the country. The focus on national unity is also incorporated into our education system where children from primary to secondary levels are taught to understand the religions, customs and cultures of the different peoples living in Malaysia.

The government also actively promotes the spirit of ‘unity in diversity’ through religious festival of the various religious and ethnic groups. A practice that is

unique to Malaysia is what is known as ‘open house’ where people celebrating a particular festival open their homes to people of other races so that they can enjoy the special food prepared for the occasion. Many politicians or corporate figures have open houses at their homes or other designated places where anyone can walk in and partake in the food being served. The government also provides support to NGOs involved in interfaith dialogues and in promoting racial harmony with the view to promoting unity and smoothening tension whenever they occur in the country.

When it comes to promoting the Malaysian culture overseas, it is usually done by a number of government agencies, the main ones being the Ministry of Information, Communication and Culture and the Tourism Development Board. The focus of their promotional activities is to promote the country overseas and develop a better understanding of Malaysia abroad. It is also closely interlinked to our efforts to promote Malaysia as a tourist destination.

In the case of IDFR, our focus is more on the training of our diplomats so that they have, besides diplomatic skills, a good understanding of the country’s culture and heritage especially with regard to its music, dances, arts and handicrafts, and local cuisines. This is to enable them to incorporate cultural aspects into the activities they organize at missions so that the Malaysian cultural identity and brand becomes more well-known internationally.

Among the activities that are usually included in the courses we organize for our diplomats include:

- Talks and visits to places related to culture such as handicrafts centres, art museums, cultural performances etc.,
- Local music and dances (so that they can perform or organize cultural performances while at mission), and
- Preparation and serving of local dishes especially in the case of spouses of diplomats.

In organizing our training programmes on Malaysian culture, we work very closely with the National Academy of Arts, Culture and Heritage.

Incidentally, the participation of diplomats together with their spouses has been made a requirement before they could be posted abroad. This is because the spouse plays a big part in the life of a diplomat especially in entertaining guests and helping out with the activities at missions. Besides basic knowledge about the work at missions, the training programmes for spouses include areas like the art of fine dining and entertaining, cross cultural communications, and the art of conversation.

The purpose of training in cross-cultural communication, which is an important component of our diplomatic training programmes, is to provide those going abroad a better understanding of the cultural practices and norms, including the ‘do’s and don’ts’ of the major racial and cultural groups of the world. It is hoped

that the training will enable them to better adapt and interact with people overseas without making unnecessary blunders due to ignorance. The training courses I just mentioned are conducted for all levels of officers – from the clerical level to junior, mid career and senior diplomats.

The cross cultural component is also an important aspect of our international negotiation courses where a proper understanding of the culture and communication styles associated with the various racial and cultural groups is deemed as important for achieving success in negotiations.

The emphasis on providing exposure to the local culture is also included in our training programmes organized for foreign diplomats. Its purpose, besides serving as a source of relaxation while attending our courses, is to enable them to have a better of Malaysia and its people. The programme for them usually includes visits to museums, handicrafts centers, cultural performances, and sometimes a home stay with a traditional rural family.

Apart from conducting courses, the institute is also involved in organizing events such as roundtables, seminars, conferences and public lectures which are usually attended by participants by senior government servants, academician, foreign diplomats and members of NGOs. Speakers invited to speak at these events include heads of foreign governments and senior officials, academicians, corporate figures, foreign diplomats and others who have distinguished themselves in diplomacy or related fields. Inter-civilisational issues aimed at bridging the gap between the East and the West has been one of the topics that have been the focus of some of our events. Among the notable speakers that the institute has hosted in this regard include Dr. Karen Armstrong and Imam Feizal Abdul Rauf.

At the regional level, Malaysia is part of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) which is made up of the 10 member countries of the Southeast Asian region. ASEAN is now moving towards closer regional integration and it is envisaged that it will be able to achieve its vision of an ASEAN Community by 2015. The role of culture in ASEAN is stated in its declaration dated 17th of November 2011 which highlights “the importance of promoting an ASEAN identity through fostering of greater awareness of the diverse cultures and heritage of the ASEAN region”. The emphasis is for respecting member countries’ differences while emphasizing their common values in the spirit of unity in diversity.

In this regard, there is some concern that the “people oriented” ASEAN as envisaged by its leaders may not permeate down to the grassroots. To overcome this, various measures being taken to enhance mutual understanding and respect of one another’s cultures, value systems and sensitivities. The steps being taken include hosting of cultural exchanges, joint cultural activities, youth forums, seminars, sports, food fairs, academic researches, quiz competition for the young etc. It is also hoped that better ASEAN connectivity would lead to more people-to-people interaction thereby increasing the awareness of ASEAN among the people.

Incidentally, one of the courses carried out by IDFR caters mainly for the ASEAN countries. This course which is funded by the ASEAN Secretariat and carried out annually provides diplomatic training for junior diplomats from the ASEAN countries. It is one of the ways by which IDFR is contributing towards forging linkages and building the bonds of friendship among diplomats from the ASEAN region. We are now in the midst of planning an ASEAN youth forum together with a local university towards the end of this year.

In my view the process of forging better intercultural understanding and racial harmony among people within a country or between different countries is an ongoing one in which a variety of people including diplomats, academicians, researchers and those attached with training institutions are involved. Our commitment to this process will help us build a more peaceful and prosperous world.

Lastly, I would like to take this opportunity to thank the organizers for the excellent arrangements and kind hospitality extended to me since my arrival here yesterday.

Thank you.

Emerging Patterns in Diplomacy

Nabil Ayad* **

Ben Okri, the Nigerian author, has said: “The magician and the politician have much in common: they both have to draw our attention away from what they are really doing.” Cynical perhaps, but we must be aware that there is an extremely high level of distrust of all government and government appointed officials, including diplomats. In a Gallup Poll in December 2012 only one in ten Americans rated the honesty and ethical standards of members of Congress as very high or high.¹ Most believe they are dishonest and unethical, and that they appoint their friends and supporters to positions such as diplomatic posts. In parts of the world where there is a free press, both conventional and new social media barrage citizens with crises and scandals which involve people in high government offices. Contemplate the thousands of pieces of ‘confidential’ diplomatic correspondence made public as a result of Wikileaks.

A major contributing factor to the disrespect and distrust is the desire of main stream media to retain viewers and readers. It has driven even the most ‘reputable’ news sources into questionable areas of reporting. The flow of information has interconnected the world so that events in all parts of the world are known as they occur. Although all interested parties employ public relations people in an attempt to weave the ‘facts’ to present their point of view to the audience, the work of public relations cannot overcome the overpowering public cynicism about messages from official sources.

Even Heraclitus of Ephesus, the Greek philosopher who pointed out about 2500 years ago that ‘Nothing endures but change’ could not have anticipated the type of information flow that dominates world today. The rate of change and the degree of interdependence is increasing with each passing day.

Emerging Patterns of Technology

In 2000, Stephanie Smith Kinney wrote an independent research study based on interviews with scores of U.S. Foreign Service officers of virtually all ranks. Her conclusions resonate today: “Our future diplomats will need expertise and skills beyond those of their twentieth century counterparts. They will need to be equally

* Professor, Rector, Diplomatic Academy of London, UK

** Keynote Address at the 2013 CEI Dubrovnik Diplomatic Forum

¹ Congress retains low honesty rating; *Gallup Politics*, December 3, 2012 <http://www.gallup.com/poll/159035/congress-retains-low-honesty-rating.aspx>.

adept at policy and resource management. They will need a solid understanding of the interaction between and among politics, culture, national security, economics, technology, and ecology in order to gain the best results for U.S. interests in an increasingly globalized world.”²

Our world is more than ever bound by technology. The Internet is an ever evolving presence in our lives. Just how pervasive and invasive has it become? One of the most profound comments about the how the Internet is changing our lives was made recently by Tom Standage, digital editor of *The Economist*. He was discussing the fact that the number of internet-connected mobile devices, including smartphones and tablet computers, will be greater than the number of desktop and laptop personal computers (PCs) in use by 2014.

As well as reshaping the technology industry, the rise of the mobile internet will also transform the way people use and perceive the internet. Mobile telephony meant that instead of calling a place you could call a person. Similarly, having long been seen as a separate place, accessed through the portal of a PC screen, the internet is fast becoming an extra layer overlaid on reality, accessed by a device that is always with you (and may eventually be part of you). In the coming years, that will be the most profound change of all.³

The Impact of Emerging Patterns of Technology

Our moment in history offers even the most humble private citizen more information in greater depth and detail than the most sophisticated scholar or artful intelligence expert could possess in past ages. Individuals are bombarded with information and misinformation from mass media and the Internet. Computers are linked together in vast networks, and governments and private groups (such as Wikileaks) seek to penetrate these networks and steal and tamper with information.

Although the malicious desire to steal and tamper with information is a serious concern; it is perhaps is not the worst enemy. The worst enemy is the amount of information. There is so much information stored in so many different places in so many different formats under the control of so many different people and agencies, that the diplomat has an almost impossible task.

We can also look to the Greeks from 2500 years ago for an extended analogy defines the difficulty of the tasks facing the diplomat today. The processes required to extract useful and actionable knowledge from the masses of accumulated data can be compared to three of the Labours of Hercules: conquering the hydra (which

² Stephanie Smith Kinney, “Developing Diplomats for 2010, If Not Now, When?” in: *American Diplomacy*, Vol. V, No. 3, Summer 2000, http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/amdipl_16/kinney/kinney_when1.html

³ Standage, Ted “Live and unplugged” *The Economist* from *The World in 2013* Print Edition November 21, 2012 <http://www.economist.com/news/21566417-2013-internet-will-become-mostly-mobile-medium-who-will-be-winners-and-losers-live-and>

was the monstrous serpent with nine heads); cleaning the Augean stables (which were piled high with manure from the herd of Augeas); and capturing the golden apples of the Hesperides (which came from the sacred tree of wisdom).

Conquering the Nine Headed Hydra

Twenty-five years ago, diplomats and other government officials needed only the most rudimentary knowledge of technology to be able to function well. However, to work the internet stream of information, the circulation system of our age, individuals have to be constantly updated. Many find the task daunting. Like Hercules, they just conquer one head of the hydra monster of information stream; when two others, which are still more serious and more difficult to contain, rise to replace the one they have just overcome. Also in a similar manner to Hercules, diplomats have to learn to conquer the nine-headed hydra monster of the information stream to survive.

Cleaning the Augean Stables

Government agencies, organizations, and businesses are flooded with information and misinformation of every imaginable type every single moment of every day. Networks of governmental, non-governmental, and business organizations possess details almost every aspect of life on earth, including data on individuals such as suspected terrorists. For example, the activities at least one of the suspected Boston Bombers was traced from Chechnya to the United States by the Russian Security Service. Yet, in the quagmire of information, inexplicably, this essential knowledge was not acted upon. All countries have access to endless amounts of covert and overt knowledge about governments, groups, and individuals. Computers all over the globe are, at this moment, processing and crunching monumental amounts of data on every imaginable, and some unimaginable, parameters of existence on earth. Comparing the mountains and mountains of information clogging systems to the piles of manure in the Augean Stables is an easy metaphor. Hercules solved his problem by diverting a river to clean the stables. Clearing government agencies of verbal and digital manure is not quite that simple for those in the diplomatic service whose who hold responsibility for ensuring the flow of essential information.

Capturing the Golden Apples of Wisdom

Capturing the Golden Apples of Wisdom was a complex task for Hercules that required cooperation with Atlas and a high level of ingenuity. The task of extracting useful and correct knowledge from the masses of raw data that exists today is equally challenging.

Logically, it could be assumed that unlimited access to information would bring improved government processes. However, the opposite is true; constructive actions are often inhibited by the amount of information, because mechanisms for analysis and interpretation of information are not as prevalent and pervasive as the overwhelming amount of materials that exist. Even though this problem has existed for almost two decades, diplomatic missions still frequently lack tools and trained personnel to turn information into usable knowledge.

An obvious case in point is the Boston Marathon Attacks in the United States. The American government possessed warnings about the intentions of at least one of the individuals involved in the attacks. Yet, they were unable to extract what was important from what was extraneous. They did not know what these individuals were planning to do. Is it possible that good diplomatic channels could have played a role in better coordinating knowledge of the situation between the United States and Russia? Like Hercules, modern diplomats need to collaborate with others, while using all their ingenuity to extract usable knowledge.

Revolutionary Technologies

Intuitively, there is a tendency to view new technologies as just another evolutionary advancement in the human condition. However, current technical innovations are much more expansive and invasive than the photocopying, audio and videotape, facsimile machines, and computer software that just a few decades ago played an enhancing role for information and administration. These earlier innovations enabled traditional work patterns to be completed more efficiently. Today, the changes go beyond evolution, and constitute a revolution that must transform methodologies within diplomatic missions.

Transformed Information Technology

Like people during the Renaissance, we are living through one of the pivotal epochs in the history of mankind. During the Renaissance, the invention of the printing press radically changed society rather than enhancing what had been done in the past. However, that transformation occurred slowly over a long period of time, as a result, strategies were developed to cope with the change. Today, the Internet is completely transforming the world, but the changes are occurring in a telescoped time frame. We just become adjusted to one wave of change when another one hits and knocks us off balance. There is little time to adjust and learn before another mutation of change requires individuals and organizations to embark on yet another expanse of learning. There is almost no time for reflection and analysis on how to best implement the change and to ponder its long-term effects.

Complex processes in government agencies, organizations, and businesses that

took generations to create and evolve are being undermined in a few months with technological change. Unfortunately, those who are managing the processes are frequently not as attuned as they need to be to the extent of change that is occurring around them. They find the prevalence and scope of change difficult to assimilate. Compounding the problem is the fact that governments spend much more money on defence than on foreign ministries. The 'solution' to problems is seen as use of force, rather than use of diplomacy.

Recently, David Clemente pointed out the large number of Critical Infrastructure (CI) elements that are vulnerable to attack. The CI elements he outlines are: communications, emergency services, energy, financial services, food, government, health, transport, and water. He states: "Critical Infrastructure (CI) is generally understood to include the particularly sensitive elements of a larger ecosystem, encompassing the public and private sectors and society at large. This goes beyond physical infrastructure to include data... Cyberspace and associated information and communications technologies (ICT) have become essential components of modern life... It can be visualized as a thin layer (or nervous system) running through all other sectors, enabling them to function and interconnect."⁴

The imagery Tom Standage, digital editor of *The Economist* and Dave Clements use is very similar. Dave Clements says: "It can be visualized as a thin layer (or nervous system) running through all other sectors, enabling them to function and interconnect" while Tom Standage says: "The internet is fast becoming an extra layer overlaid on reality."

Role of Public Diplomacy

Because the general public in every country is much more aware of political issues and events around the world, public diplomacy plays a much greater role in the activities of diplomatic missions. From comments by various government officials representing various countries around the world, it seems clear that in spite of the extent to which the world is connected, there is a lack of depth in the information about cultural and ethnic traditions in other countries. There is still an underlying fear of people of different political, ethnic, religious, and racial backgrounds. For example, if a person or persons with extremist views commit acts of terrorism, those actions are attributed to all people of similar political, ethnic, religious, and racial backgrounds by the general public and sometimes even by government officials. Even when the intentions of governments are honourable and the appropriate technology and cultural understanding is available, governments recognize the difficulty of reaching their target audience with the correct message.

⁴ Clemente, David "Cyber Security and Global Interdependence: What is Critical?" *The Royal Institute of International Affairs*, Chatham House, February 2013

Need for Quick Responses from Diplomats

Today there are borderless crimes and global terrorist networks. Attacks can occur to any infrastructure system in any government's jurisdiction, anywhere in the world. In addition, attacks can come from criminal elements that have no political agenda or national loyalties. Across the world, small groups which have little or no military power can cause massive damage. The common factor that all these emerging threats possess from the point of view of diplomatic practice is that they are largely amenable to information collection, sharing and analysis operations. Diplomatic Practice needs to reflect the changes brought about by the Internet in four ways: first, the collection, organization and retrieval of data; second, the analysis and assimilation of data; third, better security and control in the light of the all pervasive Internet; and fourth better conveying information within an embassy system and to an internet networked global general public.

Modern threats, which can be generated quickly from many sources, require diplomats to develop new intelligence methods. Diplomatic personnel at all levels need to be trained to use all sources information including classified, unclassified government and unclassified private sector.

Staffs need to be trained, equipped, organized, and funded to discover original information, to discriminate between good and bad sources in multiple languages. They need to know how to convert information into usable intelligence that can factor into decision-making. Most importantly, they need to be willing to set aside preconceived assumptions and biases. They need to listen to what is actually be said and written and not what they want to hear said and written. True intelligence gathering comes from an ability to understand other cultures and other societies; not from attempting to fit other cultures and societies into the mindset of the home country.

Information within the Diplomatic System

Today, due to the speed with which information travels through networks, decisions need to be made immediately, since events are covered through Twitter and often shown live on television, sometimes before official policy has been formulated and conveyed. Although time frames for reflection and contemplation have almost disappeared, the importance of careful selection and analysis of an ever-increasing amount of information combined with the professional diplomatic judgment and insight is more important than ever. Traditional negotiation skills and public diplomacy skills need to be re-calibrated and adjusted for a very different world reality. As part of training diplomats need to be made acutely aware of the need to re-calibrate the time frame for action for the new reality.

Public Diplomacy in the Internet Age

The general public in all countries is much more knowledgeable and aware of the world outside their home country than ever before in human history. As a result, Diplomatic Missions need to communicate with them. However, in today's world the general public is bombarded with information from all sides. Much of the material they receive through the mass media has been edited and produced by communications experts. The goal of the producers is to keep people reading, listening, or watching. Because the general public has 'heard it all' and 'seen it all' before, producers and publishers strive to find a story more sensational than the last. As well, in our fast paced society, people are busy and rushing from one place to another. They want information digested to '60 second' sound bites. They want to know the 'bottom line' or the major message very quickly.

Diplomatic missions, when conveying information to the public, need to be acutely aware of their target market. Although the general public is more aware of international events and concerns than ever before, they are less willing to listen to complicated or detailed explanations. The result is that Diplomatic Missions must carefully edit, format, and tailor their communications. Public Diplomacy must be conducted: **1)** at a time when the climate for the information is correct (for example, when public attention is focused on a certain issue), and **2)** in a digestible and attractive format which the general public is ready to receive. More detailed information can be published on a web site, which those who are interested can peruse for the detailed information. As a result, in training Diplomats need to learn presentation and formatting skills in order to present their material in the most acceptable format.

Conclusion

More than a decade ago, Jeffrey Cooper summarised the qualities that a Diplomat needs to possess. Generalist talents, including excellent communications abilities – especially strong in writing skills – were always particularly valued in support of the critical job of reporting. Excellent linguistic skills, including the ability to learn new languages needed for foreign postings were also considered to be significant advantages. Cultural sensitivity and understanding, including in-depth knowledge of selected countries and regions were critical selection factors.

Diplomats for the information age must bring additional qualifications. They should possess exceptionally strong analytical skills, combining the capability to integrate and synthesise across domains and on a regional or global basis. Extra-political expertise, in economics and technical areas, are now considered

particularly valuable; synoptic understanding of regional dynamics and integrating analytical abilities are especially sought after.⁵

In many ways, these qualifications are still important. If we add the ability to monitor the internet and global networks of information, his skill set is just as essential today. We live in astounding times – diplomats need to be able to adapt in these challenging times.

⁵ Jeffrey Cooper, “New Skills for Cyber Diplomats”, *The World Today*, March 1999, p. 19

**SELECTED PAPERS
AND
DISCUSSIONS**

Factors and Contents of Public Diplomacy

Hans Winkler*

Thank you very much for the invitation and to our sister organisation, the Diplomatic Academy in Croatia and to the Hanns Seidel Foundation for making this possible. I am not sure if I should be happy or unhappy to speak after Professor Alan Henrikson, because I knew he would say some of the same things I wanted to say. But, I think after all, it's a good thing, because there are certain things I can build on now, because my understanding of public diplomacy is very similar to the one that Professor Henrikson gave. Maybe with the exception that, frankly, I don't particularly like the terms 'branding' or 'image building' and would include such activities generally under 'public diplomacy', at least as I understand it.

Right away, I would like to add something to what Professor Henrikson said and that relates to the issue of making diplomacy better understood to your own domestic public. And in particular, because I see State Secretary Andrej Plenković here and he now has the same task that I had when I was State Secretary, responsible among other things, for 'selling' the European Union to your own public which is probably among the most impossible tasks that one could have, I would wish him and his country a lot of success in convincing the Croatian public that the EU, after all, is a good thing. But, I know, whatever you do, it might be wrong in the public perception.

I would like to begin with the factors that in my opinion influence very much how public opinion is structured and is influenced by diplomacy. One is the size of the country. Big states have big interests and have global interests. Smaller states, I wouldn't say, have small interests, but have only interests in certain areas and also regions of the world and can and must concentrate on those areas. For the United States, whatever happens anywhere in the world, in any country, is of vital interest. To Croatia or to Austria as small or medium size countries, we have our priorities which we have to pursue and this is a big difference. Second, when

* This paper brings the authorised version of the opening speech of Dr. Hans Winkler, Director of Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, held on May 3, 2011, at the Round Table 'Public Diplomacy: Cultural Diplomacy, Nation Image and Branding' in Zagreb, organised by Hanns Seidel Foundation Zagreb and Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Republic of Croatia. Round Table Proceedings were published only in Croatian language.

we talk about public diplomacy, very often it seems to me we are talking as if everywhere in the world the conditions are ideal, meaning that we are talking to the public in open societies. This is not the case.

The fact that in many countries it is difficult to pursue public diplomacy, because you do not have access to parliament, there might not even be a parliament. You have no access to civil society, because there might be no NGOs, or access to NGOs might be restricted. So, the working conditions for diplomacy from country to country are very different. In Europe, of course, we all luckily live in democracies and we live in open societies, so we can work in an ideal environment when we talk about public diplomacy. But how do you conduct public diplomacy in North Korea, just to mention one extreme example. So, it might very much be the task of public diplomacy to make it possible to conduct public diplomacy to the extent it is feasible. In other words, one must try to find the right access to the persons or institutions in a given society that then influence what the decision makers in that country think about your country.

Now, what are the instruments at your disposal? That has a lot to do with the question on how a State is organised. There are States like the United States where practically all activities besides acts of State in a very restricted sense are carried out by non-State actors. There are other States where almost everything is state organised or is initiated by the State, including economy, culture, tourism etc. So, I think it very much depends on how the State you are working in is organised.

At the same time very much depends also on how your own State is set up and how you organise public diplomacy abroad. Do you have an independent office of tourism? Do you have an independent office that promotes trade? Do you have a cultural institute or cultural forum? In Austria, probably similar to Croatia, we have a mixed system. We have semi-public institutions, like the Austrian Economic Chamber which is a public-private institution, which has elements of both. But it very much depends on who is conducting your public diplomacy, whether it is only the embassy in the country which is conducting this kind of activities. There are many countries where Austria has diplomatic representations, but we only have an embassy and nothing else. So the embassy, of course, must assume functions which in other countries are carried out by private institutions. Therefore, it very much depends on how the State and the Government you represent are organized and how they function abroad.

In the second part I would like to say something about the contents of public diplomacy. Now, I understand public diplomacy in maybe a little wider sense than Professor Henrikson does, as I have already said. Anything that promotes and reinforces the interests of your State can be useful from the public diplomacy point of view. Of course, the most important interest is to have a good image in the world, to influence the way that foreign publics see you, see your country. But that's, of course, very global. That's very general. More important, I think,

it is to ask yourself what your specific interests in a given country are and then try to influence the right players in that country in order to support and promote those interests. To take the example of Croatia, one of the priorities at this very crucial moment in time is to influence EU member States in the sense that once the accession is sealed the ratification process is finished as quickly as possible. It's a very simple, very clear priority and therefore you have to ask yourself: who do I have to influence in order for that to happen. Of course, you have to influence the general public, because the most important player in any democratic society is the voter. It's the voter who influences how politicians are acting and what politicians are doing.

It's very difficult to ask from a foreign country to act in a way that goes against public opinion in that country. To give an example, because right now President Gul from Turkey is on a State visit in Austria and, as you probably know, Austria is among those countries which are most critical about Turkish accession. So, if you talk about Turkish public diplomacy it's obviously to try to influence those decision makers who count in Austria so that the general opinion about Turkish accession might be changed and eventually politicians change their opinion and therefore are more forthcoming when it comes to a debate in the European Union about Turkish accession. So that is a very clear example on how you must operate in the interest of the State you represent.

Another point is, and that might be the most difficult part of public diplomacy, not to make public diplomacy appear as government propaganda. There is nothing as poisonous for the media or for the general public as having the impression that you are selling propaganda. Now, what does this mean? Does it mean you have to talk badly about your own country in order to be credible? No, of course not. But you have to choose very carefully which messages you sell in which way. I know a very prominent Austrian journalist who told me once: "I would never ever interview an ambassador because it doesn't make any sense. All he's telling me is government propaganda and I'm not interested in government propaganda". So you have to be very careful as a government, as an embassy, on how you package the product that you have to sell and that is very, very difficult. And it depends very much on whom you want to address. It's very easy to invite politicians and to tell them the official story. But it's very difficult to invite someone, for example, from a trade union, or to invite young people from youth organisations or to speak to an audience at a University and to tell them official government propaganda. They will fall asleep if they don't run away immediately. So, you have to be very careful on how you structure the information that you want to convey.

In this respect, actually, listening to you there are many similarities between Croatia and Austria, which is not surprising. For me as an Austrian, I think that the thing that comes to mind first is that Croatia is as much as Austria a part of the heart of Europe, and there is no question that the EU would be incomplete without

Croatia as a member. Our image, your image (our image probably even more than yours), is based very much on the past and on clichés. Now, of course, clichés can be positive. The point is that we have tried to change our image, although it was very positive, in the seventies and we failed miserably. We did this because we got sick and tired of our image of, you know, the Old Empire, of Mozart and music – which is good, basically, it is positive, but we wanted to present ourselves as a modern, industrialised and technologically advanced country. It did not work. So, my question is: should you shamelessly use clichés, even reinforce them, or should you try to correct them? For example, about ten percent of Japanese believe that Austria still has an emperor. They come to Vienna as tourists, spend a lot of money, and go to the Hofburg and to Schönbrunn and want to see the emperor. Which is good, I mean it is good for tourism, but should we correct that or should we rather reinforce it? I am exaggerating now a little bit, but should we get away from clichés and try to move into other images by ‘branding’, even if it is maybe not successful? My short answer would be: to change the ‘brand’ is difficult, in most cases probably even counter-productive, but image campaigns, if they are well made, of course, why not.

Now, finally because I know that the time is very limited, a few words about my own experience, in particular during my time as State Secretary, and the experience of Austria in trying to make the European Union a) better known, and b) more accepted in our own country. Now, Austria today after some years since our own accession have passed is presently among the most euro-sceptical countries in the European Union. And this despite the fact that accession and membership in the European Union for Austria has been a big success story. Especially when it comes to EU enlargement, there is no other country in the European Union which has profited more from enlargement than Austria and still there is a very negative image about enlargement and the EU in general, although that is now becoming again a little bit better. However, since the 1st of May, the image is getting a bit worse again, because with the 1st of May the restrictions for workers from most of the new member States of the European Union were lifted and there is a big fear now in Austria that there will be a big negative effect on the labour market. So how do you sell the European Union to your own people?

One school says that you literally have to run after every single citizen and really stuff information down his throat. I’m exaggerating now, but it is the duty of the State not only to inform the public, but interest the public in also accepting this information. When I talked to euro-critical publics as State Secretary I almost always heard: “You are not informing us, you are not telling us, we didn’t know that“. So, what should the government do? One question was: should we send a copy of the Treaty of Lisbon to every single household? Some countries did it. We decided against it, because we see the responsible citizen as the one who has to decide for himself or herself on which information he or she is interested in. The

duty of the government is to provide this information, to make this information easy to obtain through modern communication technologies, but not to run after every single citizen and to sell him or her government propaganda, because that's the next point. Citizens, like foreign publics that I have mentioned, are very sensitive to government propaganda. So, do you speak also about the negative sides of the European Union, in order to convince the citizen that the European Union is a good thing - which is almost a contradiction in itself. But on the other hand, you are more credible if you are also pointing out some of the negative things of the membership in the European Union.

Whenever I talked to euro-critic publics I always heard: "Well, you are only trying to sell us the European Union, you are totally neglecting all the negative things there are in the European Union". So, I can only say: have an honest exchange of view, have an honest dialog with a citizen. Try to be as comprehensive as possible in your information and try to make information available rather than throwing it after the citizen. Also the citizen has a certain duty to come to you for information, but it should be made available in an easy way.

Thank you.

Digital Diplomacy: From Gutenberg Galaxy Gives to Cyberspace

Daryl Copeland*

Part I: The Applications of Virtuality

The vested interests of acquired knowledge and conventional wisdom have always been bypassed and engulfed by new media.

Marshall McLuhan

In the century which has passed since McLuhan's birth, his appreciation of the pre-eminent importance of electronic media in shaping culture, values, behaviour and institutions has never appeared more apt.

This brief will survey the impact of the revolution in information and communication technologies (ICTs) on the practice of diplomacy and evaluate the implications for the structure and operations of foreign ministries. We will focus on the use of these facilities by diplomats in the discharge of their reporting, analytical and problem-solving responsibilities, as well as their efforts to connect and collaborate with diverse audiences and on-line communities at home (outreach) and abroad (public diplomacy, or PD). The case is advanced that entry into the digital universe is conditioning, and in some instances determining not only much of what diplomats do, but also how they are doing it.

Connectivity, Networks and Narratives Rule

In the ever expanding literature on this subject, the terms *digital*, *virtual*, *cyber*, *e-* and *i-diplomacy* are used more or less interchangeably. Indeed, much of the discussion in recent years surrounding the emergence of a 'new diplomacy' has been driven by the adoption, within diplomatic institutions and government more generally, of digitally-based systems of data creation, transmission and storage

* Former Canadian diplomat, educator, analyst, and consultant, the author of *Guerrilla Diplomacy: Rethinking International Relations* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Books, 2009). See more: www.guerrilladiplomacy.com

using the Internet, social media platforms, computers, and a variety of wireless electronic devices.

In the information saturated precincts of the 21st century, the party with the best story, or the most compelling narrative, is most likely to win the day. International political conversations, often involving large numbers of participants, are taking place across cyberspace. Foreign ministries must get in on that exchange, or risk facing isolation and irrelevance. For that reason and more, the creative application of digital technologies has now become widespread.

Resistance within diplomatic institutions to exploring the full potential of the new media, although initially strong as a result of inherent conservatism, is now fading. Foreign ministries and individual diplomatic missions most everywhere maintain web sites. Some host blogs, feature wikis, and offer access to a variety of RSS feeds. A growing number are turning to popular social media platforms, enjoining visitors to follow them on Twitter, join their Facebook group, or see them on YouTube or Flickr. Embassies and consulates are conducting research and formulating strategies for e-engagement, while communications bureaus at ministry headquarters are hiring tech savvy employees to work the new media, not just by pushing material out, but by responding to incoming messages and engaging in continuing dialogue, often in multiple languages. Similarly, diplomats in the field are using satellite-enabled mobile phones, laptops and various hand held appliances to not just to relay and receive messages, but to bridge the divide between the challenges they confront on the ground and the search for possible solutions.

On-line Leadership

In the second half of the 1990s, city-states Singapore and Hong Kong were out in front of the pack in establishing Web-based international identities. As foreign ministries go, the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs (DFAIT) for almost a decade was in the forefront of the race to mainstream the use new media to advance diplomatic objectives. That advantage was forsaken when a change of government abruptly ended the practice of Canadian PD in 2006-7. Since then, the US and UK have become leaders in the field, and many more countries are scrambling to join the fray.

After a very slow start, the US State Department is now the world's most active practitioner of e-PD and the source of many best practices in digital diplomacy. It operates an official blog called DipNote, and actively services Twitter accounts in Arabic, Farsi, Russian, Spanish, Hindi and French, as well as English. The Department has created an Office of e-Diplomacy, responsible for knowledge management, e-collaboration, and ICT decision-making. That division has created a network of virtual presence posts, hosts and a wiki-like intranet application called

Diplopedia, and manages a variety of highly innovative programs ranging from employee inreach and community formation to a ‘virtual student foreign service’. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has a content-rich Web page and she speaks frequently on the necessity of diplomatic engagement through the new media.

In 2010 an extensive array of the State Department’s digital diplomatic activities were gathered under the rubric of *21st Century Statecraft*, which is defined as “complementing traditional foreign policy tools with newly innovated and adapted instruments of statecraft that fully leverage the networks, technologies, and demographics of our interconnected world”.

Central policy objectives include support for freedom of expression on the Internet, and a concomitant end to censorship and access restrictions. By providing practical support to efforts intended to keep the Internet open and by defending the ‘freedom to connect’, U.S. officials hope that civil society and on-line democratic activism will flourish.

The UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) also run a highly interactive Web site, featuring bloggers and links to YouTube, Facebook, Flickr, Foursquare and specialized resources such as a commissioned volume on public diplomacy. Foreign Secretary William Hague is on Facebook. In 2008 the FCO began actively recruiting ‘digital diplomats’, and recently established a distinct site devoted to the practice of ‘digital diplomacy’.

Where to Now?

British and Swedish Foreign Ministers have blogged; certain professional US and UK diplomats are encouraged to do so as well, although not without risk. With Web 2.0 applications now mature, Web 3.0 possibilities beckon. The Republic of the Maldives, Sweden, the Philippines, Estonia, Serbia, Colombia, Macedonia, and Albania have established virtual embassies in the Web-based, 3D virtual universe called *Second Life* launched by Linden Lab in 2003. It now boasts over one million users. What can governments do there? Innovate and experiment.

Using 3D graphics, haptic technologies (simulated sense experience), and real-time voice communication, participants are testing things in cyberspace that could not easily be replicated on the ground. Examples using life-like avatars with digital identities might include the testing of unorthodox negotiating strategies, running alternative scenarios for conflict resolution, talking to the enemy in conflict zones... whatever. Diplomacy has even attracted the attention of on-line game players.

Given the overheads associated with conventional government communications, not to mention the cost of putting brogues, sandals, or, heaven forbid, boots on the ground, an increasing reliance upon Web-based and wireless media can make for enormous economies. It is also the most practical way to reach the profusion of non-state actors whose support for diplomatic initiatives is often crucial. Moreover, PD

and ICTs can be used offensively. For instance, in 2011 the US State Department established the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications, which works to undermine extremism by countering its ideological basis. Not least, in terms of demonstrating value for money, the results of digital diplomacy, especially as regards its impact on public opinion, can also be measured on Web analytics facilities such as Klout.

The Business Case

Governments are investing in digital diplomacy in order to improve performance. Benefits include:

Effectiveness: in an increasingly network-centric world, foreign ministries can better connect and communicate with new players in international society – NGOs, business, think tanks, universities, journalists, and individuals – some of whom might otherwise be attracted to radical religious or extremist politics.

Efficiency: digital diplomacy can capture scale economies, reach much larger audiences and capture a range of related benefits associated with the move from bricks to clicks.

Leverage: as a key component in any strategy to maximize comparative advantage in a competitive environment, foreign ministries can use the new media to play to the strengths of national image and reputation – branding – while minimizing the constraints associated with capacity or security limitations.

Diplomats have begun to understand the potential of the new media as a force multiplier which allows them to connect directly populations; the need to find better, more imaginative ways to do this is now at diplomacy's leading edge. Moreover, the Internet can play a crucial role in helping diplomats overcome the often severe restrictions on face to face contact imposed by personal safety considerations in an increasing number of locales.

Part II: All Sweetness and Light?

*It is the framework which changes with
each new technology and not just the picture within the frame.*

Marshall McLuhan

The arguments in favour of migrating a significant component of diplomatic practice *on-line*, to the digital and social media, are certainly compelling. After four years as Director of Communications Services at Canada's DFAIT, and in the wake of research conducted for both *Guerrilla Diplomacy*, and, last fall and winter, for a chapter on e-diplomacy which will appear in the forthcoming Oxford

Handbook on Modern Diplomacy, I confess to having become a booster of the benefits of *virtuality* for the work of foreign ministries. Those convictions in large part remain, but my enthusiasm for the **digital and social media (DSM)** bandwagon is not unconditional.

The Downside of Digitalia

At its core, diplomacy depends on the maintenance of relationships based upon mutuality, confidence, trust and respect. The digital and social media can contribute to the construction of such relationships, but – typical of technology’s double-edged impact – DSM can also contribute to their erosion, and, in extreme cases, to their destruction.

The following represent some of the major problems and perils:

- **Technological mediation.** DSM represent a technologically mediated form of communication, and hence are by nature, and of necessity, indirect and often superficial. Keyboards, screens, and hand-held devices are not the equivalent of eye contact, a handshake, or the unadulterated sound of a human voice. Essential diplomatic qualities such as emotional intelligence, situational awareness and cross-cultural sensitivity are not well-matched or ideally suited to transmission or exchange over DSM. This elemental disconnection can at minimum make for communication gaps, misunderstandings, and lost opportunities.
- **Abuse and manipulation.** The DSM are fast and conducive to extensive reach, but they are relatively fragile, easily disrupted, and highly prone to manipulation and distortion. Images and text can be altered, data hacked and stolen or destroyed, illicit web sites established and misleading e-mail generated in support of questionable causes. Al Qaeda, among other criminal organizations, has become expert at using DSM to promote their ideology and recruit jihadis and suicide bombers.
- **Vulnerability to disruption.** If the power is cut off for an extended period, servers will fail, and it will be impossible to recharge the batteries of portable devices. If the outage is widespread, and the electrical power grid is highly centralized and vulnerable to failure, access to the Internet will in short order become impossible and wireless communications won’t function. DSM are neither robust nor resilient.
- **Damage to professional journalism.** The capacity to record and transmit events through DSM has turned all users into potential journalists. This profusion of feed supplied by non-specialists has resulted in an increasing amount of the visual, and sometimes audio content used by news organizations, who themselves are contracting in the face of enormous business challenges. One of the principal implications has been the widespread closure of foreign

bureaus by newspapers and broadcasters, and the laying off of staff trained to gather, analyze and report on events. Journalists, and especially foreign correspondents, represent important contacts and sources for diplomats, and their assessments can provide an antidote to the efforts of government to spin or control communications. Their contribution in service of the public interest cannot easily be replaced.

- **Information overload and e-waste management.** Time is our most precious and non-renewable resource; DSM represent a gigantic time sink. Quite apart from the tendency for users to be distracted or drawn away from their core activities, the sheer quantity of information, and the amount of superfluous junk moving around in the digital universe requires that DSM consumers spend an inordinate amount of their time *on-line* performing e-waste management. Because there are no editors, everyone must become one. Not only does this requirement diminish productivity and creativity, but it necessarily detracts from the capacity to generate content. Imposed counter-productivity of this variety does not exist in face to face encounters.
- **Assault on work-life balance.** Our access to, and fascination with DSM has blurred the line between personal and professional lives. These media can be addictive, and tend to extend the workday, as they have the news cycle, to 24/7. This downloading of work-related responsibilities outside of normal business hours is great for employers, and provides a rationale for cost-cutters keen to reduce the resources accorded foreign ministries, but it can be a disaster for relationships, for family life and for other pursuits outside of the workplace.

Cautionary Tale

Quite apart from this panoply of specific negatives, there are broad risks associated with the fact that all content uploaded onto the DSM is effectively permanent. Touch the screen, click the mouse or hit the send button, and whatever you have dispatched cannot be retrieved. Blog postings, Facebook pages, YouTube video clips and even web sites can be taken down, but material generated for the DSM is so easily copied or re-transmitted that for all intents and purposes once posted, it is forever.

By way of example, several years ago a former British Head of Mission in the Middle East, an accomplished Arabist, model digital diplomat, and at the time one of the leading 'FCO Bloggers', posted an entry eulogizing the spiritual head of a religious-political organization considered by some to be radical, even terrorist. It was a subdued and respectful piece, recalling the wisdom, insightfulness and admirable personal qualities of the departed individual, and lamenting his passing. Ten days passed and nothing happened. Then the posting came to the attention of a special interest group in the UK, who used their influence in the national media to make it a huge issue. Excerpts were reproduced out of context and the

author pilloried for inappropriate and unacceptable behavior unbecoming of a senior diplomat. A foreign government formally protested and the Ambassador's resignation was demanded. That outcome in the end was averted, an apology issued, the offending entry removed, and the assignment completed. But the damage was done. The individual's career has since been blocked, and the former ambassador is now looking for work in an international organization.

No Substitutes

At its most fundamental level, diplomacy is about knowledge-based problem solving, meaningful inter-personal and inter-cultural communications, finding ways to balance competing interests peacefully and using imagination to build compromises, even in complicated and difficult circumstances.

In that respect, when it comes to statecraft, the DSM (their many virtues notwithstanding) can never be expected to substitute for direct interpersonal exchange.

While the DSM undoubtedly have a significant contribution to make, at the end of the day indiplomacy the human factor is still germane.

Intercultural Dialogue as a Tool of Public Diplomacy: the Emerging Al Jazeera Balkans

Jasna Jelisić*

Summary: The article elaborates on the role of intercultural dialogue within the spectrum of public diplomacy activities with a special focus on the role of international broadcasters in opening and maintaining intercultural dialogue. The aim of the article is to explore the potential of the emerging regional broadcaster Al Jazeera Balkans (AJB) to serve as a platform for intercultural dialogue in the region. The article defines the key terms and tracks the development of the Al Jazeera phenomenon. The focus and main objective of the article is to track the first indicators of the direction of AJB's public diplomacy intervention and its potential contribution to strengthening and maintaining a much needed dialogue in the region. The article also explores the potential for AJB to contribute to the ultimate public diplomacy goal and to help further mutual understanding in the countries of former Yugoslavia, as a 'shared understanding' of the past is still much needed in order to start establishing 'reliable bridges' for the future of the region.

You see, I am an enthusiast on the subject of the arts. But it is an enthusiasm of which I am not ashamed, as its object is to improve the taste of my countryman, to increase their reputation, to reconcile to them the respect of the world and procure them its praise.

Thomas Jefferson in his letter to James Madison (sent from Paris in 1785)¹

From the founding fathers to Cardinal Richelieu and the most prominent Chinese dynasties, it has been recognised that products of culture, in their widest possible meaning, have significant impact on the reputation of a country abroad. As defined

* PhD, Universities of Oxford, New York, Sarajevo and Belgrade, teaches 'Public Diplomacy' at the Sarajevo School of Science and Technology. Her book "Public Diplomacy: Towards European Voice in Global Dialogue" was published by Synopsis in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina in May 2012.

¹ As quoted in Cynthia P. Schneider, "Culture Communicates: US diplomacy that works", in Jan Melissen, (Ed.), "The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations", Studies in diplomacy and international relations, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p.147. The letter was dated September 20, 1785 in John P. Kaminski, *Citizen Jefferson: The Wit and Wisdom of an American Sage*, Madison House, 1994.

by Jefferson (and he recognised it without even trying), culture not only improves the ‘taste of fellow countrymen’ but also promotes its place of origin and reconciles the people who produced it with the rest of the world. A cultural product brings prestige to the entire nation from which it comes and that prestige has always been a valuable asset in international affairs.

Defining the Terms and Main Concepts

Before we explore of the potential of this emerging regional broadcaster to exercise a public diplomacy role by opening a platform for dialogue, there are four key terms in this article which need to be discussed.

The first is **public diplomacy**. As there is no globally accepted and adopted definition of this increasingly important academic discipline, it is necessary to explain how this term is understood in this article.

In the view of the author, public diplomacy is government organised, co-organised or indirectly supported two-way communication activity, in the broadest possible sense, that aims to ‘influence foreign audiences’ by cultivating public opinion abroad. In its highest form, public diplomacy contributes to increasing trust and mutual understanding, and may serve as an effective conflict prevention tool or as a tool of reconciliation after a conflict. In order for it to be considered ‘diplomacy’, government needs to be involved in some capacity either directly or indirectly; the definition neither excludes inter-governmental organizations, nor international or supranational regimes.

This definition of public diplomacy clearly separates it from propaganda, as public diplomacy needs to be based on genuine dialogue and two-way communication, while the foreign policy needs to be understandable and, if possible, acceptable, as there is no effective public diplomacy method which will successfully promote a bad foreign policy. Even the best public diplomacy achievements get destroyed, and money gets burnt, if a destructive policy is adopted.

This article will not engage in a discussion on different definitions and understandings of public diplomacy. None the less, for the purpose of this article, it would be valuable to understand that in its lowest form it is a sophisticated and complex process of ‘getting people on your side’ by the power of argument. This means influencing opinions, attitudes, sometimes even beliefs, of people in foreign countries. There are different methodologies and approaches but in any case this influence is exercised through the usual message multipliers such as journalists, writers, other public figures, current and future opinion formers, but also through the population – which only consumes and does not create the substance. In its highest form public diplomacy is about a genuine dialogue that brings nations to mutual respect, understanding and trust. For that influence to happen, for that trust to be achieved, exchange of ideas has to happen. That transaction, which can

be secured with or without government support, goes via communication through cultural products. In this sense nations communicate through art, fashion, design, sport, architecture, industry, innovation, literature, science, media, film, music. All of these cultural products affect how people think about their places of origin, and all of these products have influence.

Hence, public diplomacy is here understood as a highly complex umbrella concept within which different forms of public diplomacy can be practiced, from academic exchange, cultural exchange or any sort of exchange, to cultural relations, intercultural dialogue, public relations, nation branding and all sorts of activities that involve anything that may influence opinion and attitudes abroad.

The second key term in this paper is **culture**, which the author treats as the tool of public diplomacy. By culture we mean all that a nation does to explain itself to the world by sharing ideas, art, information, literature, language, news. That constant exchange is a significant component of the public diplomacy effort. In essence, what is meant by culture here is pretty much what the Council of Europe (CoE) recognises as culture, that is “everything relating to ways of life, customs, beliefs, as well as the various forms of artistic creation or world perception, which stands for values and ways of thinking”.²

The third key term is **dialogue**. It is most commonly defined as the exchange of information and views between two actors or representatives of two groups. In order to do the job of public diplomacy – build reputation, reconcile and bring a country closer to the rest of the world – culture needs to be ‘exported’ somehow. It has to, somehow, enter into a dialogue with other countries and audiences around the world. This dialogue is where the exchange of ideas happens, where concepts meet and people interact directly or indirectly, as individuals or as groups. This interaction between different, or not so different, cultures occurs in **intercultural dialogue**. The main aim, which a knowledgeable public diplomat understands and cares about, is to secure a deeper understanding of diverse perspectives, positions, values and beliefs in order to reach common understandings and to establish trust, which may, in turn, serve as a conflict prevention tool in times of crisis or conflicting interests. These ‘common understandings’, ‘shared meanings’ and trust are all immensely important and much needed goods in the Balkan region. Exploring possible platforms for developing them is not only academically intriguing but also a socially responsible act.

The working definition of intercultural dialogue, which was necessary for the development of the CoE White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue, clearly reveals this public diplomacy dimension. The CoE White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue gives great prominence to the ultimate goal of public diplomacy. It claims that while arguing “in the name of the governments of the 47 member states of the

² See The concept of intercultural dialogue, Council of Europe, http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/intercultural/concept_EN.asp#P30_3374

Council of Europe that our common future depends on our ability to safeguard and develop human rights, as enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights, democracy and the rule of law and to promote **mutual understanding**” (emphasis added).³ The working definition established for the purpose of writing this white paper stipulates, intercultural dialogue is “an open and respectful exchange of views between individuals and groups belonging to different cultures that leads to a deeper understanding of the other’s global perception”.⁴

In order for this dialogue to function it must be based on the **interactions of equals**. In addition, if it is to produce any results, intercultural dialogue, as any dialogue whose aim is to be constructive, has to be genuine. This is emphasised because while speaking about intercultural dialogue we are not talking about a mere ‘tolerance of the other’ but about a genuine dialogue which will in some way ‘change’ both of participants and allow them to at least understand the position or the reasoning of the other. There is no genuine dialogue if any party in the dialogue assumes superiority in any way. Cultural initiatives and dialogue, as well as other public diplomacy actions, are to be evaluated on the basis of their quality, not on the basis of political efficacy.

Luckily, some countries have recognized the long-term, non-quantifiable nature of relationship building through ‘dialogue based public diplomacy’, as Riordan puts it.⁵ In this context, it is high time to persuade statesmen and their diplomats all over the world of what can be achieved and ‘bought’ by branding and what can be accomplished by consistent, well strategized and organized public diplomacy effort. Ideally, **21st century public diplomacy** should be based primarily on common understanding of (at least) the basic dynamic of the contemporary world rather than on a narrowly defined national interest in which brands and identities compete. The 21st century environment calls for state networking, cooperation and collaboration, as serious issues cannot be tackled at the national level without cooperation and collaboration with others. **Dialogue** is the starting point for all of these actions. For cooperation and collaboration to happen a common view and shared meanings are needed, and for that to be achieved, dialogue based public diplomacy is essential. And this is, of course, easier said than done. Not everybody is for mutual understating and dialogue of equals. Not everybody knows how to facilitate such a dialogue, and not everybody has the willingness and resources to

³ White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue *Living Together as Equals in Dignity* launched by the Council of Europe Ministers of Foreign Affairs at their 118th Ministerial Session, Strasbourg, May 7, 2008, p.4. Retrieved from http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/intercultural/source/white%20paper_final_revised_en.pdf

⁴ See The concept of intercultural dialogue, Council of Europe, retrieved from http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/intercultural/concept_EN.asp#P30_3374

⁵ Shaun Riordan, *Dialogue-based Public Diplomacy: A New Foreign Policy Paradigm?* Discussion Papers in Diplomacy, No. 95, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, November 2004.

facilitate a genuine **intercultural dialogue**. In addition, the biggest earners may in fact earn more from conflicts that arise due to lack of understanding and thanks to divisive politics than from the cooperation that comes as a result of common understanding and a collaborative approach to life and state affairs.

‘Hot’ Media Instead of Cold

The implicit aim of any genuine dialogue needs to be understood as well. It aims to broaden one’s prospective and to try to understand the other side, including the rationale behind his or her actions. For mass media, like radio and television, engaging in such a dialogue seemed impossible. However, a broad understanding of not only globalization but also of the digital age created a situation in which Al Jazeera Network turned traditionally one-way ‘cold’ media, as television used to be called, into two-way media that became ‘hot’. It developed a dialogue-oriented model of broadcasting in which both the producers and the audience create meaning or an understanding of events, which is the ultimate goal of any authentic public diplomacy. And not only that, its interactive TV platform became integrated with the even more interactive 2.0 web. Habermas’ theory of communicative action seems to come into implementation here, as the communication model that was offered provided a platform for ‘negotiated understanding’.

From the perspective of those trying to contribute to international peace and stability, intercultural dialogue is indispensable firstly between neighbours, as the CoE Working Group on intercultural dialogue claims, and this is exactly where the main interest of this paper lies. It focuses on the region whose cultural ties and dialogue (as well as all other channels), were brutally cut by the war of the 90’s, the consequences of which are still very much present. Moreover, the lack of common understanding of what happened in the countries of the Western Balkans in the 90’s, presents the root cause of almost all remaining unresolved regional problems.

It should be recognised that the connections between the countries of the former Yugoslavia have been re-established to a great extent. However, a *facilitator* of a genuine intercultural dialogue in the region has been lacking. There have been no actions similar to the Franco-German activities after World War II to, for example, write joint history books, nor have there been massive student exchange programs between Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Croatia. At the same time, the overwhelming number of media outlets in the region, to a smaller or a larger extent, have remained under the influence of the politics that prospered, and still prospers, from divisions and conflicts and from people’s ignorance of the facts about what has been happening beyond the borders and why.

It is in this environment that the paper elaborates on an emerging platform for intercultural dialogue in the countries of the former Yugoslavia. The dialogue with one’s neighbour, as with every dialogue, not only has to be genuine, but it needs

to happen in a shared space as well. That space does not have to be physical, and very often it is not, thanks to technological development. It may be created via media and remain in a virtual environment. This paper focuses on exploring the direction and potentials of one particular new space for intercultural dialogue, and that is the new emerging regional broadcaster Al Jazeera Balkans (AJB) that started airing its news and current affairs program on November 11, 2011 in its headquarters in Sarajevo.

Intercultural Dialogue via International Broadcasting

It is well known that in order to promote ideas, values and policies, cultural and language institutions, such as the *Goethe Institute*, *British Council*, *Confucius Institutes*, *Dante Alighieri Institute* and similar institutes were founded. Institutions promoting culture, language and academic exchange became important tools of public diplomacy, like *German DAAD* or the *American Fulbright Commission*. A thick network of cultural and educational brokers has been developed with the aim of providing an opportunity for foreign elites to understand other nations' goals and culture.

The use of the media for the same purpose is not a novelty either. France started *Radio France International* in 1931. The *BBC World Service* followed a year after. The US followed them with the *Voice of America* in 1942. The German answer came in the form of *Deutsche Welle* in 1953. The international television broadcasting of the 80's followed the radio era, including, for example, French *TV5*, and later *France 24*, the British *BBC World News*, the Iranian *Press TV*, the Chinese *CCTV*, *Russia Today*, the Italian *RAI*. The list is long.

It is clear that **international broadcasting** has become one of the main tools of the public diplomacy effort of many countries, but not all of them understand the importance of editorial independence for the success of the operation. Some of the stations mentioned above in essence play a public diplomacy role in the true and genuine sense, disseminating certain social and political beliefs and values and opening a platform for dialogue and the exchange of ideas. However, some have not moved from the 80's Cold War propagandistic model. That might have brought some results in the 20th century communication and technological context, but it has proven to be fruitless in the era of the 21st Century with its multifaceted, numerous, unrestricted communication channels, 2.0 web and social media networks. Many have failed to understand that the issue is not lack of information, which somebody needs to provide, but a lack of attention, and in some cases interest, due to a waning educational culture in many parts of the world – the disappearing culture of learning.

The relatively new international broadcaster Al Jazeera seemed to understand this, as well as the shift of focus of international broadcasters, which happened along

with the shift of the foreign policy focus of many countries. Al Jazeera focused on the Arab world before the other established international broadcasters made their shift and re-focused on the Arab world.

The Beginning of 'Al Jazeera Time'

Al Jazeera departed from the method of traditional international broadcasters that presented a state-centric and often elitist point of view and created the phenomenon of giving voice to those who were voiceless. The story of the Doha based international broadcaster owned by the state of Qatar started on November 1, 1996 with an Arabic news and current affairs satellite TV channel, which rapidly developed into a powerful network with several outlets, including special TV channels and Internet platforms functioning in multiple languages.

Doing the unthinkable in the Arab world, by airing dissenting views, and doing the unprecedented in the Western world, by 'giving a voice to terrorists' it gained the most precious thing in this age of instant and global communication – attention. Following the events of September 11, 2001 the station gained **global attention** for its airing of the Osama Bin Laden videos and for its coverage of the war in Afghanistan (live) from its office on the spot. Many heard about Al Jazeera after September 11, 2001. All of us in the US heard about the station when it started airing videos of Osama Bin Laden and the Taliban. Many American friends and colleagues criticized Al Jazeera for 'giving voice to the terrorists'. However, those who understood the terrorist networks knew about the Al Jazeera outreach and its credibility among Arabs far earlier than the Western governments. The terrorist networks wanted to reach that audience. Al Jazeera used the opportunity and grabbed attention in the global cacophony of news and voices. It might be safe to say that what the first Iraqi war in 1991 was for CNN – turning that TV channel from the *Chicken Noodle Network*⁶ (as it was colloquially called before 1991) into a global TV news leader and *agenda setter* – September 11 was for Al Jazeera, turning it into an *agenda shaker* that at the same time fiercely shakes the authoritarian regimes.

Al Jazeera English soon started to receive official recognition. By 2011 it received the Columbia Journalism Award from one of the top world schools, Columbia University's Graduate School of Journalism, for "singular journalism in the public interest".⁷ The station became a brand itself and has been considered to be the fifth most influential **global brand** behind Apple, Google, Ikea and Starbucks.⁸

⁶ Danny Schechter, CNN at 20: *From Chicken Noodle Network to Global Media Power*, MediaChannel.org June 8, 2000, retrieved from: <http://www.alternet.org/story/9282/> on May 19, 2012.

⁷ See Al Jazeera English to be honoured with Columbia Journalism Award Columbia Journalism School, May 4, 2011, retrieved from: <http://www.journalism.columbia.edu/news/406>

⁸ Views of readers of brandchannel.com Global rankings retrieved from: http://www.brandchannel.com/boty_results/global_list.asp

“So dazzling was the network’s rise that its news soon became *the* news. And during the last week of March (2003), following the launch of its English-language website, Al Jazeera was the most searched-for term on both Google and Lycos.”⁹ According to AJN facts and figures, it broadcasts to more than 220 million households in more than 100 countries. In ten years Al Jazeera made a long journey, from being bombed in 2001, when the Al-Jazeera Kabul office was destroyed by a US missile¹⁰, to being praised by the US Secretary of the State Hilary Clinton, who gave the public diplomacy certificate to Al Jazeera before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, claiming that Al Jazeera “has been a leader in changing people’s minds and attitudes” indicating to the US media that AJ airs the real news.¹¹

The timeline would indicate that in 2006, when Al Jazeera English started, the government realized that Al Jazeera could be good for Qatar beyond the Arab world. Thanks to Al Jazeera, a country of 11,850 square kilometres and of 743.000 habitants became a foreign policy actor. The size of its political clout became disproportionate in comparison to the country’s size. Qatar became the sponsor of negotiations between Syria and Lebanon in 2011. The small state of Qatar gained the reputation of a mediator and established itself as an international actor, which would have been unthinkable without the Al Jazeera effect. Without it, the 2022 Football World Cup in Qatar would also be unlikely. The WikiLeaks scandal revealed US embassy cables claiming that the Qatari government used the power of Al Jazeera for smoothing its relations with other governments.¹² While AJ refuted the US cables, it is undeniable that the investment in AJ brought a disproportionately high public diplomacy effect. Now the Network is extremely well positioned; millions are watching, and not only those who want the news but also those who analyse where AJN will go from this point. The secret of its success so far might lie in very few editorial suggestions: avoid self-censorship; avoid commentary; focus on the news; do not try to please the owners; do not embed with any army or any source. While journalists of almost all other stations

⁹ See: Abram D. Sauer, *Al Jazeera tough enough?*, Brandchannel, April 28, 2003, retrieved from: http://www.brandchannel.com/features_profile.asp?pr_id=122

¹⁰ Al-Jazeera Kabul offices hit in US raid, BBC News, November 13, 2001, retrieved from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1653887.stm

¹¹ “Like it or hate it, it is really effective”, Clinton said. “In fact, viewership of Al-Jazeera is going up in the United States because it is real news.” This is how the Huffington Post covered this big media story started by Secretary Clinton at the time when the other American media were preoccupied with the habits of actor Charlie Sheen. See: David Bauder, “Hillary Clinton’s Al Jazeera Comments Draw Attention of U.S. Media”, May 3, 2011, retrieved from: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/05/hillary-clintons-al-jazeera-us-media_n_831788.html

¹² Robert Booth: WikiLeaks cables claim Al-Jazeera changed its coverage to suit Qatari foreign policy, US Embassy memos contradict the Arabic satellite channel’s insistence that it is editorially independent despite being heavily subsidised by the Gulf state, *The Guardian*, December 6, 2010.

were happy to embed themselves with the US troops in Afghanistan and Iraq, that was forbidden for Al Jazeera journalists and the world could tell the difference. The difference was also obvious in the reporting of the Arab Spring where this *agenda shaker*, and, indirectly, *agenda shaper*, turned into an *opinion former*. For example, Noah Bonsey and Jeb Koogler wrote in the Columbia Journalism Review “the way in which the station covers any future Israeli-Palestinian peace deal could well determine whether or not that deal is actually accepted by the Palestinian people”. These authors recognized that Al Jazeera is a “widely watched station in the Middle East and a subject of fascination to many Western analysts” which may become an “additional obstacle whose influence on the conflict has not previously been fully acknowledged or understood.”¹³

When shaping views, attitudes and opinions, **Al Jazeera as a public diplomacy actor** is different from other international broadcasters as it does not promote one particular state, but rather the Arab point of view and the belief system. Thus far it has not been doing this in a propagandistic way; hence it has gained credibility rather swiftly in a very difficult and complex communication environment. It has been confronting our own prejudices and stereotypes about the Arab world, while at the same time fighting prejudices against the network itself. What has been evident is that Al Jazeera has put people in dialogue, and has given a platform to those who could not penetrate the mainstream Western media.¹⁴ All the awards and recognitions, as well as its expansions, indicate that the Al Jazeera network is currently on a big rise. Its most recent expansion is to the Balkans.

Al Jazeera Balkans

It was on November 11, 2011 that the AJ Network launched its Balkans channel and website, and started broadcasting across the region from Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was after a year and a half of intense recruitment, training and construction ensuring that AJB entered a regional market of more

¹³ See: Noah Bonsey and Jeb Koogler, “Does the Path to Middle East Peace Stop in Doha? Al Jazeera’s influence on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict”, Columbia Journalism Review, February 16, 2010, retrieved from: http://www.cjr.org/campaign_desk/does_the_path_to_middle_east_p.php?page=all

¹⁴ It took my students of public diplomacy only two months of active watching of several international broadcasters, while doing research for their mid-term papers, to form the perception, that AJ English, for example is a sophisticated public diplomacy tool, but not so much of a particular state, as in the case of some other international broadcasters. It is a public diplomacy tool of the Arab and the Muslim world in general, they concluded. In all class discussions we had, , their impression, and impressions and perceptions are the key in this public diplomacy business, was that they “learned so much about the Arab world by watching AJ English and realized how prejudiced they were”. Public diplomacy scholars and practitioners know all too well that creating this sort of influence and paradigm shift is the ultimate goal of public diplomacy. (Public diplomacy, class discussions, Sarajevo School of Science and Technology, April 2012).

than 20 million people, counting on a large diaspora from each of the six former Yugoslav republics and beyond. Instead of catering for separate ethnic markets, AJB took a region-wide approach.¹⁵ It was decided that AJB would broadcast in the common language spoken in Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro, with the main studio in Sarajevo, and branches in Zagreb, Belgrade and Skopje, with plans to deploy 15 correspondents in 11 countries.

During the preparations Al Jazeera experts were coming to Sarajevo while new recruits were travelling to Doha for interviews and trainings. An unprecedented story began, as the staff hired by AJB came from the countries in the region that were at war with each other in the 90's. Regional journalists and producers came to Sarajevo, a city wracked by war and under siege from 1992 to 1995 which was, the author believes, a public diplomacy exercise in itself.¹⁶ In addition, public diplomacy awareness of the top management was evident from the start. Sheikh Ahmed bin Jassim Al Thani, the director general of the Al Jazeera Network, in his first statement on the new member of the AJ family, indicated the public diplomacy aspect of the channel as well as the importance of dialogue in the region.¹⁷

Six months later he came to Sarajevo to attend the Third International Investment Conference 'Sarajevo Business Forum' where he continued expressing clear public diplomacy intentions and speaking public diplomacy language better than many professional diplomats. He expressed the hope that Al Jazeera Balkans will "stimulate bigger social, political and economic understanding in the region".¹⁸

AJ Balkans became the first region-wide TV news service since the 1990s, when the former Yugoslavia broke up. The channel started with airing six hours of daily program. Programs of Al Jazeera English cover the rest. The goal for the first year was to cover domestic developments in each of the ex Yugoslav countries almost as thoroughly as the main national TV networks. That goal has probably been achieved, but not so much because of the immaculate quality of the AJB programming. It was more a result of the poor production and editorial quality of many domestic TV stations which mostly continue to run on the autopilot set

¹⁵ AJB Correspondents are based in Podgorica, Pristina, Mostar and Banja Luka as well as in Washington, London, Berlin, Vienna, Moscow, Beijing, Istanbul and Jerusalem. It also has the possibility to draw on the resources of 70 Al Jazeera bureaus worldwide. AJB Press Statement, November 11, 2012, retrieved from: <http://www.balkanopen.com/articlev.php?id=412>

¹⁶ Sami Zeidan, an Al Jazeera presenter recognised this as one of the significant public diplomacy features of AJB while emphasizing that journalists from former enemy countries started working together. "Here they work together, reversing the effects of conflicts fought to keep people separate." As quoted in AJB Press Statement, Doha, Sarajevo, November 11, 2012. Retrieved from: <http://www.balkanopen.com/articlev.php?id=412>

¹⁷ "We believe AJB can truly be an open free platform for the people of Balkans to debate and to have a free dialogue", statement by Sheikh Ahmed bin Jassim Al Thani, the director general of the AJ Network, Ibid.

¹⁸ Sheikh Ahmed bin Jassim Al Thani, the director general of the Al Jazeera Network, Speech at the Sarajevo Business Forum, May 16, 2012 (<http://www.sarajevobusinessforum.com/>)

in the bloody 90's. The anchors and news producers of AJB came from those domestic stations with deeply rooted national perceptions as well. Their personal views and beliefs sometimes popped up in the process of news production or in the middle of a live program. However, the professional bar was set high and the very existence and functioning of such an office has affected perceptions, prejudices, and stereotypes and sometimes even deeply rooted beliefs of the AJB journalists.¹⁹ The initiator of the AJB Project, and now general manager of AJB, Edhem Fočo, claims that AJB was a result of a series of spontaneous events and set of circumstances: "We had the right guys, in the right place, at the right time. It was as simple as that."²⁰ At the time, the idea was to establish Al Jazeera Turkey but the project was not moving forward. There were also plans to establish Al Jazeera in Urdu and Hindi, spoken by 700 million people, and then in Spanish. All of these markets were much bigger and more attractive in economic terms than the one in the Balkans, with its population of around 20 million.

The catalyst for the development was a bankrupt TV station in Sarajevo with a license until 2022; however, establishing an AJ station only for Bosnia and Herzegovina was out of the question. A bigger project was needed, and so the idea to involve the other countries in the region that used to have one media and one public space, evolved. Clearly there were other interesting regions both economically and politically. By all measures, the Balkan countries are not emerging, attractive markets, nor are they as politically significant as they used to be. However, the conclusion of the AJ Team was that they still matter strategically. There was a strong belief amongst the soon to become AJB management that AJB could become regional leader in news programming. The AJ Team was persuaded to fly to Sarajevo and explore the potential for themselves. A ten page report was written after the mission, recommending the operation. One of the arguments was that Al Jazeera must live up to its motto of '**giving voice to the voiceless**'. The people of the Balkans had lost their voice, the argument went, and this is where Al Jazeera should be. In addition, it was argued that "countries are grouping everywhere, the Nordic, the Baltic, the Gulf. It was about time for the Balkan countries to come closer together."²¹

And, two years later AJB distinguishes itself from the rest of the TV stations in the region not only because of its luxurious production facilities, network of correspondents, and interactive video wall. The programming is different as well. No TV station in the ex Yugoslavia, for example, ever dedicated its valuable news time to informing the public about products that would change people's lives, for example by airing a story about the first video store or the first ATM machine. "It was all considered a commercial in ex Yugoslavia. We try to change that,

¹⁹ Goran Milić, Director of the Programming, May 9, 2012.

²⁰ Interview, Edhem Fočo, General Manager of AJB, Headquarters, Sarajevo, May 4, 2012.

²¹ Interview, Edhem Fočo, General Manager of AJB, Sarajevo, May 4, 2012.

following the example of AJ English. The goal is to show the fact that there are things, far from politics, that can affect our lives.”²²

The director of the programming Goran Milić, a well know TV face of the former Yugoslavia, claims that he did not know the top management of the AJ Network when he was interviewed for the job.²³ One of the dilemmas he needed to solve was the language that would be spoken at AJB. That was resolved by agreeing that everybody at AJB should speak in his or her own language, and to try not to mix the languages if possible. The second issue to be clarified was objectivity. It was agreed that objectivity does not mean neutrality, as neutrality would mean treating a victim and a perpetrator the same way. If it were to stick to its slogan ‘Giving voice to the voiceless’, AJB, like the rest of the AJ Network, would need to side with the ordinary people, with the ‘voiceless’, if it were to side with anybody.

The next dilemma was about the recognition of borders and states, which is still a burning issue in the region of ex Yugoslavia. The decision was made to follow the UN and the situation on the ground. For example, the UN has not recognized Kosovo, while Kosovo has all institutions of a state on the ground. The lack of status in the UN and the facts on the ground do not match, so AJB does not show the map of Kosovo at all. Regarding its practical feasibility, the AJB operation became cost-effective when serving the entire Network, as running the operation in Sarajevo is not as expensive as it is in London. The resources deployed in the Bosnian capital are now used for testing new methods and the workflow. For example, the new graphics for the entire AJ Network were created in Sarajevo. Also among the positive factors in the argument for AJB was that it would be able to service the entire AJ Network with good quality coverage of the Balkans. No scientific study on its impact on viewers has been conducted yet. However, when randomly asked, the people in Bosnia and Herzegovina often state that AJB is a ‘breath of fresh air’, producing “news after which you are neither upset nor scared of someone”.

Contrary to the Demonization of Small Differences

What the viewers can see after nine months of airing is well-produced and objective, but not neutral, news coverage. In almost every program interviewees are from – at least two and usually three – countries in the region, discussing real issues of everyday life. The focus is not on artificially produced issues which engineer divisions, and that seems to be a firm editorial policy so far. It should also be noted at this stage that cultural differences in the Balkans are not large, so AJB

²² Goran Milić, AJB Director of Programming, Sarajevo, May 9, 2012.

²³ “When I went to Doha, the general director Wadah Khanfar was leading the Interview committee. I was not given a task. We discussed the principles that AJ Network wanted to promote in the region. One of the things they said they wanted is that the AJB develops to be capable of providing good news service to the entire AJ Network and to cover the region well in the future. However, I wanted to solve some dilemmas before making a decision.” (Ibid)

is not about shifting perceptions about cultures that are significantly different, as AJ English might have been doing in the West when reporting about the Middle East. The people in this region used to live within one country, they share a large part of the same cultural heritage, and generations were socialized within the same educational and social system. However, the demonization of the ‘small differences’ was what much of the media propagated during the 90’s.

An **intercultural dialogue** is now going on, and on a daily basis; the focus is on the importance of highways or on sustainable energy resources, environmental issues or issues of unemployment and investments, as well as on the common cultural heritage. A prime example of this was the dialogue-structured AJB emission dedicated to *stećci*. The AJB evening talk show Context, aired on May 17, 2012, presented the topic, involving two historians – one from the studio in Sarajevo and the other in Belgrade – in a direct dialogue about the joint project of four countries in the region for the nomination of *stećci* for the UNESCO list of World Cultural Heritage.²⁴

Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina submitted the nomination, initiated by Bosnia and Herzegovina, and did it jointly. The story itself is a story of cultural relations with a public diplomacy effect. AJB gave valuable TV time to this project, probably the only joint project in the region which was not initiated by international institutions but by domestic forces. It concerned the cultural affirmation and preservation of 22 necropolises in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2 in Croatia, 3 in Serbia and 3 in Montenegro.

That alone would be enough for any story to contribute to a genuine public diplomacy effort and the global cultural promotion of the region. But there was more to the story. The expert historians to whom AJB gave time clearly indicated the multi-ethnic character of *stećci*, clearly stating the fact that the different peoples in the region used to have a common tombstone, and that they therefore have not been divided by everything under the sun since ancient time, as the ‘spokespersons’ of the bloody 90’s claimed.

Putting an emphasis on this story like nobody else in the region, AJB indicated that, in essence, it works against the ‘demonization of small differences’ insisted on by so many other media in the 90’s and even later.

Research indicates that AJB has defined its target audiences in the same way in which a good public diplomacy strategist would. The management is well aware that major shifts are not possible in the short run. They are also aware that there are people in the region who do not want to know, not just about what is happening in neighbouring countries, but also about what is happening in their own countries. And those people will never be AJB viewers.²⁵ AJB is thus attempting to attract

²⁴ It was about the joint effort for protection of monumental medieval tombstones (*stećci*) that are scattered across Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the border parts of Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia.

²⁵ Statement given in the interview with the AJB General Manager in Sarajevo, May 4, 2012

‘**people who want to know more**’, the usual target audiences of public diplomacy activities: those who are influential in their communities and in the environment in which they operate; those who belong to the centres of power (government, political parties, NGOs, any centre that has some degree of power to change things); and prospective youth.²⁶

Currently AJB has 165 employees and only five of them work in administration. It has been around for six months only so it is impossible to measure overall public diplomacy effects at this stage – and they are difficult to measure anyway. However the potential for making such an impact can be discussed considering valid parameters. One indicator of influence is that related to the willingness of top decision makers to appear in a program. And these indicators are good for AJB. Every president in the region has so far responded positively to the AJB call as well as all other decision-makers, power holders or opinion-makers and ordinary people. Some of the interviewees from Pristina for example, did not want to enter into a direct dialogue with a representative from Serbia, but did so in the end because “they did not want to refuse the invitation of Al Jazeera”.²⁷

The distribution of AJB in the region is growing. AJB is still not aired via all major cable operators in Serbia for example, but mainly for commercial, not political reasons.²⁸ The AJB operation costs 12 million EUR per year, and indicators of its efficiency seem to be higher than for AJ English or Arabic, as its administration is very small.

What Was Found?

The research indicated that its very operation opened an intercultural dialogue, as well as creating other dialogues. The fact that the journalists, who are primary opinion-makers, come from the region, most of them with their own prejudices, views and stereotypes, and are put together to collaborate, is a public diplomacy operation *par excellence*. Their intercultural dialogue began 18 months before AJB was aired for the audience of the ex Yugoslav countries. The dynamic that developed among the AJB staff was far better than anybody expected, hence it is not surprising that the same dynamic is offered to the audience.

Every anchor or journalist speaks in his or her own native language, as does those interviewed by Al Jazeera – and everybody understands everybody. This linguistic

²⁶ It seems that the trajectory in reaching the target audience of youth is more than promising in the first six months. AJB is the media with the highest number of YouTube subscriptions in the region, which usually indicates a younger population. At the time of the research, done in March, April and May, AJB had 2000 You Tube subscribers and plans to go even further in integrating Internet and TV, increasing the interactivity of AJB even more.

²⁷ Statement given under Chatham House Rule in the period of preparation of AJB, March 2011

²⁸ AJB is aired via small operators in Serbia, but neither via the big ones, eg. SBB (Serbia Broadband) the leading Serbian cable operator nor via IKOM but negotiations are ongoing. Source: *Top management of AJB*, May 2012.

understanding, if this constant dialogue continues, has a great chance to spill over and to translate into better understanding in the region and into the production of 'shared meanings', and 'common understandings' of the past and present, all of which are necessary for projecting a vision of a more stable and prosperous future for the region.

The dialogue between people in the region seems to be constantly open, through the reporting, documentaries and info-sharing as well as via daily dialogue shows in which experts, public figures and opinion-makers give their views on current issues from Belgrade, Sarajevo, Zagreb, Skopje, Pristina or Podgorica. In this context, the channel opens a platform for direct and almost constant dialogue between the countries and people who used to live together in one country but who were separated by the wars that marked the dissolution of former Yugoslavia. Entertainment in the media has been dominant for more than a decade. The prioritization of commercial success rather than of social responsibility has had its toll on the quality of programming in the entire region. However, AJB claims that it has the resources and patience to sustain the competition. The research clearly indicated that AJB does not seem to care about ratings in the same way other commercial stations do. They claim to have time and the patience to become the regional leader in a very specific media niche, the one of news and current affairs TV which is integrated with Internet.

Concluding Remarks

Intercultural dialogue cannot fix all the problems but it can facilitate exchange of views, open channels of communication, diminish prejudices and gradually 'build bridges', opening the door to appreciation of the values and ideals that are characteristic of a certain country or people. In order to open such a channel and deploy soft power in this way, hard dollars, plus a bit of wisdom and expertise, are needed.

We have to be aware that as long as public diplomacy, and all the approaches and activities under its umbrella, amount to only about 1/3 of 1% (one third of one percent) of the military budget, as in the US, this conflict prevention tool cannot develop effectively nor build a reliable bridge. That requires time, consistency, sufficient human and financial resources, a great deal of expertise and awareness at the top and a bit of stubbornness and passion among practitioners as well. Of course, when facing sheer terror and violence it is easy to dismiss the power of intercultural dialogue, which often appears too soft and peripheral to the real security issues. Hence, it has to be emphasised that intercultural dialogue and other dialogue based public diplomacy actions are not so much tools to solve conflicts, as tools for preventing conflicts from arising. This is because 'knowing each other' always comes in handy in times of crisis, and can certainly oil the wheels of reconciliation.

It should also be understood that reputation, truly, cannot be constructed. It can only be earned. The research indicated that AJB provides a platform for and seems to be willing to support the action of projecting a new and prosperous picture of the region when it becomes real. And that picture is not the one projected in the short-term 'Enjoy' campaigns, in which a member of a Balkan nation practices yoga on the top of the beautiful mountain. Yes, the mountains are gorgeous indeed and so are the coasts and the world may be persuaded that this part of the world is worth visiting, but it would still refuse to appreciate the disregard for the respect of the human rights of various minorities, or the destructive rhetoric that feeds the conflicting dynamic, and the world would continue to treat these regional countries as objects rather than the subjects of international affairs.

The picture, which AJB has the resources to project, would need to reflect a real change of attitudes, policies and practices, which would reflect the real aspiration of the region to become a stable and prosperous part of the world. This must not be about window-dressing and short term banding campaigns or declarative statements. People do not only listen to what leaders say or pay for, they also monitor what kind of policies they create and implement. With 21st century technology, the global audience monitors more closely and quickly than at any time during the history of mankind, and instantly detects inconsistencies.

What AJB airs so far in its own programs as well as while transmitting AJ English is that, in essence, peoples are not better or worse, they are just different, and the way to discover those differences and beat the negative stereotyping that usually leads to conflict and misunderstandings, is to enter into a dialogue via all available communication channels. AJB seems to be on the way to contribute to this noble cause. Yes, AJ has an agenda as every public diplomacy actor does, but this one in the Balkans seems to be worth supporting as it has a potential for reconciliation, which could lead to much needed regional stability.

Years to come will show whether that so far unprecedented opportunity in the region will be deployed in the best interest of the peoples of the countries of ex Yugoslavia, which suffered so greatly at the end of the 20th century. That and the growing use of Internet, has a chance to bring people to mutual understanding and towards shared meanings, which good public diplomacy insists on.

A lesson, again, needs to be taken from European history, which has been "peaceful and productive whenever a real determination prevailed to speak to our neighbour and to cooperate across dividing lines".²⁹ AJB has proved that sort of determination, providing a platform for reaching '**negotiated understanding**' of what happened and what is happening, and this may shape what will happen in the region's future.

²⁹ White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue "Living Together as Equals in Dignity", launched by the Council of Europe Ministers of Foreign Affairs at their 118th Ministerial Session, Strasbourg, May 7, 2008, p.4, retrieved from: http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/intercultural/source/white%20paper_final_revised_en.pdf_p.16

Rethinking Cultural Diplomacy: European Cultural Policy and Intercultural Dialogue

Martina Borovac Pečarević*

This paper raises the question on cultural diplomacy, its legacy and future perspectives in the context of contemporary European cultural policy. The European cultural policy from its inception was based on applying the principle of subsidiarity, and it was difficult to talk about ‘common cultural policy’. However, DG Education and Culture has started in 2006 to develop a strategic approach and to build a European cultural policy that would complement the national policies and fill the gaps in transnational cooperation and distribution of the creative content beyond the national borders and beyond the EU.

UNESCO 2005 convention and the new European Agenda for Culture adopted by the Commission in 2007 along with a fresh design of the Culture programme paved the way to the first ever-structured cooperation of the European Commission with the EU Member States and cultural operators and civil society. Traditional understanding of culture has been broadened into larger societal context embracing economic values, skills, social inclusion, intercultural dialogue, intellectual property and innovation. International pillar of the cultural cooperation became inseparable dimension of external relations. Culture unified with the successful MEDIA programme is now ready to grow. New and modern Creative Europe programme is a step for Culture on its way to help the European idea to spread and sustain.

However, common EU strategy on culture in the EU’s external actions is lacking. One of the strategic objectives of the 2007 European Agenda for Culture was to promote culture as a vital element in the EU’s international relations. Under the Work Plan for Culture 2011-14, ‘Culture in external relations’ is identified as a priority area. Significantly, it has not led so far to cultural merging like in the case of common regional or bilateral cultural centres or initiatives. Intergovernmental cultural cooperation should be understood not so much as what governments do amongst themselves, but as a sum of joint policies they articulate in order to ensure the best dynamics of European cultural diversity and its cultural resources.

* PhD, Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, Zagreb, Croatia.

It should shift from the event-oriented, bilateral practice to a more strategic and multilateral level.

Smart Power as a form of cultural diplomacy is becoming more and more significant. On this basis, cultural diplomacy is not secondary to political or economic diplomacy, but functions rather as an intrinsic and necessary component of it. Cultural diplomacy can therefore be seen as a crucial foundation of all political activity. In that context, as the world has moved from the bi-polarity of the Cold War to the present hetero-polar world, cultural diplomacy, as a smart/soft power, has also gained in significance.

Next generation cultural diplomacy should revise traditional definitions of culture that still prevail in the programmes of intergovernmental cultural cooperation, so as to include new cultural phenomena, emerging fields of creation, like for example digital arts, and notions of culture that fuse disciplines and sectors. Discussion focuses on aspects of cultural diversity and stresses the importance of intercultural dialogue in Europe. It continues around the notion of redefinition of cultural identities, the possible existence of the common European identity and tends to offer answers on whether European multiculturalism is based on pluralism and equality of individual and collective culture or on a subordinated position of minority cultures within imposing national cultures.

Culture has always been a powerful tool in hands of skilful diplomats. Therefore, I shall raise the question of cultural diplomacy within the context of European cultural policy and its new emerging tendencies, which put a special emphasis on the role of intercultural dialogue.

European Cultural Policy

From its very beginning, the European cultural policy was based on applying the principle of subsidiarity, and it was difficult to talk about ‘common cultural policy’, which means that culture is traditionally in national jurisdiction. The approaches to culture differ from country to country which renders the process of reaching consensus on issues related to European cultural policy even harder. To provide an example, Belgium, Germany and Austria have a federal approach to cultural policy; on the other hand, Ireland, Great Britain, Denmark, Netherlands, Finland and Sweden keep their culture under the authority of delegated cultural agencies. That is to say that culture is in the hands of independent foundations and funds for financing of culture. France, Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece have centralized model of cultural policies that fall under the national authority. Besides that, until

the Treaty of Maastricht the field of culture was not among the range of interest of the European Parliament. In that context The Council of Europe and UNESCO exclusively dealt culture.

Before the Maastricht Treaty, European Community did not have a special impact on culture. Culture was inexplicitly present within some ad hoc initiatives done by the EU. However, since the Treaty, we have witnessed a growing interest in culture and art production. The EU Treaty, in particular Article 128, legalized the position of culture, which led to numerous widespread initiatives for the development of common dimensions of cultural policy.

Today we have more widespread initiatives for the development of common dimensions of cultural policy. The European institutions' relevant documents regarding cultural policy as well as strategies and programmes, which outcome will be known in the future, serve as a reminder to the direction the European cultural policy is prone to take. These documents, strategies and programmes provide insight into the new cultural policy profile that embraces cultural diversity, intercultural dialogue and external cultural policy of the EU.

There are three common sets of objectives of the European cultural policy on which the consensus was reached by all member states. Firstly, the emphasis is put on cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue. One should mention here the importance of UNESCO's Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, which was a major step forward and was ratified by 117 Member States as well as the European Union. Secondly, there is the aspect of cultural and creative industries, and finally there is the external cultural policy of the EU.

Historically speaking, the idea of unification of European civilization arose among a group of European intellectuals during the First World War, but besides some sporadic ideas that have seen the light in the 1940s and 1950s of the last century, the first real attempt to formulate an European cultural policy happened during the period of Recession in the 1970s, big oil crisis and during the first enlargement of the EC. All the later attempts mainly focused on the idea of cultural production within the economic aspect.

Due to Article 128 of the Treaty of Maastricht the position of European cultural policy was eventually legalised as a logical step forward in the pursuit of the already on-going process. The article stresses out the EU's intention to contribute to the flourishing of culture in the member states, while at the same time puts an emphasis on the important role of national and regional diversity and underlines the idea of common cultural heritage. The article 128 has in a way confirmed the principle of subsidiarity. The real step forward was a more direct involvement of the EU institutions and their role in a decision making process on cultural issues. The Lisbon Treaty has brought up a few changes, but the only important change since the Treaty came into force regards the procedure itself. The decision-

making in the Council is to be treated under Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) as opposed to the former unanimous vote. Until December 2009 and its entry into force, all cultural measures were agreed by a co-decision procedure shared by the European Parliament and the Council, with decisions in the Council having to be taken unanimously. The key impact of this could be a progressive weakening of national veto in cultural affairs, which is a very sensitive point. However, as there is still no possibility of harmonization of regulation in the cultural policy area, the QMV rule will apply principally to decisions concerning the format and scope of the funding programmes – so, it would undoubtedly make it easier to increase the size of cultural budget in the future. Nevertheless, the primacy of national policy remains a corner stone of cultural action in Europe. And although QMV facilitates decision-making, it had no important consequences on cultural issues so far.

It was not until 2007 with the first European cultural strategy – The European Agenda for Culture in a globalising world that the EU decided to take a more serious interest in dealing with culture related issues. Besides Agenda a new Culture 2007-2013 Programme, as well as MEDIA 2007 Programme, have been launched. The new programmes put a special emphasis on cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue. It is rather clear that the idea behind it is to elaborate on the concept of *united in diversity*. That is the path developed in the so-called new tendencies in the field of European cultural policy.

For the future of the EU's cultural policy the new culture programmes are extremely important. Those are: *2011-2014 Working Plan for Culture; Creative Europe*, that is to say *2014-2020 EU Culture Programme*; documents like *Green Paper on the potential of cultural and creative industries* from 2010, but also the new generation of the EU public policies like *EU 2020 Strategy* and *Europe 2030 Project*.

It is important to stress out that the new generation of the EU culture programmes emphasises the role of regional and local administration and civil society. In that context *Agenda 21 for Culture* from 2004 should be mentioned as the most important document on local cultural policies, which introduces an obligation of the local administration to cooperate with the civil society in the implementation of cultural policies and programmes.

The European Agenda for Culture in a globalising world opens a new chapter of cooperation on cultural policy at European level. It was endorsed by the EU Member States in Council Conclusions adopted in November 2007 on a Commission's proposal. For the first time, all partners – European institutions, Member States and civil society – were invited to pool their efforts on explicitly defined shared goals, which are:

1. The promotion of cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue,
2. The promotion of culture as a catalyst for creativity and innovation in the framework of the EU Lisbon Strategy for growth and jobs and its follow-up and the Europe 2020 Strategy, and

3. Promotion of culture as a vital element in the EU's international relations, which is the basis of the recent EP's *Resolution on cultural dimensions of the EU's external actions*, which emphasises the role of cultural diplomacy.

The EU's Culture Programme (2007-2013) has a budget of €400 million for "projects and initiatives to celebrate Europe's cultural diversity and enhance shared cultural heritage through the development of cross-border cooperation between cultural operators and institutions". With additional € 700 million subsidizing the European film and € 3 billion from structural funds, also used by the cultural sector, culture accounts for only 0.1% of the EU budget. This means that actually only 0.05% of the EU budget is earmarked for direct financing of art and culture. In addition to that there is a problem of austerity measures and cutting down of national budgets in most of the EU member countries, which endangers the position of culture and art. Culture programme aims to secure funding for projects, organisations, promotional activities and research in all areas of culture, except the audio-visual sector, which falls under a special MEDIA Programme.

The Culture programme aims to achieve three main objectives: **1.** to promote cross-border mobility of those working in the cultural sector, **2.** to encourage the transnational circulation of cultural and artistic output, and **3.** to foster intercultural dialogue.

Based on the strategic objectives set out in the European agenda for culture and drawing on the achievements of the Work Plan for Culture 2008-2010, the current work plan for culture 2011-2014 provides six priority areas for the cultural field under which specific activities will be pursued. Those are: cultural diversity, intercultural dialogue, accessible and inclusive culture, cultural and creative industries¹, skills and mobility, cultural heritage², culture and external relations and promotion of the ratification of the *Unesco Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions* by partner countries, and finally, culture statistics.

This working plan is important for the future culture programme *Creative Europe* that will begin in 2014. Closely linked with the future programme is a Culture Action Europe campaign 'we are more', which is a Europe-wide arts advocacy campaign with concrete goals and a long-term ambition. The message

¹ Cultural industries – cinema and audiovisual, publishing, music and crafts – are also important sources of revenue and of jobs, employing more than seven million people or 4,5% European GDP and 3,8% employed labour force which is more than automobile industry, with a huge growth potential. Having said this I would like to underline that there will always be a way to justify the existence of cultural policies with economic growth, but it would be better to steer the programmes towards the common developmental goals, intercultural communication and social cohesion.

² This includes the digitisation of cultural heritage, work on film heritage, *European Heritage Label* and *Europeana*.

of the campaign says “we are more than entertainers, and Europe is more than coal and steel”. The economic contribution of culture cannot be the only goal of implementation of the *Creative Europe*; the real challenge is to open up new possibilities for the participation of culture in the whole range of its developmental targets. The campaign is anchored in the political context of the EU today and has measurable and time-bound goals. The campaign aims at increasing the budget for culture, improving and providing more explicit support for culture in the EU regional development fund. An added value of this campaign is that it seeks to generate new networks and alliances, builds up stronger capacity at national level and improves advocacy in cultural civil society networks.

Europe 2020 Strategy and *Project Europe 2030* represent new generation of public policies emphasising innovation, creation and knowledge based on human capital and promoting European values. It is important to mention these documents because they have a more implicit reference to culture. Culture is viewed as a question of creativity, value, knowledge, but in the part of the study dedicated to the EU external policy, we do not find any reference to culture. So, it is essential to enhance the role of the Culture and MEDIA Programmes in the context of the economic growth and opening of new jobs. Therefore, the integration of culture in the new European strategies is indispensable.

Cultural Diplomacy

Cultural diplomacy is a way of connecting cultures by using the means of soft power in order to exchange cultural goods, heritage, values and ideas, whether they promote national interests, build relationships or enhance socio-cultural understanding. Cultural diplomacy in the 21st century is one of the most powerful tools in fostering peace, stability, tolerance, cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue.

We could say that, at this point, cultural diplomacy is still mainly a national initiative. Governments are firm believers in bilateral agreements. More than 300 bilateral agreements are in force in 31 European countries (EU27 + Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway) at the moment. It relies on reciprocity, hence the expression ‘cultural relations’ rather than cultural diplomacy. Governments tend to engage in international cultural cooperation with primarily political, not cultural aims. In a way, international cultural cooperation could be seen as an extended form of diplomacy, particularly when it is left in the hands of foreign affairs ministries. Ministries of foreign affairs and ministries of culture are perceived to differ in the general aims of their activities insofar as the former are often engaged in promotional work whilst the latter tend more often to get involved in processes where technical and creative structures might develop. Over the last few years, intergovernmental cultural cooperation has increasingly tended to address general audiences where previous

targets had been specific intellectual or diplomatic elites. Important differences are found in Europe among those countries, which empower national arts organisations and national cultural institutes to further strong international connections and those countries where less autonomy is allowed.

This can also be perceived in the extent to which countries take part in multilateral, as opposed to bilateral, engagements. Because of the prevalence of bilateralism, international cultural cooperation is often reduced to international cultural exchange. This in fact means that the governments or organisations from two countries exchange cultural goods or visits driven by the logic of reciprocity: a presentation of 'national culture A' in 'country B' is often followed by 'culture B' being on display in 'country A'. The forms vary, with big events (Europalia, European Cultural Capitals, international exhibitions, etc.) taking a large share in contemporary cultural cooperation. Recent years have shown an improvement in the integration of the technical, logistic and managerial expertise into the external cultural activities where national governments take part, with the result a more professional standard of programming and presenting, often borrowed from the experienced cultural institutions and their staff. National cultural institutions, including national theatres, ballet companies or national museums, are often mentioned in the proposals for international cultural cooperation and expected to engage in transnational mobility. Such institutions may see this as an interference with their own artistic planning, yet it compels them to break a tendency to concentrate solely on national audiences.

As for the future trends in international cultural cooperation, governments will continue to play a cooperation role through cultural actions according to the needs of their domestic or international political agenda. It is expected though that such activities will be planned with a wider examination of their effect on the particular sector both at home and abroad. Advantages drawn from such collaboration might prompt national governments to entrust the task of monitoring international cultural cooperation in Europe through an agency with special reference to intergovernmental actions. And yet, governments will tend to engage in cultural interaction on the basis of promotional goals and economic and political interests but leaving increasingly to the professional agents the task of organising and managing the specific activity. As national governments realise that the effectiveness of their international cultural cooperation depends on the quality input and engagement of cultural organisations themselves, they will make their policies and planning procedures more flexible and participatory so as to involve the arts and heritage sector in the planning and not only in the implementation.

Besides diplomatic action, driven chiefly by promotional and economic motivation, national governments might decide to support stable long-term alliances and partnerships between and among cultural organisations, since they bring an important learning experience and strengthen the professional qualities

of the sector. Intergovernmental cultural cooperation will increasingly absorb those values that rest on the notions of European diversity, solidarity and 'people to people' cooperation.

In short, national governments need to renew the rhetoric of international cultural cooperation making the language of their declarations, policy papers, and agreements reflect the new political realities in Europe and the world and new cultural trends, especially in the interaction of artistic creativity and cultural industry.

Intergovernmental cultural cooperation should be understood not so much as what governments do amongst themselves, but as a sum of joint policies they articulate in order to ensure the best dynamics of European cultural diversity and its cultural resources. It should shift from the event-oriented, bilateral practice to a more strategic and multilateral level, which actually means that traditional cultural diplomacy within Europe, should become obsolete, as the logic of a common European cultural space increasingly prevails and cultural organisations integrate their international engagement, at least within Europe, in their daily work. Multilateral consensus ought to be achieved in order to ensure equity between all European countries in the scope and intensity of their international cultural engagement and in order to avoid unbalanced presence of strong cultures in small nations without prospects of reciprocity. Multilateral commitment is also needed in order to set clear standards of non-state and minority cultures and languages, for them to be adequately involved in intergovernmental cultural cooperation.

Mobility of professionals, of works and artefacts remains the essential part of international cultural cooperation. National governments should develop mobility enhancement schemes in order to enable their cultural operators to go abroad and to receive at home cultural operators from abroad, in short term visits, stages, internships, and longer residences. National governments should stimulate the role of and ensure the transfer of expertise among local and regional authorities, and provide the necessary coordination and coherence on the strategic level.

It would also be important for national governments in Europe to boost international cultural cooperation outside the EU, primarily with the countries of first proximity in Eastern Europe, South-Eastern Europe and the Southern Mediterranean. In those zones, cultural diplomacy could play a major role to weaken ignorance and prejudice, dispel hatred and intolerance and to stimulate mutual respect, trust and understanding. Migrants and communities issued from migration processes should be seen not only as a reason for international cultural cooperation with their countries of origin but as a primary resource in developing this collaboration. Unfortunately, at the moment a common EU strategy on culture in the EU's external actions is lacking, although it has been identified as one of the strategic objectives of all new EU's cultural programs and strategies. For example in the 2007 European Agenda for Culture or the Work Plan for Culture 2011-14 promotion of culture as a vital element in the European Union's international relations is

identified as a priority area. Significantly, it has not led so far to cultural merging like common regional or bilateral cultural centres or initiatives.

EP's *Resolution on the cultural dimensions of the EU's external actions* (May 2011) emphasizes the importance of cultural diplomacy and cultural cooperation in advancing and communicating throughout the world the EU's and the Member States' interests and the values that make up European culture. The Resolution stresses the need to devise effective strategies for intercultural negotiations, and considers that a multicultural approach to this task may facilitate the conclusion of beneficial agreements, putting the EU and third-country partners on an equal footing. It emphasizes the need to adopt a comprehensive approach to cultural mediation and cultural exchange and the role of culture in fostering democratization, human rights, conflict prevention and peace building. Also, it encourages the launch of policy dialogues on culture, such as that recently initiated between the EU and India, in order to strengthen people-to-people contacts. And last but not least, it calls on the EU external relations and European External Action Service and the Commission to coordinate the strategic deployment of the cultural aspects of external policy, incorporating culture consistently and systematically into the EU's external relations and seeking complementarity with the Member States' external cultural policies, or more concretely to set up a cultural diplomacy directorate within the Service, because at the moment the EEAS does not include any position relating to cultural aspects.

Now – a couple of words on the term 'soft power', which cannot be avoided when we are speaking about cultural diplomacy. In general, two broad approaches to conducting regional and international relations can be distinguished – that of 'hard power' and 'soft power'. Whilst the 'hard power' approach has historically been a favoured policy of governments in conducting international and regional relations, the increasingly interconnected world stage highlights the need for cooperation on a new level. This is where the role of soft power as a form of cultural diplomacy becomes significant. On this basis, cultural diplomacy is not secondary to political or economic diplomacy, but rather functions as an intrinsic and necessary component of it. Cultural diplomacy can therefore be seen as a vital foundation of all political activity. Cultural diplomacy has acted as a peacekeeping force in a number of situations throughout history. With increased social exchange and the platforms in place to promote it, the future potential for cultural diplomacy to improve mutual understanding on all levels is highly significant.

Becoming 'the biggest provider of development aid in the world', the Union increased that way its credibility and strengthened its position. In 2004, some authors like Mark Leonard or Jeremy Rifkin even published books contending that, despite limited military resources, Europe will influence the US with its 'soft power'. But as some authors (like Terence Casey) demonstrated, "translating soft power into actualized power is difficult and, paradoxically, may require more hard

power than Europe possesses”. In short, “much of European soft power derives from its (hard) economic power”. Yet, the financial crisis has demonstrated the limits of this frame and stressed on the necessity for the EU to renew the concept and the results. The EU has to move beyond the limits of its current policies. Providing a favourable ground for many major topics such as the European security and defence policy (ESDP) and the first step toward the emergence of a European citizenship, ‘a new European smart power’ could be part of the answer. To summarize, the concept of ‘smart power’ is the combination of hard and soft power and perhaps looking at current conflicts in the world today, the only way for the EU to get international recognition as a global actor. It is, with trade, the major aspect of the new Common Foreign and Security Policy.

Cultural diplomacy has also gained in significance as the world has moved from the bi-polarity of the Cold War through multi-polarity to the present hetero-polar world that has to be managed by soft power. The rise of the BRIC countries is shifting the global balance of power and necessitating a renegotiation of relationships with these countries. The European Union maintains an ever-closer relationship with emerging global partners of the EU, including China, India, Brazil, Mexico or Russia. In each case the action of the EC is focused on the following elements: the presence of cultural provisions in international agreements, the establishment of sustainable policy dialogues on culture with emerging partners of the EU and the use of existing cooperation mechanisms for the benefit of culture.

Most of these emerging powers already understand the importance of cultural diplomacy in their external relations and are actively developing this aspect of their foreign policy while respecting the principles of intercultural dialogue as for example China in the current EU-China Year of Intercultural Dialogue. The main objectives of the Year are promotion of intercultural dialogue and mutual understanding between the EU and China through cultural exchanges and ‘people-to-people’ contacts and establishment of structured cooperation between Chinese and EU cultural institutions and organizations. The Year covers not only culture, but also related fields that contribute to mutual understanding and exchanges between civil societies, in particular education, research, and exchanges between intellectuals, multilingualism and youth.

But the power shift in a hetero-polar world does not only mean the shift from West to East, but also the shift from similarity towards respecting difference, from isolation towards connectivity and networking, from military, ‘hard’ solution towards diplomatic, ‘soft’ ones.

Intercultural Dialogue

Since the beginning of the new millennium we have witnessed a number of developments like migration flows that have significantly changed the population

diversity of some European countries, EU enlargement, globalization and geopolitical changes, new means of communication and the concerning rise of incidents of discrimination, racism and populism. All these developments have given intercultural dialogue (ICD) a more prominent place on political agendas. That is why in all recent EU programmes, ICD features as one of the priorities, that is to say as an instrument or political strategy for promoting cultural diversity and social cohesion. There is no single and universally accepted meaning of intercultural dialogue.

When the European Commission launched 'European Year of Intercultural Dialogue' (EYID) by asking 27,000 EU citizens what they thought the phrase meant, by far the most common response (36%) was total puzzlement. However, a forum organised by the Council of Europe in 2006 suggested the following: "an open and respectful exchange of views between individuals and groups belonging to different cultures that leads to a deeper understanding of the other's world perception". Other definitions or usages have been closer to concepts such as inter-religious dialogue and often to active citizenship learning. In a number of countries the phrase refers to dialogue between indigenous people and immigrant people, and it can also be used as a metaphor for forms of contact between countries, that are not based on military power. Intercultural dialogue has long been a principle supported by the European Union and its Institutions. But the crucial moment was when the year 2008 was designated 'European Year of Intercultural Dialogue' (EYID) by the European Parliament and the Member States of the European Union. It aimed to draw the attention of people in Europe to the importance of dialogue between diverse cultures and support the EU's commitment to solidarity and social justice.

The White Paper on intercultural dialogue by the Council of Europe from 2008 describes the ICD as the process through which the society develops and transforms. ICD is also referred to as valuable factor of the social cohesion. ICD improves the cohesion of the culturally different societies based on the principle of mutual respect and promotion of cultural diversity without the intention of forming culturally homogenous societies. According to the White paper there are 5 prerequisites for promotion of ICD: democratic running of cultural diversity, participation, development of intercultural competencies, making space open for dialogue and international dimension of ICD.

Platform for Intercultural Europe is a civil society initiative taken in the context of the European Year for Intercultural Dialogue 2008. This platform puts an emphasis on ICD practices in the areas of major diversities, mainly urban areas in which the ethnic diversity comes as a result of new and old migration flows. In 2008 the Platform issued the Rainbow paper as a result of a participative process in which many organisations came together to shape the voice of European civil society in the field of ICD. It sets out Platform's approach to ICD and interculturalism and

delivers its recommendations both to its own constituency and to public authorities at all levels in Europe, using the European Union as the point of access. It sets out the principles of the intercultural experience: dialogue, competence and action and recommends concrete actions on ICD.

When talking about the ICD, it is important to clarify the idea of **multiculturalism**, which stems out as one of the key factors of the European cultural policy. It has become commonplace for Western liberal democracies to describe themselves as multicultural societies, even though only a few had embraced official policies of multiculturalism.

Recently, right-of-centre governments in several European states, notably the Netherlands and Denmark, have reversed the national policy and returned to an official monoculturalism. A similar reversal is the subject of debate in the United Kingdom, among others, due to evidence of incipient segregation and anxieties over 'home-grown' terrorism. Several heads-of-state have expressed doubts about the success of multicultural policies: The United Kingdom's Prime Minister David Cameron, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and former French President Nicolas Sarkozy have all voiced concerns about the effectiveness of their multicultural policies for integrating immigrants.

The current problems linked to multiculturalism have their relevance to the discussion. The fact that multiculturalism in the European countries has not been based on the respect of different cultures but quite on contrary to finding the way to reach a solution to the growing number of immigrants that had been invited as a labour force in the time of need. Such a European or better said Eurocentric model of multiculturalism failed to secure the survival of his or her own culture. It has isolated them from the dominating national culture and by doing so the European culture has defended itself from penetration of foreign influences. The basic problem is in the perception of multiculturalism as a framework for coexistence of different cultures that is to say '**plural monoculturalism**'.

We can deduct that the EU links the multiculturalism with xenophobia and extremism while strengthening the national dimension in the cultural policies of European countries as a response to globalization, migration and multicultural challenges. This is the reason why we consider that today multiculturalism as a concept is in real danger. We need to modify or introduce a new concept of accepting the models of intercultural approach which implies interaction of cultural societies and which leads to abandonment of neoliberal global monoculture. That is precisely what ought not to be done in the SEE region, where it can be used as a factor of social cohesion that can reduce conflicts or in other words be used as a smart power that failed in the Western Europe, but could fall on fertile ground in the SEE region.

The question remains on what the consequences of such positions will be on the future of EU policies towards Balkans and Turkey. Now that the islamophobia is

on the rise in the Western European countries, we can raise the question of the Turkish accession to the EU, but the Balkans as well. In case Turkey joins the EU by 2020, the EU population will reach 600 million people out of which 100 million will be Muslims. These current problems (of integration and multiculturalism in the EU) open up many pending issues which still have not been dealt appropriately. Intercultural dialogue represents the way toward solution or at least the way to diminish the destructive consequences of the contemporary migration processes because it contributes to real integration of immigrants and serves as a factor of social cohesion. It is clear though that these aspects that I have mentioned give possible answers to national and global questions but not the final solution. There are numerous issues that are reopened every day.

Another important aspect that will contribute to dealing with conflicts on global level from EU's point of view is acknowledging culturing the importance it deserves since it has become an integral component of all EU policies to the point of becoming crucial in various sectors, some as surprisingly as the Common foreign and security policy. We often forget that Europe is first and foremost a cultural entity because it is too often considered in economic terms. European culture, for most Europeans has become a major political and philosophical issue. So-called 'geo-cultural' issues constitute, along with geopolitical and economic issues, a governance axis. The EU's current mode of cultural action, intrinsic to national policies, is unable to address these issues. Indeed the EU should completely rethink its conception and political implication of culture, and recognize its great importance, both for the success of European integration, and for the new civic relationships, which are developing today in our local, national and global communities. From this point of view it is indeed paradoxical that we still cannot talk about the EU's cultural policy because it does not exist as such. It remains though a very sensitive issue because we must, at all times, be aware of and respect the essence of the European culture, which is **cultural diversity**.

Building the EU layer of cultural policy remains an important imperative for the European Union and its future. Increased cultural heterogeneity in combination with an unprecedented technological development of the past two decades opened a possibility for our life to become more dynamic, open, and democratic. At the same time they increased the risk of deeper exclusion, closeness, and even xenophobia.

The role of culture becomes in this respect fundamental since it creates a matrix in which creativity develops. It is an irreplaceable catalyst of the mind opening and the main building material of the social fabric bringing to the front ethical and moral values, so important for the sustainable development of our society.

References:

1. Article 167 (ex Article 151) of the Lisbon Treaty – Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Official Journal of the European Union C 115/47 (9.5.2008).
2. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on a European agenda for culture in a globalizing world, Brussels (10.5.2007), COM(2007) 242 final.
3. Council Conclusions on the promotion of cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue in the external relations of the Union and its Member States, 2905th Education, youth and culture Council meeting, Brussels, 20 November 2008.
4. Creative Europe – A new framework programme for the cultural and creative sectors (2014-2020), COM (2011) 786/2.
5. Decision No. 1622/2006/ec of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 2006 establishing a Community action for the European Capital of Culture event for the years 2007 to 2019.
6. Decision No. 1855/2006/ec of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 establishing the Culture Programme (2007 to 2013), Official Journal of the European Union, L 372/1.
7. Haigh, A. *Cultural Diplomacy in Europe*, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 1974. (<http://eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED102067.pdf>)
8. Report on the cultural dimensions of the EU's external actions (2010/2161(INI)), Committee on Culture and Education, Rapporteur: Marietje Schaake A7-0112/2011, (31.3.2011).
9. The Rainbow Paper *Intercultural Dialogue: From Practice to Policy and Back*, Platform for Intercultural Europe, 2008.
10. White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue *Living Together as Equals in Dignity* launched by the Council of Europe Ministers of Foreign Affairs at their 118th Ministerial Session, Strasbourg, 7 May 2008.
11. Work Plan for Culture 2011-2014 – Conclusions of the Council and of the representatives of the governments of the member states, meeting within the Council – 3046th Education, youth, culture and sport Council meeting, Brussels, 18 and 19 November 2010.

The Role of the Regional Cooperation Council in Promoting Intercultural Dialogue in South East Europe

Jovan Tegovski*

Excellencies,
Distinguished participants,
Dear friends,

At the outset, I would like to express my appreciation to the organisers and to the host for making this event possible and my sincerest gratitude for inviting the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) to take active part in the discussion on the role and effects of intercultural dialogue in broader terms and in particular in the context of South East Europe (SEE).

The RCC is, by now, a pivotal platform for guiding and monitoring cooperation in SEE, building on the genuine regional ownership and input from the region itself, and being supported by European and international partners. Under the umbrella of Southeast European Cooperation Process (SEECPP), the RCC, as a status neutral and all-inclusive cooperative platform, focuses on developing the project-oriented aspect of regional cooperation in the priority areas of Economic and Social Development, Infrastructure and Energy, Justice and Home Affairs, Security Cooperation, Building Human Capital and Parliamentary cooperation, and recently Media development, thus assisting the countries from the region in their European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations and, certainly, contributing to the promotion and strengthening of the intercultural dialogue in SEE.

The complexity of the political, economic, security and social environment on regional and international level, as well as the diversity of the region in terms of culture, history, religion, ethnicity, legacy of the past wars and conflicts, are influencing the overall context of the RCC mission. It is obvious that in such complex environment our work must be complemented by best use of diplomacy in creating and ensuring sound and stable climate for developing and enhancing the regional cooperation. After four and half years of its establishment, the results RCC has achieved in all of its priority and other areas of cooperation are the best confirmation of the success of its diplomatic and expert engagement materialized in a numerous concrete regional projects.

* Chief of Staff, Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) Secretariat, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina

A genuine regional cooperation process in this corner of Europe emerged, and currently evolves, as we look to the determination of the SEE countries to contributing to the prosperity in an environment of peace, security, good neighbourliness and stability. So long as the importance of regional cooperation will continue to grow, the results of the RCC will further contribute to the relaxation of political and social relations in the region, to the stepping up of European integration process and to the enhancement of intercultural dialogue in this part of Europe. We must be recurrently reminded of the role intercultural dialogue has in achieving these goals through no other than a better understanding of the '*self and the other*'.

The overall assessment of regional cooperation in SEE is positive and encouraging. Despite the unfavourable economic situation and oscillating trends in bilateral relations, several important breakthroughs were recorded. Needless to say, European and Euro-Atlantic integration has been marked by a positive determination to move forward, where dialogue has always been an inherent pre-condition for not only materialisation of the required reforms but also for creating conditions for reconciliation, better mutual understanding and confidence building.

Bearing in mind the differences inherent in the institutional relations of SEE countries and in particular of the Western Balkans with the EU, the period behind us has been marked by gradual and firm advancement by each of them on the European integration path. The region by now includes acceding countries preparing to join the EU and I would like to use the occasion and congratulate our host Croatia as the first country coming from the Western Balkans to become full member of EU on 1st July 2013, countries that are in the accession negotiations, countries that have been granted candidate status and are expecting to start EU accession negotiations, countries working to achieve candidate status, countries whose European aspirations are pursued within a different institutional framework, as well as several EU member states.

However, the protracted open issues and the current economic crisis, which have the potential to spill-over into the social and political spheres, depict the other less encouraging developments in the SEE region. It goes without saying that these developments can become residual, perpetuating the climate of unfinished peace and unattained durable stability with inevitable effects on the EU enlargement process. Dealing urgently with these open issues, thereby creating a climate conducive to alleviating some of the harsh consequences of the current economic crisis, can be the best formula for avoiding delays as regards the region's ultimate goal to become part of the EU and Euro-Atlantic community.

As we look to the successes several RCC members from SEE, also members of the Central European Initiative (CEI), have achieved on their way towards EU membership, we must not forget the importance common areas of work have in initiating and sustaining a constructive cooperation and dialogue. The fruitful

cooperation between RCC and CEI, which have developed and are developing joint projects as a way of enhancing their capacities to respond to potential emerging challenges in their areas of activity is an excellent example.

This dual role, innate in organisations such as RCC and CEI, has so far been one of the keys to the genuine political, economic, cultural dialogue in SEE, thereby promoting a greater rapprochement, reconciliation and pragmatism among its countries. And, in this complex exercise the RCC has confirmed its ability to act as a promoter of dialogue among different cultures and religions, dignity of peoples and respect for their national linguistic, cultural and religious diversity in the SEE region. RCC is a place where countries of SEE meet, sharing many cultural similarities and at the same time bringing their own distinct features, making it a truly unique platform for intercultural dialogue among the countries and the peoples of the region. A very important example of this particular feature is the RCC Secretariat, where 35 people from almost all countries of SEE with different cultural, ethnic, linguistic and religious background on a daily basis are working together, exchanging experiences, knowledge and opinions, thus providing a personal contribution to the development of intercultural dialogue.

Certainly, one of the most important principles for ensuring success of the overall process of regional cooperation is the all-inclusiveness. The RCC strives to ensure that the respect and practical application of this principle serve the long-term interests of its members from the region the best. An all-inclusive participation at the events organised within the RCC framework was witnessed in the course of 2011 and 2012.

Taking into account the direct or indirect positive effects of the concrete RCC results on the intercultural dialogue, it is worth mentioning few of the most important.

The RCC took over the management of the South East Europe Investment Committee (SEEIC) from OECD; elaborated the 2011-2013 Regional Strategic Document on Justice and Home Affairs and its Action Plan, which covers fight against trans-border organised crime, anticorruption, migration, asylum, refugees, fundamental rights and cooperation in civil matters; developed a regional mechanism of cooperation among the Chiefs of Military Intelligence, the Heads of the South East European National Security Authorities, and the South East European Counter-Intelligence Chiefs Forum etc.

Taking into account the importance of the United Nations (UN) Alliance of Civilisations (AoC) Regional Strategy on Intercultural Dialogue and Cooperation in SEE and the complementarities of its with the RCC's goals, in particular those related to fostering peace and development, education and youth, media and migration, let me share with you a short assessment of the RCC work in its priority area of Building Human Capital and Parliamentary Cooperation. In this area the RCC has been making the most of this genuine intercultural dialogue when strengthening cooperation in the fields of science, education, culture, etc. The

positive climate for development and implementation of the agreed projects was further improved by growing awareness that the capacities of the region to face future challenges should be rooted in its knowledge, assisted with introduction of new scientific sectors and technological breakthroughs and based on the solid grounds of reformed education systems and efficient legislative bodies.

The RCC flagship project in the field of science and research is the Regional Strategy for Research and Development for Innovation for the Western Balkans (RSRDI) which is an illustrative example of an efficient communication with both national institutions in SEE and international partners. The aim of the project is to develop a strategy that will foster cooperation at regional level by interconnecting research institutes, pooling resources, training scientists and transferring knowledge across the region to increase its competitiveness.

The RCC had a leading role in the establishment of the RCC Task Force on Culture and Society – in the framework of transition of the Ljubljana Process to the RCC. The Task Force, as a new regional mechanism to coordinate activities at the regional level and monitor progress of the implementation of Ljubljana Process II, was established in June 2011 and the TF Permanent Secretariat was opened in Cetinje, Montenegro. The RCC and its TFCS strengthened cooperation and promoted partnerships with other relevant mechanisms and initiatives at national, regional and international level, including the Council of Ministers of Culture of South East Europe and UNESCO. The focus has been on exploring possibilities of cooperation on other potential regional projects such as the cooperation among national museums in SEE, creation of the Regional Film Fund, implementation of the project related to preservation and restoration of cultural heritage in conflict areas in the Western Balkans, etc.

In the field of education, the RCC is paying particular attention to the implementation of project titled Building Capacity for Structural Reform in Higher Education of Western Balkan Countries (STREW), whose main task is to facilitate further advances in effective higher education structural reforms in the Western Balkans and its coherent convergence towards European Higher Education Area. The RCC has an excellent cooperation with the Task Force Fostering Building Human Capital (TFBHC) and Education Reform Initiative for South Eastern Europe (ERI SEE), where discussions are being held to jointly develop three Regional Clusters of Knowledge.

An important venture of the RCC activities is the partnership with Regional School for Public Administration (ReSPA) and European Training Foundation (ETF) confirmed in, for example, co-organising regional events, the most important being the first Regional Training of Education Inspectors (October, 2011), focusing on their role in quality assurance and sustainable Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education policies.

The Second Action Plan 2013-2014 on the implementation of the AoC Regional Strategy envisages a role for RCC, and RCC stands ready to contribute to this

goal in addition to the tasks within its own Strategy and Work Programme (SWP) 2011-2013.

Regional parliamentary cooperation has a substantial positive impact to reconciliation and good neighbourly relations in SEE. This area has recorded stable progress as a clear indication of the new approach in the region which is fostering systematic cooperation among parliaments. Here, I would like to emphasize the excellent cooperation we have established with the European Parliament which has been confirmed by joint organisation of several important events.

The RCC continued cooperation with civil society and supported the endeavours of the Centre for Reconciliation and Democracy in South East Europe in developing and implementing the new phase of SEE Joint History Project.

As we are all aware, media is one of the areas with immense possibilities to influence the use or misuse of differences between the cultures, societies, religions. Recognizing the importance of fostering transition and development towards free, professional and objective media in SEE, the RCC has invested substantial efforts in enhancing its cooperation with the European Association of Public Service Media in SEE, (established in 2010 with the support of RCC and the European Broadcast Union-EBU); facilitated signing of the Protocol on Regional Cooperation in Education and Training among 12 members of the Association; and is currently involved in the development of project titled "How do I See My Neighbour?", entailing a short documentary with the aim to stimulate understanding and dialogue, reconciliation and good neighbourly relations, and promote the image of the Western Balkans as a dynamic space, rich in cultural heritage and innovative skills.

Another important element of the RCC work is the continuous process of communication (through permanent outreach activities among different stakeholders, regularly publishing Newsletter and other relevant information) and its positive impact to the strengthening of the intercultural dialogue. More the people are aware of what, where, in which format and to what purpose we are doing, more they are realizing the importance of the broad network of different regional initiatives and task forces, of the large scope of regional activities involving different national and international stakeholders, of the added value of their work and results.

In conclusion, as the countries of SEE will certainly continue to advance on their path to European and Euro-Atlantic integrations, the RCC will continue to invest its utmost efforts in further enhancing regional cooperation, creating conditions for more regional ownership and assuming, by the directly concerned regional stakeholders, greater regional responsibility. And we are convinced, relying on our results achieved so far, that the benefits of such an endeavour will spill over to the intercultural dialogue and cooperation in SEE.

Thank you for your attention!

Cultural-Historical and Diplomatic Relations of the Republic of Dubrovnik with West Indies and (since 1811) with Venezuela, Colombia and Panama

Zdravko Sančević*

In this paper we are concerned with intercultural dialogue of Croatian Diplomacy, which in the period 1492-1808 was essentially in the hands of the Republic of Dubrovnik (RD, 1358-1808), as the completely independent part of the old Kingdom of Croatia-Dalmatia-Rama (KCDR, 1137-1526) and Croatia-Dalmatia-Slavonia (KCDS, 1527-1918). This plurinomial kingdom of Croatia assumed since 1358 (Peace of Zadar) protection of RD, but which became ineffectual due to the separation occurred between KCDS and RD due to the Turkish and Venetian invasions and conquests (1463-1808).

With Croatia's restoration of independence in 1991 Croatian diplomacy reassumed the old Dubrovnik intercultural dialogue with the countries of the New World, which was initiated with Columbus' discovery in 1492. To illustrate this cultural dialogue we have selected the case of three participants in the independent Gran Colombia (1819-1830) and her independent states since 1811: Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama. We are showing that excellent relations between Republic of Croatia and the three mentioned latinamerican countries are being achieved precisely by reassessing the old multicultural and cultural-historical aspects of diplomatic relations.

We are here shortly presenting five recently discovered cultural-historical aspects related to DR diplomacy which are these days significantly contributing to Croatia's diplomatic relations with the three countries mentioned: Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama and to certain extend also to the other three Bolivarian countries: Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia.

1. Solution of the question of the presence of Croats on the 3rd trip of Cristopher Columbus.

Due to good diplomatic relations of the kingdom of Spaniards and Indians (officially: Rex Hispaniorum et Indianarum) with the Republic of Dubrovnik, it was suspected that on Columbus' four trips to the New World there were some

* Ret. Ambassador, Croatia

Croats. In what was called West Indies i.e. Caribbean Sea area, Central America, and the northern part of South America, Columbus visited with his ships a number of islands and in the only one case (in Eastern Venezuela) Columbus disembarked on the South American Continent. Great majority of non spaniards in these ships' crews had latinized or even hispanized their names in order not to be discriminated. So, it was impossible to identify the Croats by their original names.

On his third trip Columbus was looking for a maritime passage along the western and southern coasts of Central America, and, in particular, in front of northern Caribbean coast of Panama before he retreated to Cuba. By examining maps of north Panama we have detected a promontory called San Blas, a bay called San Blas, a mountains chain (cordillera) called San Blas, archipelagus called San Blas, and a province called San Blas.

Conclusion 1: On the third trip of Columbus there were several Croat voyagers or expolorers who gave too many newly discovered geographical features the name of San Blas. In Venezuela Dr. Ricardo Godigna discovered also a mountain called San Blas next to La Guaira port.

Conclusion 2: Those Croat voyagers or explorers on Columbus ships were from the Dubrovnik Republic which was also called Republic of San Blas (*Republika sv. Vlaha*).

Conclusion 3: Dubrovnik Croats arrived to West Indies not as conquistadores (like Spanish, Portuguese, Nederlands, and British conquerors), but as navigators, explorers, missionaries, and merchands.

2. Dubrovnik Croats in North Colombia Uraba-Vraba/Vrba Bay and region.

While studing a map from my colection (Terre Firme... Venezuela, Nouveau Royme de Granade & c. par N. Sanson d'Abbeville Geographe ordinaire du Roy... à Paris 1656) I have discovered in northern Governacion de Cartage (Colombia) region of Vraba/Vrba and the golf of Vraba/Vrba. Presently the gulf is called Bahia de Uraba. Letter V has been converted in U, and A inserted after R for the sake of easier pronounciation. Now, from where comes Vrba? When the Croat navigators sew Mangle trees in this area, they remembered salicaceae in Croatia. The branches of both similar Croat and Caribbean trees reach the water level from above.

Conclusion 1: Croat navigators settled the area of golf of Vraba/Vrba (Cr.) – Uraba (Sp.) in order to cross by foot Panamenian istmus.

3. Dubrovnik Croats on Pacific coast of Panama settled in Dubrava town and on the islands of Otoque, Saboga, and Taboga in order to build the ships and continue navigating westward across Pacific Ocean, north to California, and south to Peru.

Z. Sančević and A. S. Eterovich have simultaneously and independently detected the following islands south of Panama City with Croat names: Otoque, (Cr.)

Otok, (Eng.) Island; Saboga, (Cr.) Za Boga!, (Eng.) By God; Taboga, (Cr.) Ta Boga ti!, (Eng.) For God's sake. On these islands and the settlement of Dubrava (see the same Sanson's map on which Dubrava was discovered by Sančević), the Dubrovnik Croat shipbuilders in this area built large ships for transpacific crossing (*Crescenzo's print of Dubrovnik Croatian galion*).

Conclusion 1: Having crossed Panama Isthmus by foot, Dubrovnik shipbuilders built large transoceanic ships similar to the one published by Crescenzo in 1607 (the large Croatian flag was courageously displayed on that Dubrovnik galion far away from Turkish dominions where it was not welcome).

Conclusion 2: The idea was to follow Marco Polo (a Croat from Korcula and Venice) and Christopher Columbus ideas of reaching across Pacific Zipango and Katay, and navigating to the norths: California, and to the souths: Peru (in which eventually settled the Croat refugees from Turkish Empire).

We do not know if Croat navigators managed to cross Pacific, but California and Peru were reached by them in the early 16th century.

4. Dubrovnik diplomatic relations with the kingdoms of Hispaniarum et Indianarum and the kingdom of Croatia-Dalmatia-Slavonia and the cultural-historical and diplomatic consequences.

The Republic of Dubrovnik (DR) enjoyed limited protection of Croatian Habsburg kings (Ferdinand's Branch of Habsburgs, 1527-1918) and ample protection of Spanish of W. Indies branch of Habsburgs (1516-1700). As a result DR established great number of consulates in the Habsburg dominions of Europe, especially in Mediterranean. Dubrovnik Republic' navigators were well received in the vast Habsburg dominions in West Indies 1492-1700 and after the Independence of Hispanoamerican countries (Bolivarian countries) in 1811 as the visitors, peaceful navigators, voyagers, merchants, explorers and missionaries, but which were never involved (as a small state) in any colonial conquests like those of great colonial Atlantic powers: Spain, Great Britain, France, Netherlands, and Portugal. They, however, were involved, through their building of the fleet of Twelve Apostols (i.e. 12 large galion battleships, like the one in Crescenzo's print, which successfully fought Caribbean pirates, buccaneers, and corsairs who raided, robbed, and killed Mestizos and Indian coastal population. Besides, foreign pirates also persecuted Mestizo populations among which were also mestitized Croats.

Conclusion 1: Dubrovnik Croats in West Indies always acted as navigators, voyagers, peaceful explorers, missionaries, and merchants, and never were involved in great colonial powers' conquests. Dubrovnik Croats were never conquistadores.

Conclusion 2: Dubrovnik Croats were involved only in fighting Caribbean pirates, buccaneers, and corsairs, and defending local Mestizo and Indian population.

5. The wars for the liberation of Spanish colonies from Spanish crown conducted by the precursor and first combatant Generalissimus Francisco de Miranda (1806-1816) and by Liberator Simon Bolivar (1811-1830) and Croat participaton in them.

Francisco de Miranda, great intellectual, writer, orator, and enciclopedist spoke seven languages, and also was Captain of Spanish army, Colonel of USA army, girondist Field Marshall, Colonel of imperial Russia, Generalissimo of patriotic Venezuelan army. He was the enemy of the Spanish crown, of the Jacobins and Bonapartist that persecuted and almost guillotined him if he did not managed to escape to England. He fought for the independence of USA and of Venezuela (1806-1812), died as prisioner in Carraca jail in 1816. Creator of national flags of Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador, visited the most European countries, all western and central European countries and Russia and Turkey, and also Croatia's Elafitic Islands, Dubrovnik and Cavtat. During his 22-days stay in Dubrovnik Republic (1886) he got inspired by Dubrovnik republican state organization and expressed his admiration for Dubrovnik in his travelog diary (which was found in London and published only in Caracas in 1936) in the following terms: "... This Republic [of Dubrovnik] offers to the sultan [Ottoman] every third year 28.000 pesos fuertes which corresponds to the privilages that [DR] enjoys in Turkish ports and dominions, which in fact is a commercial agreement, while her number of ships was close to 200, and with all of these they live confortably among these rocks – here you can see the advantages of republican state organization."

When Miranda proclaimed the independence of the 1st Republic in Venezuela (1811), he said in his proclamation (July 5, 1811 in Caracas): "... Dubrovnik, whose virtues I admired when I was in it [1786], did not have much arable land and had lot of rocks, but it was brilliantly radiating with its laboriosity and productivity through liberty that enjoyed Dubrovnik Republic with his eighty thousand inhabitants." Croats that participated in wars for the liberation Bolivarian countries were Commander Kazimir Galić (Casimiro Gallicy) and Ivan Pavan, a shipowner from Rovinj that established them selves in Carupano, Venezuela. This family still preserves their Croat consciosness.

Conclusion 1: Miranda, the first combatant fot independence of Bolivarian countries: Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and Panama, expressed his admiration for free and independent Republic of Dubrovnik, which represented for him a model for his planned republics in Americas.

Conclusion 2: Croats also participated in the wars for Latin American independence.

Conclusion 3: Present day approach of Croatian diplomacy through intercultural dialogue and knowledge is particulary sucefull and appreciates by receiving country in establishing closer relations of Croatia with Latin American countries and especially with Bolivarian countries.

As a **final conclusion** we can say that consular representations of Croatia in Latin American countries can much easier be promoted and established through mutual cultural-historical dialogues and consequent mutual knowlage. According to the Vienna Conventions consular representations cannot be involved in recipient countries' internal politics. It is much easier to work according and to persue Vienna Conventions specified promotions of cultural, historic, scientific, comercial, turistic, sports and proper consular relations. All of the mensioned aspects can be effectivelly promoted when there are also significant Croat groups of inmigrants and their descendants established in various Latin American, Caribbean, Central American and South American countries many of them integrated and mestized in local population. Also common Western Civilization strongly contributes to the diplomatic multicultural dialogue. From my own experience, I strongly suggest intercultural-diplomatic aprouches for diplomatic and consular representations.

European Union – Mediterranean Relations and Current Crisis

Lisen Bashkurti*

Introduction

‘European Union – Mediterranean Relations and Current Crisis’ is a complicated subject to be discussed in such a limited time and within the frame of this session. This is because each component of this matter has its own challenges as well as their relations itself are full of problems. Some problems are inherited from the past some others are actually created in these two geopolitical close areas. It is extremely difficult also to give clear definitions for what is going to happen actually in the EU, in Mediterranean Region and in their cooperation process without having a look on history of these two regions.

It seems to be even more unclear what will take place in those areas in the times to come. Both, the EU and Mediterranean are in troubles. The EU inside is facing several institutional, political, economic, financial and enlargement challenges. On the other side, Mediterranean Region is involved in democratic revolutions, actually very chaotic and unclear for the near future. Therefore partnership in crisis between EU-Mediterranean looks like a delicate flower in storm.

1. Mediterranean Region

1.1. Geography

Mediterranean is a Region with very rich geography, history, politics, economy and geo-strategy. The Region is among Europe, Asia and Africa and includes areas wet by Mediterranean Sea. This is the region with different names: Latins, Greeks, Jews and Arabic peoples named Mediterranean Sea or Mediterranean Region in different names, but in very similar meanings: *mediterraneos*, *Mesogeios*, *Mare Nostrum*, *Mare Internum*, *Il Mare Ossidentale*, *Hayyam Hattikohn*, or *al-Bahr al-Abyad al-Mutaeassit*. Those names mean more or less the same. Mediterranean Region has been surrounded by old and very rich civilization, which influence prevailed history, way of life and people’s cultures. Mediterranean Sea and Region

* Ambassador, Professor, PhD, President, Albanian Diplomatic Academy, Tirana, Albania

and its old civilization, economic areas, international waters, three main Canals or Waterways and Irelands scattered throughout the Mediterranean Sea gathered 21 states which share the same beach.

1.2. History

The history of Mediterranean peoples knows the beginning almost 5 thousand years ago, leaving behind Faraone, Greek, Roman and Byzantine cultures as well as Arabic civilization. They are all still present in that huge area creating complexity of interests and diversity of cultures, sometimes in harmony, sometimes overlapped and sometimes crashed with each others.

The Colonial period of history found the Middle East and Mediterranean mostly under Ottoman Empire. Because of that, the independence movement of Arabic and other Mediterranean peoples started during the collapse of Ottoman Empire and later on. After the Second World Wars several regional organizations are operating in that area and Africa, such as the League of Arab Nations, OPEK, Organizations of African Unity and Organization of Islamic Conference. These organizations have been actors of developing multilateral diplomacy in Mediterranean, Middle East and Africa.

During the Cold War the Mediterranean Region was part of bipolar world. The both, Former Soviet Union, the USA and their allies tried to focus their attention to that area mostly during the Arabic-Israeli conflict in 1967, especially after Helsinki Process, in 1975. The first international legal instrument signed and ratified by West and East Blocs during the Cold War was *Helsinki Final Act*, where the Mediterranean Region was involved as the part of two Cold War Blocs legal engagements. It was included under the Chapter “Questions relating to Security in Mediterranean”. It contents:

- “Conscious of the geographical, historical, cultural, economic and political aspects of their relationship with the non-participating Mediterranean States...
- Convinced that security in Europe is to be considered in the broader context of world security and is closely linked with security in the Mediterranean area as a whole...
- Believing that the strengthening of security and the intensification of cooperation in Europe would stimulate positive processes in the Mediterranean region, and expressing their intention to contribute towards peace, security and justice in the region...
- Recognizing the importance of their mutual economic relations with the nonparticipating Mediterranean States, and conscious of their common interest in the further development of cooperation...
- Noting with appreciation the interest expressed by the non-participating

Mediterranean States in the Conference since its inception, and having duly taken their contributions into account...!"¹.

Helsinki Final Act on the Chapter 6, points out the international goal and objectives toward Mediterranean which intended:

1. to promote the development of good-neighborly relations with the non-participating Mediterranean States in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations...
2. to seek, by further improving their relations with the non-participating Mediterranean States, to increase mutual confidence, so as to promote security and stability in the Mediterranean area as a whole...
3. to encourage with the non-participating Mediterranean States the development of mutually beneficial cooperation in the various fields of economic activity...
4. to contribute to a diversified development of the economies of the non-participating Mediterranean countries, whilst taking due account of their national development objectives...
5. to intensify their efforts and their cooperation on a bilateral and multilateral basis with the non-participating Mediterranean States directed towards the improvement of the environment of the Mediterranean, especially the safeguarding of the biological resources and ecological balance of the sea...
6. to promote further contacts and cooperation with the non-participating Mediterranean States in other relevant fields².

These goals and objectives guided West and East Blocs policy toward Mediterranean Region until the end of the Cold War. As a matter of fact mostly these goals and objectives remained on paper. Just a few steps were taken and very modest achievements were reached. Mediterranean Region despite of Helsinki Final Act objectives, especially Middle East and North Africa remained unstable politically, poor economically, backward technologically and underdeveloped socially and culturally. That was overall situation in the most Mediterranean Countries in Middle East and North Africa when Berlin Wall felt dawn and a new era began after the Cold War.

2. Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

Euro-Mediterranean process got its directives by European Council in Lisbon in the year 1992. It continues further in Corfu in the year 1994 upon the proposals

¹ *Helsinki Final Act*, Chapter 6, "Questions relating to Security in Mediterranean".

² *Helsinki Final Act*, Chapter 6.

of European Commission. These two events made by main EU institutions, Council and Commission prepared the necessary framework for building Euro-Mediterranean relations.

2.1. Barcelona Conference

This process was formalized in Barcelona Conference on 27-28 November 1995. There were 15 EU member states and 12 Mediterranean states participating in that event. At the end *EU-Mediterranean Partnership Declaration* was signed by all participants.³ The Declaration promoted cooperation in three main fields:

- in the political and security fields intending to create peace and stability in the Region,
- in the economic and finance fields intending to allow the establishment an area with common prosperity, and
- in social cultural and humanitarian field intending the development of human resources and to promote understanding among cultural diversity and the exchange between of civil societies from both sides.⁴

Barcelona Declaration was followed by several meetings among Foreign Ministers, carried out a lot of activities and annual Ministerial Meetings in relevant fields of partnership. In accordance to the goals and objectives of Declaration, Euro-Mediterranean Development Agency-EMDA was established as a financial instrument. In 2005, *Year of Mediterranean* was celebrated between two areas.⁵

2.2. Union for Mediterranean

The new stage of cooperation between EU-Mediterranean started upon the initiative of the President of France, Nicolas Sarkozy on 7th February 2007. President of France, Sarkozy proclaimed this initiative as the main objective of foreign policy of His Country. Mr. Sarkozy's initiative was widely supported by the EU member states establishing the common goal *Union for Mediterranean*. In the frame of Union there are 10 directives. Compared to Barcelona Declaration the Union intended also to contribute in solution of Israeli-Palestine conflict, to adopt to Islam policy, to avoid negative attitudes toward Mediterranean from some EU member states, to increase competitive capacity against China and India, to address properly illegal emigration toward EU and to promote the enlargement process of EU to Mediterranean region by better cooperation with the League of Arabic Nations⁶.

³ *Barcelona Declaration*, Barcelona Conference, 27-28 November 1995.

⁴ Euro-Mediterranean Development Agency (EMDA).

⁵ Barcelona Conference, 27-28 November 1995.

⁶ Nicolas Sarkozy, *Union for Mediterranean*, February 7, 2007.

3. Current Crisis

It was a big difference between political dynamics in Eastern Europe compared to the Mediterranean Region after the Cold War. The Cold War repercussions were over very fast in Eastern Europe, but very slow in the Middle East and North Africa. In these huge parts of Mediterranean actually Post-Cold War phenomenon and crisis are taking place. But in this complexity there are four main serious challenges shocking entire international community and mostly Euro-Mediterranean area:

The First, ‘Arabic spring democratic revolutions’; we know its beginning, but none of us is able to foresee in the near future of the dynamic on the ground, political trends within the each Countries, the kind of opposition leadership that is to take initiative, internal, regional and international impacts and so forth. We know from history what Klemmens Von Metternich said almost two centuries ago: “...if a national, liberal, popular revolution were crushed in one place, another will spring up elsewhere.”⁷

The Second, Israeli-Palestine continuing conflict; despite the long run of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy from Dayton to Oslo and so far the dispute between two parties remains unresolved. Recently, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu expressed to US Joint Congress his readiness to make a painful concession to Palestine people on order to be recognized by Palestine Authority⁸. But, on the other side, Palestine unclear coalition between two political organizations has complains and demands toward Israelis. This Israeli-Palestine vicious circle with no way out under the shadow of latest political dynamics on the Region will make the compromise far from being possible in the near future.

The Third, terrorist organizations, groups or individuals still operating in that Area; these terrorist structures using chaotic situation on several Countries in Mediterranean are becoming more serious threat to international community and to democracy in the world. Despite the death of former leader of Al Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden, there are still several indications that lead us to the conclusion terrorism remains long run threat and risk for peace and security all over the world. Even there are crisis experts and crisis agencies of the idea that after the death of Bin Laden and the ongoing chaotic explosive situation in Mediterranean the war against terror will be much more sophisticated.

The Forth, Middle East is still the area of violation of international law, such as *Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*⁹; the individual initiative taken by Iran to violate international legal binding treaties for nuclear weapons

⁷ Klemmens Von Meternich, quoted by J. B. Duroselle, Germany, *Europe and the History of its Peoples*, Germany, 1990, p.317.

⁸ B. Netanyahu, US Joint Congress, May 24, 2011.

⁹ NPT (signed 1968).

is still on the centre of international community dispute. It is well-known tough and long term debate between Iran and international community in order Iran leadership to be convinced to give up the hidden efforts to transform nuclear energy programme into the military nuclear weapons. This nuclear military effort by Iran authorities is real serious threat to peace and security not only in the Region, but in the entire world.

4. Recommendations

These four above mentioned challenges in Mediterranean are mixed and inter-linked to each other geographically, politically, geopolitically, strategically and economically. It is extremely difficult to clarify the lines among them and especially now, during the spring revolutions in the Middle East and North Africa. It is quite clear for all of us that situation to come in that area is going to be very uncertain. It means that crisis should be considered in its complexity, for the entire Euro-Mediterranean Region and in the long run.

The EU is focused more and more in inside economic challenges, facing financial crisis in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. This crisis has increased skepticism on euro-zone perspective, euro-internal market functioning, international competitive capacity of EU market, enlargement strategy to the Western Balkans and on the immigration policy for Mediterranean Countries during current crisis. This EU internal priority economic agenda needs to be better balanced with the problems in the Mediterranean crisis areas. In substance these are market failures, but the response toward those failures cannot be one side approach. In his speech to the Parliament of London recently, President Obama said: “Market failures can go global, and go viral, and demand international responses”¹⁰. This is very realistic approach. Economic crisis cannot be addressed in a globalized market by regional approaches. The EU partial inside engagement needs to have broader approach, including more and more involvement of the EU in Mediterranean area. The Mediterranean needs EU serious commitment. This is because the crisis, generally speaking, should be addressed by EU opening approach, in the area where the crisis was born and not by strengthening internal drastic measures.

Related to the crisis between EU and Mediterranean Region there is a tendency by the EU to marginalize the crisis by frozen all field of cooperation, applying indirect sanctions, focusing in several Countries and using only some military and diplomatic mechanisms. I think this tendency of marginalization the crisis areas is contra-productive. The reference to the history gives us a lot of examples that the marginalization with all of its forms and shapes is not real and sufficient crisis resolution mechanism. It only isolate and postpone problems, but does not solve

¹⁰ B. Obama, “The Time for Our Leadership is Now”, Speech to the Parliament in London, May 25, 2011.

them. As a matter of fact the consequence of marginalization put the peoples of those Countries to suffer from both sides: from the EU frozen relations in one side and from authoritarian repressive regimes on the other. And the most negative impact of marginalization crisis policy followed by EU or at least by some member states makes this positive democratic process in Mediterranean, in Middle East and North Africa to slow down or even worst to be temporarily reversible.

The lack of unification of foreign and security policy within the EU toward the Mediterranean crisis areas is going to bring very negative impact to address that crisis. There is very limited EU commitment politically and diplomatically to help resolution in the Mediterranean crisis area. It is true that EU is soft power in term of foreign and security policy, but it does not mean that EU is weak power in case of crisis management in Mediterranean Region. It is time for EU to demonstrate its complex capacity to help, support and develop their partners in crisis. There are only few EU states, mostly some European Old Powers traditionally linked with Mediterranean Countries which are trying to be deeply involved in crisis resolution. The lack of the EU unification attitude toward the crisis in the Middle East and North Africa is lucky attitude only for dictators, authoritarian regimes and fanatic political forces in the crisis area. These diabolic factors are masters-mind to use, misuse and abuse the lack of EU unification foreign and security policy toward crisis.

The crisis in the Mediterranean, Middle East and North Africa does not carry passport. It means the crisis sooner or later will come over the Continent, if there is not strong and unified commitment and contribution to Mediterranean by the EU, not only in foreign and security policy, but also in very broader and general supportive policy. Now it is time for solidarity. Tomorrow will be too late. The inspiration for democracy moved to Mediterranean from the West liberalism, including the EU. The inspiration is prerequisite for democracy, but it is not enough. In addition to that the democracy can not be in accordance with nationalistic feelings and xenophobia attitudes and religious fanatics taking place to some political circles within the EU member states. It destroys the image of the EU in the Mediterranean peoples and discourages democratic forces in their societies. To all of us exists an old proverb: *A friend in need is a friend indeed.*

The democratizations get its cost. The cost of democratization of Mediterranean Region, first of all, should be shared between EU and Mediterranean Countries in the economic, social and immigration fields. So far, we are not realizing any concrete steps to be taken on this way. The EU should be more friendly to the Mediterranean areas crisis actually and not to disappoint Mediterranean peoples on their dreams toward democracy. The solidarity and social values which are so admirable unique within the EU philosophy need to be shared despite the sacrifice of the EU with the peoples of Mediterranean to whom Europe and Its peoples shared almost everything from ancient history till modern time. Let them share also together the current challenges in order to have the better future together.

Union for the Mediterranean and Croatia

Nives Malenica*

Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, Dear Colleagues,

I am delighted at the privilege to address this gathering today in my capacity as the Croatian Coordinator for the UfM and share with you our experiences of cooperation in the UfM.

Croatia joined the Union for the Mediterranean in July 2008 at the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean. The Paris Summit saw the opening of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean to all coastal countries of the Mediterranean and hence also to the Adriatic countries. We advocated such an expansion for a number of years as a natural development.

'Mediterraneanism' is a major strain of our Croatian identity, rooted in geography and our cultural and historical heritage. We in Croatia therefore have a durable interest in undertaking active efforts for dialogue and cooperation in the Mediterranean region.

We are convinced that the Mediterranean, due to its strategic importance in political and economic terms as well as in light of emerging global security and other challenges, deserves a prominent place among priorities of the European and world politics. With fifteen resident embassies in the Mediterranean region, Croatia testifies to its commitment to regional cooperation.

As an EU membership candidate country and partner state in the Union for the Mediterranean, Croatia has actively participated and contributed to the development of this Partnership. We endeavour to contribute constructively to the Union for the Mediterranean, bringing to the table our own transition experiences and active cooperation in the Southeast-European region, through which we have learned the importance of co-ownership.

We wish to contribute constructively to the processes of the Union for the Mediterranean and we affirm the Mediterranean dimension of our foreign policy. Our approach and dialogue will build upon experience from multiple, parallel transitions and on-going active cooperation in the Southeast European region.

* Coordinator for the Union for the Mediterranean, Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, Zagreb, Croatia

Croatia wishes to further invest in relations with all Mediterranean countries. Through these relationships we aim to enrich joint efforts to develop the European Union's Mediterranean policy, in an effective UfM.

Beyond the strictly political, domestic civil society in Croatia shows great interest in cooperation in the Mediterranean. Established in January 2009, the Croatian Anna Lindh network includes about eighty civil society organizations and is the fastest growing new national network within the Anna Lindh Foundation.

On political situation in the region and the future of the Partnership

The Barcelona Process has been the central instrument for Euro-Mediterranean relations ever since 1995. Recent history reminds us that the Mediterranean region plays an essential role in European life, diplomacy and security. Among EU and Mediterranean partner countries, we face common strategic challenges that are revisited and treated with the utmost political weight.

Specifically, the persistence of the conflict in the Middle East and the recent political crisis in the region have challenged and stretched the Partnership to the limit of its abilities to preserve dialogue among all partners. However, the Barcelona Process – **Union for the Mediterranean has provided perhaps the only persistent forum for an on-going dialogue on certain issues among Middle Eastern stakeholders and their neighbours**. This dialogue is indeed a testament to the early and on-going efforts and vision of the EU members in the Partnership since 1995.

Union for the Mediterranean made progress via certain key decisions. The official inauguration of the Secretariat represents a major political achievement that points to an opportunity for all Mediterranean partners wishing to work together in promoting common projects vital to the citizens of the region. The projects and programmes developed under the initiative will work to promote regional cohesion and economic integration, and develop infrastructural interconnection.

Operationally, it is critically important to transform concepts and intentions into actions and results. We look forward to extending our support to the Secretariat as we firmly believe that projects and initiatives driven by its efforts are at the heart of this partnership. In that respect we are planning a secondment to the Secretariat in September this year as well as a financial contribution to the budget.

Further developments of the Union for the Mediterranean should reinforce the existing successful elements, at the same time bolstering political dialogue, increasing co-ownership, and boosting institutional governance.

We hope that the new EU Partnership for the Southern Mediterranean being currently under revision would create synergies and complementarity between existing policy frameworks and instruments and ensure coherent external action. We will continue to demonstrate our full commitment to this endeavour as we believe that UfM may serve as a valuable catalyst of the relations in the region.

SECTORIAL COOPERATION

Croatian Proposals for Cooperation in the Union for the Mediterranean

In Marseilles, Croatia presented its proposals for cooperation in specific areas – in the projects of the maritime security and safety, the development of maritime highways and links between seaports, the elimination of pollution in the Mediterranean, the alternative energy sources and a solar plan for the Mediterranean, the development of small and medium-sized enterprises and tourism.

Renewable Energy Sources, Mediterranean Solar Plan

The Mediterranean Solar Plan is fully in line with the energy policy of Croatia as regards renewable energy sources. Combined with positive ecological effects, the initiative might influence social and economic development by improving the standard of living or encouraging the modernization and development of infrastructure, agriculture, industry and tourism. We outlined **potential pilot projects and diverse activities**:

- Exchange of experience concerning the political framework for the MSP with the states that have good experience (Spain, Portugal, Greece),
- Consultations with other states (mainly Spain) concerning the construction of thermo-solar power plants in Croatia and the mechanisms for attracting funds for their realisation through the UfM or the EU, and
- Developing a strategy for harnessing other renewable sources of energy such as sea currents, sea waves, biomass, and wind power.

Motorways of the Sea, Maritime Safety and Security

We encourage the development of maritime transport and redirecting cargo from road to maritime and railway transport as ecologically acceptable transport modes. In this context we are very much interested in the development of the maritime corridor, the so-called Southeast Europe Motorways of the Sea linking the Adriatic to the Ionian Sea and eastern Mediterranean. All Adriatic countries (Ministries of Transport) are cooperating on a common project, Adriatic Motorways of the Sea (MoS) with the aim of creating a common development strategy in the transport. Adriatic MoS Master Plan is a regional segment of East Mediterranean MoS Master Plan, strategic document of the European Commission. In addition to the development of maritime traffic, tourism is one of the major industries in Croatia and therefore we are resolved to protect the maritime environment from pollution.

GloBallast Partnership Project: Croatia hosted the First Regional Meeting of Mediterranean States on monitoring and management of ballast waters from ships; Turkey/Istanbul hosted the second meeting. An outline of the strategy and its action plan was consolidated. We believe that this project deserves a concerted

follow-up of all Mediterranean countries. The Croatian national system of monitoring and managing of maritime traffic was successfully implemented in November 2010. This will create conditions for continuing the cooperation with coastal states in the Adriatic in establishing a joint Adriatic system of monitoring and managing maritime traffic. We are convinced that there are potentials for the extension of such cooperation to the Mediterranean at large.

Water and Environment

Croatia has provided its active support for the preparation of the Strategy for Water in the Mediterranean (core group conceiving the Strategy) a document of great importance that is the basis and framework for undertaking any activities aimed at sustainable use of water resources in the Mediterranean for the sake of its protection. The project for the protection of coastal waters from pollution (**the Adriatic Project**) – the on-going National study to develop a scenario for the future of water in the Mediterranean – the Study for the Republic of Croatia (political and economic analyses for national water policies). The study is being prepared by Plan Bleu, the regional action centre of the Mediterranean Action Plan of the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP/MAP).

Croatia proposes cooperation among the states on the Adriatic as part of the Mediterranean in launching the initiative to establish and implement research monitoring of the sea that would include biological, hydromorphological and chemical indicators. The project of research monitoring would be based on the cooperation of the states with the support of the European initiatives, UNEP/MAP or potential states partners.

Climate Change

Cooperation in UfM can be carried out related to adaptation on Climate variability and change issues, development of region wide coordination mechanisms and tools to address climate variability in the Mediterranean Region. Due to their geographical position some countries are more vulnerable than others. According to different climate scenarios for Croatia, climate change might affect the Adriatic Sea level, change the hydrological situation, and jeopardize the main Croatian branch of economy – tourism as well as agriculture.

Sustainable Development

Exchange of experiences in implementation of sustainable development policies – priority has to be given to the protection of the sea, the coast, the climate and air quality, water resources, soil and biodiversity. Access to information, education, training and professional upgrading is needed so as to move from an ‘emergency’ to a ‘prevention’ culture.

Civil Protection

We are ready to share our knowledge and experience concerning the operation of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism in projects conducted within the Union for the Mediterranean. Croatia participates in the “Community Mechanism for Civil Protection”. We are actively involved in several projects, courses and exercises for civil protection.

Small and Medium-sized Businesses

Cooperation proposals: Entrepreneurial learning, Exchange of experience in preparing inter-regional and EU projects, Financial incentives for entrepreneurs (a combination of budget and loan financing), Network of Women Entrepreneurs (Government Office for Equality in cooperation with Ministry of Economy), Cooperation in research and development and knowhow transfer, Cooperation in cluster development and networking and Cooperation in trades (arranging international fairs, exchange of information and experience, exchange of experience concerning vocational education for trades).

Tourism

We believe that the role of tourism should be reinforced in the UfM activities as it is one of the key factors of faster recovery after the crisis as well as the development motor and a valuable option in poverty reduction in less developed countries.

We are interested in projects and activities focused on sustainable development of tourism (preservation of the environment, particularly the water of the Mediterranean Sea, and the rich heritage of our respective states).

As an additional option, when the political circumstances allow it, a joint promotion of the Mediterranean on third markets as an area of specific, recognizable culture that still offers sufficient diversity for all interests.

Russia – EU Relations

Tatiana Zvereva*

In the multipolar world Russia has some important partners. One of the most important is the European Union. In my brief presentation I will try to show some main reasons for the cooperation between Russia and EU. I will say some words about the history of Russia-EU relations. I will describe main legal documents regulating Russia-EU relations. I am going to speak about current situation.

I. Factors Bringing Russia and EU Closer to Each Other

Scholars are talking about fluctuations in the relations between Russia and EU. At the same time both sides pay great attention to developing this relationship. Experts point out some factors showing the priority of Russia and EU relations of and the necessity of strategic partnership.

1. Russia and EU are interdependent from the point of view of geography, history, culture. Scholars speak about geographic, historical and cultural affinity and high degree of social and political interdependence too.
2. The security factor. Both world and European security is determined today by economic, social and political stability in all post-communist countries, and in Russia too. It means the necessity to coordinate efforts in order to guarantee European and world security.
3. The last but not the least, economic interdependence. Russia became the third trading partner of the European Union after the USA and China. For Russia EU is the main provider of new technologies, know-how, machinery and investments. Experts say that common market of Russia and EU gradually, though very slowly, is developing.

II. History of Russia – EU Relations

It is always very difficult to single out different periods or stages in History in general. Nevertheless I will try to do it, it could help to see main features and – what is more important – the prospects of Russia-EU relations.

* Professor, PhD, Senior Researcher, Institute of Contemporary International Studies, Diplomatic Academy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow, Russian Federation

There are three different stages in Russia – EU relationship:

1. The first is the 90ies,
2. The second – the first decade of the new century, and
3. The third has begun with the financial-economic crisis of 2008-2009.

As for the first period it began with the end of the cold war in late 1980-ies. In the Soviet Union the European integration was considered as a challenge to ‘the socialist world’. We had no official relations, and the first agreement between the Soviet Union and European Economic Community was signed only in December 1989. The Agreement on trade, commercial and economic cooperation was the very first document regulating the relations between the then Soviet Union – and later Russia as its successor – and the EU. The Agreement was on the establishment of cooperation.

After the end of the cold war Russia turned to European experience. At the beginning of 90th European countries created a developed, socially focused economy. Living standards in the European countries were the highest in the world. Great attention was paid to the improvement of the quality of life. All this became possible mostly thanks to democratic mechanisms operating in all states of Western Europe. The disintegration of bipolar system of international relations became a strong impulse for cooperation between Russia and the European Union. Fast development of these ties was connected, first of all, with the Russian new policy. It means that its economy was opening up to the West and integrating in the world economic system. Russia decided to build the economy based on private ownership and a law-based democratic state. We can consider the period after disintegration of the USSR as the time of big political rapprochement between Russia and EU.

The second period began with a new century. It was time of political and economic stabilization in Russia mainly connected with high oil and natural gas prices. Russia paid back the biggest part of its external debts. As for the EU it was adopting itself to the unprecedented enlargement, introducing institutional reforms. The EU tried to implement them in order to adopt the organisation to its new membership. The Union was focused on internal and not external problems. With the EU enlargement Russia and EU became close neighbors. All these things influenced Russia-EU relations. At that time some points of disagreement appeared. Scholars explain them mainly by the fact that Russia and EU became closer to each other than ever before.

The third period began with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on Dec. 1, 2009 and the beginning of the world financial and economic crisis. In one of his statements the Russian foreign minister m-r Lavrov stressed (of the 13 of September), that “Lisbon treaty did not affect the depth and breadth of the Russia-EU dialogue, which is generally successful”. As for the crisis I have an impression that it did influence our relationship. Now it is clearer, than ever, that we have to

use every opportunity and to advance cooperation in order to strengthen economic and political positions both of Russia and of the European Union in order to find effective answers to the challenges of globalization. I'd like to point out that special role is played by the countries-new-comers of the EU. They are very experienced in cooperating with Russia, they have economic and trade ties with Russia. Their very important role in Russia-EU relationship seems to become more and more positive.

III. Main Documents Regulating Russia – EU Relations

Partnership and cooperation agreements: Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation (1997), Protocol to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (2004), Joint Statement on EU enlargement and Russia-EU relations (2004), Protocol to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (2007), and Joint Statement on EU enlargement and Russia-EU relations (2007).

The basis for initial fast development of relations between Russia and EU in all areas is the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between (PCA) Russia and EU. It was signed on island Corfu (Greece) in June, 1994. It came into force on December 1, 1997. It was concluded for the period of 10 years with annual automatic prolongation if no party to the agreement decides to withdraw from it. The Agreement stressed, first, the adherence of both parties to general democratic values, and, second, the creation of a free-trade zone between Russia and EU as the goal of cooperation. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement is the basic one, in other words, it contains general provisions for cooperation between the European Union and Russia. It provides for the development of enhanced relations in political sphere, trade and economy, in legal and humanitarian areas. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement was focused on economic cooperation. 30 areas of interaction were pointed out, such as energy, black and nonferrous metals, engineering, food industry, chemical industry, telecommunications, transport, housing construction, outer space exploration and others. The Partnership agreement also set up the Political dialogue between Russia and EU on different levels. It established institutional architecture that enables the two sides to discuss practically all problems of today's world.

Summits play a pivotal role in the institutional structure of cooperation and define the strategic direction for the development of Russia-EU relations. They take place twice a year: traditionally in Russia in the first half of the year, and on the EU territory - in the second half. At summits Russia is represented by the President and Ministers responsible for specific areas of cooperation with the European Union. The EU is represented by the President of European Council, the President of European Commission and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

The Agreement established Cooperation Council, replaced in 2003 by the Permanent Partnership Council (PPC), which is the main working body of the Russia-EU cooperation. Council meetings are held in the format of Foreign Ministers as well as other Ministers. Regular consultations allow Ministers responsible for various policy areas to meet as often as necessary and to discuss specific issues. This interaction intensifies which is reflected by the fact that at the level of expert consultations on foreign policy and security issues there are more than 20 meetings per year. We can speak about fast development of the inter-parliamentary dialogue. This dialogue was becoming more and more important even when the relations between Russia and the EU were going through some difficulties. Meetings between members of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation and the European Parliament take place on a regular basis. Cooperation between factions of the State Duma and political groups of the European Parliament is an important addition to the Partnership and Cooperation Council activities. So the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement gave a big impulse to the development of our relations on different levels and in different fields.

In the first decade of the new century both Russia and EU decided to work out and adopt a new document on cooperation. It was not to be binding. Its purpose was to preserve and to maintain relations at the existing level and to show the determination to further develop partnership between Russia and EU. The next milestone in the Russia-EU relations was the endorsement at the Summit in St. Petersburg in May 2003 of the concept of four Common spaces: a Common Economic Space, a Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice, a Common Space of External Security and a Common Space of Research and Education, including Cultural Aspects. The implementation of the so-called road maps for these Common spaces, adopted at the Summit in Moscow in May 2005, remains a key track of the interaction between Russia and the EU.

Road maps on four common spaces: Road Map on the Common Economic Space (2005), Road Map on the Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice (2005), Road Map on the Common Space of External Security (2005), and Road Map on the Common Space of Research and Education, Including Cultural Aspects (2005).

Sectorial agreements: Russia and EU have concluded sectorial agreements in different fields. The Russia-EU dialogue includes virtually all issues: global politics, economics, science and technology, justice and home affairs.

Energy: Energy Dialogue Russia-EU. The Tenth Progress Report (2009), Memorandum on an Early Warning Mechanism in the Energy Sector within the Framework of the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue (2009), and Memorandum of Understanding on Industrial Cooperation in the Energy Sector between the Ministry for Fuel and Energy of the Russian Federation and the European Commission (1999).

Steel: Agreement between the European Community and the Russian Federation on trade in certain steel products (2007).

Textile: Agreement between the European Community and the Russian Federation on trade in textile products (1998).

Fight against transnational crime and terrorism: Agreement on cooperation between the European Police Office and the Russian Federation (2003), and European Union Action Plan on Common Action for the Russian Federation on Combating Organised Crime (2000).

Fight against drugs: Memorandum of Understanding between the Federal Service of the Russian Federation for Narcotics Traffic Control and the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (2007).

Science and technology: Agreement on Cooperation in Science and Technology between the European Community and the Government of the Russian Federation (2000), and Agreement renewing the agreement on cooperation in science and technology between the Government of the Russian Federation and the European Community (2003).

Non-proliferation, export control and disarmament: Council Joint Action establishing a European Union Cooperation Programme for Non-proliferation and Disarmament in the Russian Federation (1999), and Council Decision implementing Joint Action 1999/878/cfsp with a view to contributing to the European Union Cooperation Programme for Non-proliferation and Disarmament in the Russian Federation (2001).

Regional Policy: Memorandum of Understanding for Establishing a Dialogue on Regional Policy between the Ministry of Regional Development of the Russian Federation and the European Commission (2007).

So we have concluded sectorial agreements in all these areas. But our relations are alive and continue to develop.

IV. Prospects and Current Problems of Our Relations

The first decade of the new century was the period of a very quick development of Russia-EU economic relations in spite of some political differences. The turnover between Russia and EU member states gradually is getting close to 300 bn euros per year (this figure tripled between 2000 and 2008). In recent years Russia has become the third trade partner of the EU after the US and China. The EU share makes more than a half of Russian foreign trade turnover and it provides two thirds of cumulative foreign investments in Russian economy. EU is the main importer of Russian energy resources, and Russia firmly holds the position of the major supplier of natural gas to the EU, satisfying the total demand for it in the EU member states by a quarter, and remains for the EU the second most important exporter of crude oil and oil products.

Security Dialogue

Some very optimistic people insist that economic development and trade ties are the main key of the security. But unfortunately it is not the only guaranty of peace and security. Political aspects, measures of confidence and mutual understanding are very important too. One of the examples proving the importance of the preliminary political settlement is the project of the Union for the Mediterranean. On June 5, 2008, the President of Russia put forward an initiative to develop a new pan-European security treaty. Its main idea is to create a common undivided space in order to finally do away with the Cold War legacy. Dmitry Medvedev suggested formalising in the international law the principle of indivisible security, which means, that no nation or international organisation of the Euro-Atlantic region is entitled to strengthen its own security at the expense of other nations or organisations.

Russia has prepared a draft European Security Treaty. The Russian President has sent this draft to the heads of relevant states and to chief executives of international organisations of the Euro-Atlantic region. Russian president emphasised that Russia was open to any proposals on the subject matter of this initiative and counts on the positive response from its partners and the beginning of a substantial discussion on specific elements of the Draft Treaty on European Security. In June last year Russia and Germany put forwards the proposal to set up a Russia – EU Security Committee. Its implementation could provide new legal framework for the security cooperation between Russia and EU and could strengthen not only European but world security.

New Partnership Agreement

Although ‘Roadmaps’ on creating of four common spaces maintained and developed the logic of cooperation, put in by the Agreement of partnership and cooperation of 1994, they didn’t have legal validity. And PCA was expiring on December 2007. So several years before the date of expire of PCA there raised a discussion on the ‘problem of 2007’ and the decision was to work out a new agreement, because the old PCA was behind the times. Within 13 years from the date of the PCA subscription many changes happened in Russia and in the EU. Relationships between Russia and Europe needed a new contractual basis. The new basic agreement should reflect these changes and make a qualitative step forward in Russia – EU interaction. At Russia-EU Summit in London in October 2005 Russian and the EU leaders have reached a political agreement to conclude a new basic agreement, replacing the existing Partnership Cooperation Agreement (PCA).

And though the negotiations on this question were postponed for many times because of claims of new EU participants, negotiations were finally started in July

of 2008. And until a new framework agreement will be subscribed, Russia-EU relationships are subject to PCA of 1994 and ‘Roadmaps’ of 2005. The aim of the new agreement was clarified by Russian Foreign Minister Mr. Lavrov: “The aim is, by looking 10, 20, 50 years ahead, to try and understand where Russia and the EU will come during this time in forging their partnership, and to lay a reliable legal foundation for that.”¹

Partnership for Modernisation

In the context of overcoming negative impact of the global financial and economic crisis, the idea to establish a Russia-EU ‘Partnership for Modernization’ is of special significance. At the summit in Rostov-on-Don a year ago Russia and EU adopted a joint statement launching the practical work toward this end. The Partnership for Modernization is intended to take a central place in Russia-EU relations, and Moscow considers its implementation as a priority area for cooperation. For Russia the comprehensive modernization of the country, the diversification of the economy and its transfer to an innovative, high-tech model of development is a key challenge. It has an extensive foreign policy dimension, implying the maximum utilization – in the broadest sense – of external sources of modernization.

I’d like to stress that the idea to create a free-trade zone between Russia and EU is not quite dead. This idea first appeared at the beginning of the 90-th and was fixed in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 1997. It reappeared now in some statements of Russian government members. For example, in March Russian television broadcast a statement made by First Vice-Premier Igor Shuvalov in Kiev. Speaking about Ukraine’s possible participation in the Customs Union, Shuvalov mentioned the fact that in next January negotiations on the establishment of a Russia-EU free-trade zone would begin.

One more point of current negotiations between Russia and EU is Visa-cooperation –Agreements on visa and readmission: Agreement between the Russian Federation and the European Community on the facilitation of the issuance of visas to the citizens of the Russian Federation and the European Union (2006), and Agreement between the Russian Federation and the European Community on readmission (2006).

People-to-people and professional contacts as well as tourism are becoming increasingly active. In many respects this is an immediate result of the implementation of the Russia-EU Agreements on visa facilitation and readmission, concluded in 2006 which came into force on 1st June 2007. On 27th April 2011 the

¹ Lavrov Summary of Speech by Sergey Lavrov, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the Association of European Businesses in the Russian Federation, Moscow, September 13, 2010.

first round of negotiations on modernization of the Russia-EU Visa Facilitation Agreement, signed on 25 May 2006, took place in Moscow. Possible amendments were discussed to a number of articles of the Agreement, including those aimed at expanding categories of persons enjoying visa facilitation, extending terms of validity of multiple-entry visas and setting up new arrangements for visa fees. Visa-facilitation issues were discussed at the 14th Meeting of the Russia-EU Permanent Partnership Council on Freedom, Security and Justice held in St. Petersburg on 19th May 2011. The Parties reiterated their commitment to further facilitate and improve people-to-people contacts and movement of their citizens as an important element of Russia-EU relationship. To this end, they welcome the progress made by the Senior Officials of Russia and EU to agree on an exhaustive list of Common Steps towards Visa-Free Short-Term Travel of Russian and EU Citizens. The Parties look forward to prompt finalization of this work, of their internal procedures, and further report to the upcoming Russia-EU Summit to be held on 9-10 June 2011 in Nizhny Novgorod. The Parties reiterate that the implementation of the Common Steps will open possibility for engaging in negotiations on an EU-Russia visa waiver agreement. They noted the importance of the effective implementation of Agreements on Facilitation of the Issuance of Visas and on Readmission. The Parties welcomed the opening of negotiations on amendments to this Agreement on 27th April 2011 in Moscow. In this connection, they expressed hope that the negotiations will be finalised as soon as possible and the amendments to the Agreement will contribute to further facilitation of issuance of visas for short-term stay to Russian and EU citizens. Further development of human contacts, economic and cultural ties is impossible without the abolition of visas for short-term trips.

Energy dialogue: In September 2000 between EU and Russia at the initiative of the European Union energy dialogue has been opened. Its purpose was to enlarge the deliveries of Russian energy carriers to Western Europe, to guarantee the reliability of these deliveries. Since 2006 EU has insisted that Russia was to ratify the Energy Charter, which she has signed in 1997, and to sign the additional protocol. Meanwhile, according to Russia, if it signs this document in the conditions of liberalization of the European energy market it would put Russian power companies in extremely disadvantageous position. The so-called Third EU Energy Package creates a threat to earlier Russian investment in the energy sector of the EU member states and will greatly hamper such investment in the future.

So it is very brief and, of course, very incomplete overview of Russia-EU relations which are about 20 years old. Our partnership not is only alive, but is becoming broader and deeper. And all this gives us every ground to believe that all-round cooperation between Russia and EU will be very successful to the benefit of Russian people and the nations of the EU.

The European Integration Policy of Ukraine in the Context of Social Modernization

Oleksandr Poltoratsky*

Speaking about the **theoretical aspects** of this topic, one should above all note that the modernization phenomenon began to attract the attention of the world research community as early as in 1950's-1960's with the emergence and development of the political modernization theory. The basis of this theory was the justification of the general model of global development of the human civilization. **Modernization** was then seen primarily as **Westernization**, aiming at the transition from traditional to modern society through scientific and technological progress, socio-structural changes, as well as transformation in state regulations and value systems. Modernization was therefore understood as purposeful determination of the state to make qualitative changes in the society.

Historical experience and the subsequent evolution of political and legal views regarding social and economic structure of society as well as the place and role of government in the development of political institutions and processes has actually led to the **present understanding of the modernization process** – as the complex process aiming at reforming the existing and creating new political, legal, economic and social institutions and introducing those cultural norms which meet the best standards and values of the developed countries. In other words, modernization means creating conditions for the qualitative transformation of interactions among the actors of international relations in political, legal, economic and social spheres based upon recognition of modern principles of democracy, the rule of law and human rights, market economy, the society-oriented state and the sustainable international instruments of coexistence among nations worldwide¹.

The ways of implementing social modernization, therefore, are of specific importance nowadays. Speaking in this regard about the concept of shaping Ukraine's foreign policy, one actually means analysing the scope and expediency of realizing the concept and practice of Westernization by Ukraine. Ukraine represents a large and rather vast European country, particularly regarding its extent from East to West; therefore it is destined to serve as a civilization bridge between the larger Europe and Eurasia.

* PhD, Associate Professor, DAU, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kiev, Ukraine

¹ *Ukraine's Modernization: Priorities of Reforms*. In: Week Mirror, No. 14 (April 10, 2010).

Asking the question either West or East in terms of shaping Ukraine's foreign policy course seems inexpedient – because the choice of ways for effective national development will be deliberately limited in the geopolitical and sound irrational in the social context. What seems realistically expedient and quite important for Ukraine in terms of using the modernization experience of different social systems – is to determine the mechanisms of interaction between the national culture and those cultures which for centuries formed productive coexistence with the Ukrainian one².

Such an approach seems to be the most constructive response to the threats and challenges of both domestic and external nature, which the present Ukraine has to deal with. Organic combination of both Western and Eastern models of social modernization, keeping in mind strengthening of transnational relations, has obvious advantages. In particular, provided that foreign policy primarily focuses on European values, this approach will prevent the uncritical absorption of everything else from the social and cultural spheres of other civilizations.

European Integration: Present State and Tasks for Ukraine

Cooperation with the European Union is the main priority of Ukraine's foreign policy. Integration into the European political, economic and social space is considered as the process that will create additional opportunities for modernization and innovation development of state and society³.

Practical dimension of Ukraine's European integration policy implies realization of the following tasks: **1.** Harmonization of national legislation with the EU legislation, **2.** Establishment of deep and comprehensive free trade area between Ukraine and the EU, and **3.** Introduction of visa-free regime with the EU countries. It should be noted that these tasks are not of a legally binding character for Ukraine. Ukraine-EU partnership is presently realized through the PCA instrument which is voluntary, and no sanctions are provided in case of breach of any provisions of the Agreement⁴. Quite a different format is envisaged by the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine, according to which Ukraine will be obliged to carry out relevant tasks in accordance with the clearly set timeframe⁵. Successful fulfilment of the above tasks depends on the efficiency of consecutive structural

² Shergin, S. O. *Geopolitical Identity of Ukraine*. (<http://www.euroatlantica.info/index.php?id=840>)

³ Gryshchenko, K. *Henceforth Ukraine Plays Her Own Game*. In: *The Day*, No. 49 (March 22, 2011).

⁴ Ratification of the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation between Ukraine and the European Communities and their Member States, Law of Ukraine, No. 237/94 (November 10, 1994) – VR In: *Official Bulletin of Ukraine*, No. 24 (2006), Article 1794, p.203.

⁵ Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (February 22, 2007) No. 684-V on the “Statement of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on the Start of Negotiations between Ukraine and the EU on a New Basic Agreement” (<http://www.mfa.gov.ua/mfa/ua/publication/content/19157.htm>)

reforms within the state, further progress in implementing key reforms, the system-based state European integration policy⁶.

Different political elites in Ukraine repeatedly stated their desire to move westwards, referring to European integration as Ukraine's strategic priority, however certainly there is a real European recognition of deep historical and cultural ties with Ukraine and therefore Ukraine has a European perspective – as a democratic, legal and economically stable country. EU is regarded as an important economic partner of Ukraine which after its enlargement in May 2004 became the largest trade partner of Ukraine. **Ukraine, in turn, is perceived as one of the key partners of the EU among its Eastern neighbours**, since it influences the security, stability and prosperity environment of the region. There are many areas for cooperation between the EU and Ukraine, among the most essential are: trade and economy, energy matters and cooperation in the field of transborder transportation regimes.

Therefore both Ukraine and the EU developed close economic and political relations. Various EU initiatives – the Eastern Partnership, the Parliamentary Assembly EURONEST and the Black Sea Synergy – are aiming at strengthening and deepening cooperation between the EU and Ukraine and promotion of cooperation within the region. For example, from 2011 to 2013 Ukraine will benefit from 470.05 million euro, provided under the program of the European Neighbourhood Policy.

European Parliament from the outset supported Ukraine's accession to the WTO. Presently, negotiations are underway as regards the Association Agreement and the Free Trade Agreement – the FTA talks should end by the end of this (2011) year. In this context, the current year 2011 can be crucial for the future relations between the EU and Ukraine.

However, despite these close contacts still many problems remain in Ukraine related to the rule of law, as democracy and corruption affecting the country's ability to establish closer relations with the EU. Ukraine should provide perception of the European perspective not only in the foreign policy domain but also as an indispensable part of its domestic political course. The general state in the field of democracy, the rule of law and freedom of the speech will have direct implications for the Association Agreement. Another very positive and important project – the deep and comprehensive free trade area (DCFTA) – is regarded in this context through the interdependence of democracy and the rule of law in the region⁷.

Therefore, Ukraine needs to provide full adherence to the principle of society-oriented market economy, the rule of law, protection of human rights and political

⁶ Sherr, James. *Ukraine's Election: Watershed or New Stalemate?* Brief Paper. Chatham House (February 2010), p.7.

⁷ Brok, Elmar: *European Perspectives of Ukraine* In: The Day, No. 64 (April 12, 2011).

stability. Cooperation with the European Commission for Democracy through Law (the Venice Commission) is also required to ensure full compliance of legislative reforms package with the European standards and values.

European Integration: Tasks for the EU

The European Union, taking into account the Lisbon Treaty and its new tools in international politics (such as the EU High Representative – Vice President Catherine Ashton and the relevant European External Action Service), has the ability and possibility to pursue a more consistent and coherent foreign policy. Thus not only Ukraine but also the EU should look for the new opportunities to strengthen bilateral relations.

The **European Neighbourhood Policy** should be enhanced with a range of instruments, although not only bilateral but also involving the whole region. This means that the EU needs a multilateral approach to the whole region to help closer contacts among the neighbouring countries and hence contribute to strengthening European security and stability.

In this sense, an effective move forward could be made by the Eastern Partnership of the EU, which covers partnerships with Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. It seems also advisable that the educational program ‘**Erasmus**’ be extended to the countries on the Eastern Partnership. Ukraine’s accession to WTO could and should become a positive factor that will foster the introduction of European standards. The more effective multilateral political and economic cooperation between the countries of Eastern Partnership is regarded as an indispensable condition of political stability and economic progress.

The whole European integration is based on the principle introduced by one of the ‘founding fathers’ of the EU – **Robert Schuman**, who once said that Europe would not become a single whole at a time or according to one single plan, but would be built through concrete achievements which would first create a de facto unity⁸. The same can be said regarding relations between Ukraine and the EU.

In this respect one should not think of some concrete dates of accession, but rather of the long-term goals and specific steps to achieve them. This could mount solidarity and confidence, and thus become steps on the way to the goal. This is a process that can not be accomplished in one day. Meanwhile, the EU should give Ukraine a clear European perspective but it should not be limited only to the situation-based discussion of any final date of future accession to the EU. Rather the EU should establish enhanced cooperation with Ukraine and outline concrete benefits for Ukrainian citizens. Otherwise Europe-oriented Ukrainian citizens will feel disappointed. These measures and steps could and should include at least visa

⁸ Declaration of 9 May 1950. (http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/9-may/decl_en.htm)

regime liberalization and the free trade area. **Konrad Adenauer**, the former well-known German Chancellor of the past once put it in his Cologne speech in 1946 and said that parallel, interconnected economic interests was the cleverest and the best long-term basis for good political relations between peoples⁹. This approach seems to be friendly to all and may at the same time lead to European prospect and stability.

Conclusions

1. The modernization experience of Western and other social systems could make sense for Ukraine provided that Ukrainian foreign policy primarily focuses on European values.
2. The pace and degree of Ukraine's movement towards the EU primarily depends on the implementation of and compliance with European principles and values.
3. Practical dimension of Ukraine's European integration policy implies harmonization of national legislation with the EU legislation, establishment of deep and comprehensive free trade area between Ukraine and the EU and the introduction of visa-free regime between Ukraine and the EU countries.
4. Problems related to the rule of law, democracy and corruption negatively affect Ukraine's ability to establish closer relations with the EU.
5. Ukraine should provide perception of the European perspective not only in the foreign policy domain but also as an indispensable part of its domestic political course.

⁹ Shippy, Paul. *Konrad Adenauer: Strong Leader and Principled Statesman*. (<http://www.tpaulshipy.com/Adenauer.htm>)

Improving the Eastern Partnership: A View from Moldova

Alexandru Codreanu*

In his presentation the speaker referred to the Eastern Partnership initial objectives, revealed the progress of EU-Moldova relations and pointed out the Moldova's expectations for developing further the EU Eastern Partnership.

The launching of the **Eastern Partnership** (EaP) two years ago was an important milestone in the European Union's policy towards its Eastern Neighbourhood. As stated in the EaP Summit Declaration: "The main goal of the Eastern Partnership is to create the necessary conditions to accelerate political association and further economic integration between the European Union and interested partner countries. With this aim, **the Eastern Partnership will seek to support political and socio-economic reforms of the partner countries, facilitating approximation towards the European Union.** This serves the shared commitment to stability, security and prosperity of the European Union, the partner countries and indeed the entire European continent."

The participants of the Prague Summit shared the wish to deepen and to intensify bilateral relations between the EU and the partner countries, taking into account the specific situation and ambition of each partner country and respecting existing bilateral relations between the EU and the respective partner country. They agreed that bilateral cooperation under the Eastern Partnership umbrella should provide the foundation for Association Agreements between the EU and those partner countries who are willing and able to comply with the resulting commitments.

Supporting mobility of citizens and visa liberalisation in a secure environment is another important aspect of the Eastern Partnership. New Association Agreements, beyond existing opportunities for trade and investment, will provide for the establishment deep and comprehensive free trade areas, where the positive effects of trade and investment liberalization will be strengthened by regulatory approximation leading to convergence with EU laws and standards.

*The speaker referred further to the positive dynamics in the EU – Republic of Moldova relations since 2010. He state from the outset that the overall **strategic objective of the Republic of Moldova is achieving EU membership.***

* Ambassador of the Republic of Moldova to the Republic of Croatia, Budapest

The negotiations on the **Association Agreement** between the EU and Moldova were launched in Chisinau on 12th January 2010. According to a recent Joint Assessment Report “Negotiations have been conducted in a constructive and positive atmosphere, with both sides showing readiness to find compromises on disputed issues and more generally to advance quickly.” In that context, broad agreement was reached on the elements covering the *Political Dialogue and Foreign and Security Policy* and *Justice, Freedom and Security*.

Good progress was also made on the *Preamble, Objectives and General Principles*, as well as, *Institutional* and *General and Final Provisions* of the Agreement. In total, negotiations on 26 chapters have been provisionally closed in these areas. The Parties re-affirmed their commitment to continue negotiations in the same spirit and consider the completion of the negotiations as a key mid-term objective for their relationship.

At the latest **EU-Moldova Cooperation Council**, held in May 2011, the EU welcomed Moldova’s European aspirations and commitment to the goals of political association and economic integration. The Cooperation Council also expressed satisfaction at the **good progress made in negotiations on the future EU-Moldova Association Agreement**. It reviewed the state of play towards the start of negotiations on a deep and comprehensive free trade area, and the recent achievements in bilateral cooperation the areas of aviation, research and energy. The EU expressed appreciation for the **Moldovan Government’s comprehensive reform programme**, and its pro-active consultations with the EU and other donors on how best to assist such reforms.

The EU welcomed **Moldova’s strengthened cooperation in the area of foreign and security policy**. It also stressed its increased engagement in the Transnistria settlement efforts, including through continued EUBAM support and confidence-building measures. It recalled its efforts in support of the resumption of official settlement talks, exclusively in the internationally recognised ‘5+2’ format.

Very good **bilateral dialogue** is developing **with EU Member States**. The 4th Meeting of the Group for the European Action of the Republic of Moldova (**‘Friends of Moldova’**) that took place on 12th April in Luxembourg on the margins of the EU Foreign Affairs Council.

The **Visa Liberalization Dialogue**, launched on the 15th June 2010, is another priority area of cooperation and Moldova is advancing in good speed. The Visa Action Plan was presented to the Republic of Moldova in January 2011. A **Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement** will provide substantially improved access to the EU market of Moldovan goods and services, as well as investment opportunities. Moldova is ready to start negotiations over joining the **European Common Aviation Area**. Hope that both negotiation mandates for the European Commission could be approved during the Hungarian EU Presidency.

We are approaching an important event: the **Eastern Partnership Summit** on 29-30 September 2011 in Warsaw. The Prague Eastern Partnership Summit Declaration stated as its main objective the political association and economic integration between EU and partner states, and thus made the European integration essential to all its activities.

The **Warsaw EaP Summit** Declaration should give a clear recognition to the **European perspective** of those Eastern European neighbours of the EU who are able to meet the accession criteria. The Republic of Moldova considers that such partners should have the right to apply to EU membership at some point, according to Article 49 of the Lisbon Treaty.

The principle of differentiation based on the individual merits of each partner country enhanced by the **more for more** principle should represent the driving force both for opening new opportunities for an ever-increased bilateral cooperation with the EU and for new jointly agreed deliverables rewarding a positive track-record registered in the EaP's bilateral and multilateral dimensions. **European integration** in all its manifestations, ranging from basic fundamental values and principles to EU directives and regulations, should represent the cornerstone and the ultimate goal of each and every activity undertaken under the two dimensions of the EaP.

We believe that the Partnership will only be successful if it is kept focused on realistic goals and provides incentives for our internal Europeanization through pursuing ambitious economic modernization projects and free movement of our citizens, trade, investment, personal contacts, education, etc. Based on the ambitions and needs of Eastern partner states we believe that a **greater focus** should be placed on the following **areas of cooperation** either within the bilateral or multilateral tracks: promotion of regional development and social cohesion; establishment of an Instrument for agriculture and rural development; development of a more structural dialogue in the macroeconomic policies, aiming at promoting foreign direct investments; strengthening energy security; improvement of the transport interconnections between the EU and its eastern neighbourhood.

Shaping the next Working programmes of the EaP Platforms would represent the opportunity to reflect on the ways to ensure a better correlation between the activities carried out under the multilateral cover and the priorities of the bilateral cooperation with the EU based on the principle of the tailor-made approach. For instance there is a clear need to streamline the activities designed to sustain **legislative and regulatory approximation** which have to go beyond the mere exchange of views and best practices and concentrate on clear benchmark and deliverables in terms of concrete harmonized pieces of legislation.

The involvement of civil society in development and monitoring of the EaP policies has to be ensured. The private sector and business community have great

potential in contributing to the success of the EaP. The Republic of Moldova is committed to further development of the Parliamentary dimension of the EaP.

One cannot underestimate the importance of the **financial aspect**. The financial support should be dependent on the proposed objectives, commitment to fulfill the undertaken tasks and, finally, the implementation of the agreed agenda.

The Republic of Moldova is using the instruments offered by the EaP for the achievement of its European integration objective reflected in a profound and comprehensive internal Europeanization process. **Conflict settlement dimension** of the EaP is relevant for Moldova to the extent that we see the European integration of the country as the best facilitating tool for the conflict settlement and country's reunification. In order to advance our ambitious reform agenda the Republic of Moldova is using all available tools and policies including EaP and will continue to do so in as much as they stay relevant and do not restraint Moldova's EU integration efforts. We believe that Eastern Partnership is an instrument to reach our goal. In the long run, the Eastern Partnership will be relevant if it becomes a political vehicle for the Republic of Moldova to gain EU membership. Let us keep this policy flexible and visionary enough to encourage progressive development of those Eastern Partners who see their **future in the European Union**.

Theoretical Principles of Economic Diplomacy

Dubravko Žirovčić*

The term economic diplomacy has established itself in the Croatian sources as an umbrella term for all the activities of the national state to protect and promote its own economic interests in the international environment. Under the broader concept of economic diplomacy we distinguish the activities of economic diplomacy and commercial diplomacy. The economic instruments of foreign policy are divided into two major groups: economic (development) aid and economic sanctions. Contrary to these traditional concepts we have a newer phenomenon called ‘country branding’. Some countries use different systems of organizations to promote their economic interests in the global environment, and such a system is called model of economic diplomacy.

Although economic diplomacy has been around from the beginning of the organization of communities into political entities (city-states, kingdoms, empires etc.), as a practical skill focused on achieving individual betterment of society through appropriately negotiating the terms of trade in international exchange, it has only been the subject of more extensive study for the last ten years or so. It comprises the concepts of the economy and diplomacy, and the combination and synergy of these two makes for a complex concept that includes skilful international communication and negotiation (diplomacy) with the protection and promotion of own economic interests. The authors who engage in economic diplomacy are quite restrained in defining the concept, and they emphasize that this is a discipline that is constantly changing and evolving along with the concerns of the international economy and international political relations. To professors Bayne and Woolcock (Bayne and Woolcock, 2007) economic diplomacy “is the way in which states conduct their economic relations (at the beginning of the twenty-first century), how decisions are made at the national level and (then) negotiated in the international arena (with other international actors), and how these two processes interact”. Although the authors put the state at the centre of this process, they talk about other actors (i.e. non-state actors) that are becoming increasingly influential in the process.

* PhD, Diplomatic Academy, Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, Zagreb, Croatia

Saner & Yiu (Saner and Yiu, 2003) introduced the concepts of economic diplomacy and commercial diplomacy that are under the jurisdiction of state actors, and there are numerous 'diplomatic' activities carried out by the so-called postmodern, non-state actors: corporate diplomacy, commercial diplomacy, diplomacy of national non-governmental organizations, diplomacy of transnational NGOs, etc.

For the purposes of this study we shall use the term economic diplomacy as it has become established in Croatian sources in the last twenty years. This umbrella term that includes all the activities of the state to protect and promote its own economic interests in the international environment can be split into economic diplomacy and commercial diplomacy.

Economic diplomacy includes state actors (government employees and officials) with international organizations such as the World Bank, United Nations, World Trade Organization, European Union, ASEAN, NAFTA, etc., as well as bilateral negotiations with individual countries when concluding bilateral economic agreements such as the Agreement on Avoidance of Double Taxation, Agreement on Promotion and Protection of Investment, Agreement on Cooperation in Tourism, etc. Economic diplomacy is not engaged in the promotion of specific entities (companies, firms, corporations, etc.).

Commercial diplomacy represents all the activities of a government in supporting and promoting its economic operators through a network of diplomatic and consular missions, the chamber of commerce network, agencies, state-owned export banks, etc. To achieve this task, each country builds its own model of economic diplomacy that will possibly protect and ensure its economic growth and development and improve its position in the international environment. All knowledge, experience and tradition that a country has in its international positioning are summarized in its model (mode) of communication with other stakeholders in the international arena. Economic diplomacy is a means of economic foreign policy, and the participants in its implementation include the state (diplomats, government officials and employees, etc.) as well as non-state actors (transnational companies, NGOs, trade unions, business lobbies, etc.). The area in which these actors operate is very broad and includes: the national economy, the international economy (international trade, foreign trade, finance etc.), international organizations (the UN system, governmental and non-governmental organizations, etc.). Assuming both components under the model of economic diplomacy – economic diplomacy and commercial diplomacy – we can start off by noting that in smaller countries lacking the economic and political power to exert significant impact on global governance, there prevails commercial diplomacy. As early as in 1980, Alan James (James, 1980) noted that many embassies directed large part of their activities towards the promotion of trade. Since that time, this role has constantly been growing, and empirical studies have shown that diplomatic activities have a major impact on the commercial activities between countries. It is common

knowledge now that ‘Trade follows the flag’ (Pollins, 1989) (Rose, 2007). In large politically and economically powerful countries, the two components – economic diplomacy and commercial diplomacy – are equally important. The area of international economic and political relations is the setting of all of the processes and phenomena studied by economic diplomacy. The internationalization of enterprises, direct foreign investment, interstate negotiations and commercial contracts, functioning of multinational corporations, activities of international governmental organizations, international and regional multilateral interconnection of states, acting through the UN and other specialized organizations, etc. – all these are activities that belong to the field of study of economic diplomacy. However, the focus of this research will not be on all the aspects of the activities mentioned, but only on those activities that are the responsibility of state authorities and the effects that such activities produce in the international and national settings. Today, the understanding of the concept of diplomacy is widening, and we have: corporate diplomacy, NGO diplomacy, business diplomacy i.e. the so-called non-state actors in the field of economic diplomacy (Saner and Yiu, 2003). Though they are undoubtedly important in the complexity of today’s international relations, they will not be included in the scope of this contribution. This contribution is limited to the study of the activities of state actors in the international environment, and thus economic diplomacy will be defined in its traditional form as the work of state authorities and their organizations in promoting economic interests at all levels: bilateral, regional, plurilateral and multilateral.

Diplomacy and Economic Diplomats

The role of diplomats has been changing throughout history, and these changes are much more extensive today because of the great technological advances related to information, communication technologies and transport. The role of multilateral diplomacy is growing, and in the interconnected world of today diplomatic agendas are no longer exclusively bilateral but are becoming global and comprehensive. Familiarity with the cultures of other countries, their languages and the comprehensive assessment of the situation in each country, remain important in addressing certain issues, and the Ambassador becomes a ‘coordinator and adviser’ to individual ministries. In some cases a dominant role in modern diplomacy is played by prime ministers and state presidents who communicate directly at top-level meetings (G8, G20, the UN General Assembly, etc.) and can thus settle many issues.

A modern diplomat in the current multipolar environment, with the rapid flow of information, is often in a position of having to quickly and correctly analyse many and often contradictory pieces of information, make conclusions and properly

inform their ministry about a specific situation, problem and/or country. Today, particular importance is also attached to public diplomacy that includes clear and transparent communication with all the segments of society, including the dialogue with civil society organizations.

Generally, diplomacy as a tool and agent of the foreign policy must adjust to big changes in the latter. For instance, current global issues such as climate change differ from the 'traditional' issues that commanded the attention of diplomacy in the past. Also, meetings of G20 involve a large number of experts who are not diplomats. In addition to government officials or representatives of Foreign Ministries, individual ministers and experts as well as representatives of civil society organizations and the media that play an important role in the context of modern social relations are becoming increasingly involved in international arena. The customs of diplomacy play an important role in diplomatic law. They do not belong to the legal norms whose violation would be violation of international laws and regulations. However, both a custom and legal norms have their mandatory portions whose violation results in sanctions. Consequently, any breach of the customs of diplomacy is also a violation of diplomatic ethics and constitutes diplomatic incorrectness and a blow to the international reputation of the international entity that allows such practices (Simoniti, 1994, 18-19).

The rules and norms of diplomatic and consular law were generated over the centuries of practice and have grown into customary law. International law authors such as Gentilis Grotius, Bynkershoek, Vattel and others wrote and shaped some of the already valid customary law rules. Some of these rules have become part of the local (internal) law of individual states, e.g. the 1708 Diplomatic Privileges Act issued at the time of Queen Anne of England.

It was only at the Congress of Vienna (1815) that the first attempt at the codification of diplomatic law was made by enacting the "Vienna rules on the level of diplomatic representation" that recognized diplomacy as a separate activity than that of politicians and statesmen. It was confirmed as a profession with its own rules and customs. All the customs were noted that had hitherto been in place and through regular use had become integral part of diplomatic law. (Vukadinović, 1995, 25) (Simoniti, 1994, 7-8) The next attempt at integration was the Aachen Protocol (1819) that added another level to the ranking of diplomatic representatives.

At the Pan American Conference in Havana (1928) the Convention on Diplomatic Agents and Consuls was adopted. The process continued within the United Nations that in 1947 established the International Law Commission responsible, among other things, for the adoption of the multilateral convention on diplomatic and consular relations and immunities.

The immediate reason for the codification of diplomatic law was the tense relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR. Because of the continued violations of diplomatic immunity of Yugoslav diplomats in the USSR, Yugoslavia raised the

issue with the UN General Assembly concerning the inviolability of diplomatic agents and unimpeded operation of embassies (Radovič, 1990, 15). The General Assembly adopted the initiative of Yugoslavia to launch the codification of customary law norms in diplomatic law and, in resolution 685 (VII) of 5 December 1952, it ordered the International Law Commission to prepare the codification of diplomatic law.

The work on the convention lasted until 1961, when the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations was signed, followed by the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations in 1963. In its introduction, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations recalls that ever since ancient times peoples from all countries recognized the status of diplomatic representative (diplomatic agent), stating that the rules of customary international law would continue to regulate the issues not expressly regulated by the provisions of this Convention (Berković, 1997, 16). Article 3 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations is particularly relevant to the activities of economic diplomacy, dealing with the functions of diplomatic missions and specifying “...the promotion of friendly relations between the sending state and the receiving state, and developing mutual economic, cultural and scientific relations.”

Satow analyzes and clarifies the provisions of the Vienna Diplomatic and Consular Conventions concerning the economic tasks of diplomats and consuls, and states: “...if Article 3 of the Vienna diplomatic convention refers to the promotion of ‘economic relations’, Article 5 of the Vienna consular convention refers to the promotion of ‘trade relations’, so we may conclude that this is one and the same thing, as it is now difficult to distinguish between trade relations and economic activities. The difference between a diplomat and a consuls in the economic field is that the diplomat works at the national level in his promotion of the economy, and the consul is acting locally i.e. promoting the economy of his own country in the consular district awarded to him in the *exequatur*.” (Satow, 1994)

In conclusion, both Vienna Conventions that codify diplomatic and consular law allow, even today, each country to organize its diplomacy in accordance with its financial, organizational and staffing resources and to choose their model of economic diplomacy, to represent and protect their economic interests in the host country as best they can.

Economic Agents of Foreign Policy

In today’s world of globalization, when economies around the world are increasingly becoming networked and interdependent, the economic instruments of foreign policy are important levers of influence and control over processes and events. Given the prevailing global economic doctrine of (neo) liberal capitalism, that gained remarkable momentum and global inclusiveness after the fall of the

Berlin Wall and the collapse of communist regimes (early 1990s), all the world economies are more or less open and subject to global trends. It is almost as if the internal economic policy cannot be separated from the foreign policy because they are intertwined and indivisible.

Back in 1985, Baldwin talked about ‘economic statecraft’ as the highest form of state economic engagement that included internal and external economic policies (Baldwin, 1985, 39-40). Economic foreign policy is a narrower term and it is directed ‘outwards’ and is often used as a tool for achieving foreign-policy (and often non-economic) goals.

“Unlike political means of diplomacy used by direct foreign policy makers to communicate certain messages, economic resources are directed towards the general population and their application will soon be felt by all, not just the foreign policy makers.” (Vukadinović, 2005)

Economic resources can be roughly divided into two groups:

- Means used when relations are normal and when a country is ‘rewarded’, i.e. receives various forms of economic assistance or reward, and
- Coercive economic means that seek to discipline a country or state, i.e. lead it to behave in a desirable way.

The first group are classified as: foreign aid (grants, loans, etc.), development aid (development of agriculture, industry, education system, etc.), use of trade agreements and trade routing etc. Even when at first sight the intention to use such aid for political influence over the policies and orientation of a state is not apparent, such intention will sooner or later show, because the country that provides the aid strives for the implementation of some of its foreign policy objectives (Vukadinovic, 2005).

The second group includes coercive economic means used to warn states that they must abide by certain rules imposed by the international community. Here we can put such measures as boycott, embargo and/or withholding economic aid.

Economic (Development) Aid

Economic or development aid includes the transfer of funds of the government or public agency of one state or group of states to the government or public agency of another state. Such transfer is considered aid only if it does not include any form of reciprocity or purchase or refund (Economides and Wilson, 2001).

Economic and development aid, as opposed to economic sanctions, represents the intention of the donor country to provide assistance and try to influence or change the behaviour of the receiving state. What economic sanctions seek to achieve with threats and punishment, the providers of aid strive to achieve with offers, promises of aid, actual deliveries of aid, etc. The thing that is common to

both development aid and sanctions is that they are only means to an end, either economic or political, and least of all a humanitarian manifestation (Baldwin, 1985, 291-295).

Economides and Wilson (ibid, 125-126) suggested four reasons why states decide to provide development aid to other states:

1. Political and strategic plans (an example is the Marshall Plan: the most comprehensive plan of development aid, under which the USA allocated to the Western European countries about 17 billion US dollars between 1948 and 1952, and the goal was to make these countries more economically dependent on the United States, as well as to create conditions for the economic integration of Europe in response to the threat of the Soviet Union. The U.S. goals were economic and strategic (Benko, 1997, 267);
2. Encouraging international economic development (after the Second World War, aid was provided to many countries so as to recover from the war as soon as possible and then begin to cooperate in a liberal trading system, to the benefit of the developed countries that provided the aid);
3. Humanitarian aid (in case of major natural disasters, this assistance is usually not related to any obligations); and
4. Aid as a means to achieve a range of other objectives (fight against corruption, struggle for human rights, development of democratic institutions and effective governance in the countries in transition, as well as the IMF's 'structural' policy adjustment in order to adopt the Western economic and political values, culture and ways of thinking and acting).

In the era of the Cold War, many were wary of economic aid supporting autocratic regimes in less developed countries, stoking regional conflicts and supporting the neo-colonialism. Moreover, the agencies that were supposed to facilitate the distribution of aid spent the largest portion of the funds on themselves and the large bureaucratic apparatus, spending the aid intended for poor countries on capital-intensive projects that were of little help in raising the general standard of living of the population (Hook, 1996, 4-6).

Things become clearer if we bear in mind that the successful post-war development of Germany, Japan, Korea and Taiwan would not even remotely be as it was, had they not received generous (development) aid from the United States. The entire Western Europe after the Second World War depended precisely on the Marshall Plan. It was very similar in Asia, where, according to estimates, Japan received about \$ 500 million per year in the period from 1950 to 1970, and South Korea received economic and military aid worth 13 billion dollars in the period from 1946 to 1978, whereas Taiwan received \$ 5.6 billion.

All developed countries attach importance and allocate substantial resources to economic and development aid to under-developed and undeveloped countries, because that way they are enabling their growth and development, and in the

comprehensive interconnection of the world (globalization) they are thus creating conditions for increasing the overall demand and consumption. This will also facilitate their future exports based on increased global demand.

Economic Sanctions

In international relations crises are constantly appearing that are being addressed in various ways. Primarily, diplomacy is given a chance to try and use its means and resolve the situation, mainly through negotiations, but also through some form of political or economic pressure.

With the general development of society and economic interdependence (globalization) states are becoming vulnerable to economic pressures, and international economic sanctions have become important part of the foreign policy of certain countries or international organizations. International organizations justify such decisions by the need to achieve the goal of collective security, whereas the great powers thereby realize their national interests and widen the sphere of their influence in the under-developed countries and regions at large.

Under the concept of economic sanctions various authors include a variety of economic measures differing in scope and the goals to be achieved. Galtung (Galtung, 1976, 378-416) speaks of economic sanctions as the sanctions by one or more international actors (the tenders) against one or more countries (the receivers) with the intention of punishing the target countries for improper behaviour or to force them to accept the norms and behaviour that to the country (or international organization) introducing the sanctions seem reasonable and in line with the expectations of the international community.

Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott (Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott, 1985) speak of economic sanctions as a deliberate, government-driven and guided measure, or the threat of such measure, to suspend the trade or financial relations. Those who impose sanctions intend to change some elements of the internal or external policies of the sanctioned state.

Drezner (Drezner, 1999) sees economic sanctions as a threat or actual suspension of economic exchange by one state or coalition of states (the sender) directed against another state (the target) with the intention to compel the target country to change its policy. The suspension of economic exchange may include: trade sanctions, boycott, withholding economic aid, freezing the funds abroad or introducing customs duties.

There was an increased use of economic sanctions in the second half of the 20th century, and this can be defined as replacing military threats (and interventions) with this form of pressure on the governments of the countries that did not comply with the standards set and agreed by the international community. However, economic sanctions, admittedly, rarely achieve their goal: political change in

the country sanctioned, halting military operations, democratization, change of dictatorial regimes etc. Sanctions inflict great economic losses and do damage not only to the sanctioned country but also to the broader international community and even, reactively, to the country or international organization that introduced the sanctions.

Branding in Economic Diplomacy

Today we talk about different types of 'brands' as models and indicators of high standards in certain areas. In addition to trade and marketing brands that bring profit and extra profit to their owners, today the state, too, is trying to become a 'brand'. Particular civilizational, social and productive achievements aim to identify with certain nations and their national communities, so we thus recognize: French cheeses and wines, German cars and technical goods, the American lifestyle, Scandinavian concern for the environment, exotic tourism destinations in the Far East (Bali, Seychelles, etc.), Swiss banking and milk sweets, etc.

'Country branding' is becoming a promotional mission of diplomacy of a country, and the success in the implementation of this function determines the success of its international positioning and generation of additional income on the basis of the widely known and recognized 'brand'.

In today's era of global communications and satellite TV programs available all over the globe, we can see the trend of 'telling one's story', so TV stations of the superpowers (BBC World, EuroNews, Sky News, CNN, etc.) or of the powerful and wealthy nations that aspire to 'run the world' make programs to spread their own civilizational, cultural and economic patterns. They actually send out messages about what should be the ideal pattern of social structure, values (moral, material and ideological) to strive for, as well as their own interpretation of everyday political and economic events in the world. Countries outside the Western cultural circle have realized this was being imposed on them, and in order to get in the advertising game themselves, they have begun to broadcast similar programs that promote their own civilizational values (Al Jazeera, Xinhua, Asianet, etc.).

Economic Diplomacy

Economic diplomacy is concerned with issues of economic policy, such as the negotiation on the standards of international trade under the World Trade Organization (WTO), or some other international organizations in the domain of determining economic standards (at the regional or global levels). Economic diplomat also monitors and reports on the economic policies in foreign countries and advises his government how best to respond to such policies. Economic diplomacy

includes using economic resources as a reward or punishment (e.g. development aid and/or economic sanctions), in order to achieve a particular foreign-policy goal. This activity is sometimes called 'economic statecraft' (Berridge and James, 2001). Diplomats engaging in such activities usually come from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of their home countries (sending states), but are also often recruited from other relevant ministries such as the Ministry of Economic Affairs and/or the Ministry of Trade and Industry, depending on the model of economic diplomacy of the sending state.

Diplomacy, like politics, is the art of the possible motivated by economic interests. If we remove the economic component from today's diplomacy, it would not be able to solve any of the pressing global issues and conflicts. It was noticed by Guy Carron de la Carrière (Carron de la Carrière, 1998) who discussed the economies of individual countries that are becoming more open and the international division of labour is becoming so intensified that the role of economic diplomacy is becoming increasingly significant, pushing away the traditional forms of (violent) resolution of conflicts between states.

Solving international problems today can only be approached with traditional diplomatic means reinforced with elements of economic diplomacy, because the economy comes before politics and offers solutions that are better than the political ones. Notably, a country with stronger, more powerful economy that ranks high in terms of global competitiveness, can apply its economic power and economic diplomacy to successfully achieve its goal of achieving the biggest possible share in the world's GDP (and greater prosperity for its people) making use of the economic means rather than force and conquest of foreign territories. Direct foreign investment, selling goods and services, placement of financial capital achieve much better and more favourable effects than the use of force, land grab and other colonial methods of the past.

At the beginning of the 21st century, the ideological divide affecting the relations between states in the 20th century, disappeared. After the Second World War, two ideologically opposed blocs of states (East and West) with different systems had been set up: capitalism in the West and the command economy in the East, so there was no free flow of goods, capital, ideas, technology and people in both directions, as there is today. Both systems operated independently of each other and there was little trade between them. In these circumstances, economic diplomacy was of little use. This situation lasted until the fall of the Berlin Wall and the liberation of the forces that during the 1990s lead to the globalization process.

Today, economic factors are constantly gaining in importance in the foreign policy of all countries. The increasing international division of labour (now called globalization) increasingly binds the national economy into one interdependent whole and one can only operate with economic instruments in such an environment, defending the national interests and the interests of the national economy.

To successfully defend one's interests in international relations, it is necessary to anticipate certain events and situations, and act in time to reap benefits from them and, at the same time, avoid sustaining loss and/or damage to the national economy. In this, the most successful state has been the United States of America, the largest economy in the world and the leader in global economic diplomacy. The financial and economic potential of the United States, with the dollar as the global currency and their greatest strategic offensive weapon, enabled this state to use the means of economic diplomacy and achieve most of its foreign policy objectives. What they failed to achieve this way, they - of course – attempted to achieve with arms (which is not our focus here), yet the economic methods seem to have been much more successful than the military ones. This is especially true of the second half of the twentieth century and the beginning of the 21st century.

Commercial Diplomacy

Commercial diplomacy includes activities of diplomatic missions (and consular posts) that help the business and financial sectors of the sending state in their efforts to achieve economic success in line with the overall development objectives of the state. Such activities include the promotion of foreign investment (in both directions) and trade relations. An important part of the activities of commercial diplomats representing the work to collect information about export opportunities, favourable conditions for investment, as well as organizing visits by and showing hospitality to business delegations from the sending state.

Commercial diplomats are usually civil servants, but they can be representatives of chambers of commerce attached to diplomatic and consular missions as the experts on the economic situation in the receiving state.

Feltham (Feltham, 1996) highlights the distinction between economic and commercial sections of diplomatic missions and consular posts in such a way that the commercial department includes the responsibilities for the promotion of trade relations with the receiving state (import and export), aiding and informing businessmen about business opportunities, consultancy in legal matters and regulations (relating to business, investment, customs and trade) and so on.

Professor Kishan Rana (Rana, 2002) described in detail the procedures and methods used by commercial diplomacy in their daily work:

1. Analysis

Understanding the economic dynamics in the receiving state is the primary task that includes insight in the main parameters of the domestic economy. The analysis of the import and export and the main regions with which foreign trade takes place, the main features of foreign investment, technological strength of the receiving country, the activities of competitors (actual and potential) as well as

their impact on the export of the sending state to the domestic market, and other relevant economic activities of the receiving state, are the subject of study.

2. Creating Basic Information Materials

Creating the basic written materials about the receiving state is useful for a number of reasons. It facilitates the understanding of the basic economic profile of the country, shows the major economic indicators, the organization of the economy, taxes, duties and customs policy in general, banking and financial institutions, the system of resolving business disputes and arbitration, the way of business organization, the main import and export actors and alike.

Furthermore, such materials are used as the basic information for commercial inquiries of businesses from the sending state; they can be uploaded to a website (interactive public information material allows for easier collection of feedback and continual improvement and amendment). It is possible to make comparisons with other similar materials of diplomatic missions and consular posts (e.g. written profiles of individual countries prepared by the U.S. Commerce Department – the Ministry of Trade of the United States – serving as a reliable standard in preparing such materials). Specific commercial reports (commercial briefing notes) are also prepared for known clients, dealing with particular market segments for specific products and analyzing the competitors and their market shares and the marketing tactics used.

3. Scope of Work

Economic entities of the receiving state that are already doing business with partners from the sending state or taking part in joint ventures are a good basis and a model to follow in expanding cooperation to other companies potentially interested in such cooperation. Various business associations, lobbying groups, parliamentarians, academics, media specialists in science and technology and local political (self-) management units, are also actors that should be targeted in order to improve the economic cooperation with the receiving state.

4. Teamwork

Although the tasks of a diplomatic mission or consular post are precisely arranged by areas (political, consular, cultural, economic, etc.), it is possible to achieve a synergistic effect through the mobilization of the staff available (so-called task force method) on a particular task. For example, export promotion of a priority product. In this, one's own citizens in an influential and important position in the receiving state can be involved, such as prominent business leaders, technical experts, intellectuals and so on. The Head of Mission must lead in such operations by personal example and insist that any contact made by any member of the working team should be utilized for the economic promotion of their own country.

5. Delegation

A traditional method for the promotion of international trade, investment and other forms of foreign exchange is quite certainly the organization of business delegations in both directions. Preparing and organizing such delegations requires careful planning and making out business partners in advance (so-called match making) that show serious intentions to enter into business agreements. Serious and careful organization of such meetings is only possible if there are already available written info-materials, market analysis and other relevant information on business opportunities that can be submitted in advance to interested parties. The follow-up activities of commercial diplomats are also important.

6. Promotion of the Country

All operational aspects of commercial diplomacy are covered by one common denominator: 'promotion of the country', i.e. all the activities undertaken with regard to the promotion of trade and investment, and technology transfer, as well as in other areas such as creating positive atmosphere in the media of the receiving state with regard to the overall image of the sending state. Such activities are usually undertaken in order to attract tourists and/or build institutional relationships in order to develop cooperation in the field of science and common research and educational cooperation.

Conclusion

With the successful appearance of a state in international organizations, on the regional, plurilateral and multilateral levels, on a global scale, and within the UN system, economic diplomacy is positioning that state in international relations and commercial diplomacy is positioning it on the bilateral level to promote products and services, increase exports, helping with country branding and contributing to economic and social growth and progress. Thus, both components of economic diplomacy – economic and commercial – are acting in synergy to position the country in the international environment and contribute to its economic growth and prosperity. The organizational form applied by individual countries in this process is called model of economic diplomacy.

References:

1. Baldwin, David Allen. *Economic Statecraft*. Princeton: University Press, 1985.
2. Bayne, Nicholas and Woolcock, Stephen. *The New Economic Diplomacy*. London: Ashgate, 2007.

3. Benko, Vlado. *Znanost o mednarodnih odnosih*. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede, 1997.
4. Berković, Svjetlan. *Diplomatsko i konzularno pravo*. Zagreb: Nacionalna i sveučilišna knjižnica, 1997.
5. Berridge, Geoff R. *Machiavelli*. In: Geoff R. Berridge, Maurice Keens-Soper, and T. G. Otte (Eds.): *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger* (pp. 1-32). Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001.
6. Carron de la Carrière, Guy. *La diplomatie économique: le diplomate et le marché*. Paris: Economica, 1998.
7. Drezner, Daniel W. *The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations*. Cambridge: University Press, 1999.
8. Economides, Spyros; Wilson, Peter. *The Economic Factor in International Relations*. London: I. B. Tauris, 2001.
9. Feltham, R. G. *Diplomatski priručnik*. Zagreb: Naklada Zadro, 1996.
10. Galtung, Johan. *On the Effect of International Economic Sanctions*. In: *World Politics*, Vol. 19 (October 1966 – July 1967), pp. 378-416.
11. Hook, Steven W. *Introduction: Foreign Aid in a Transformed World*. In: Steven W. Hook (Ed.): *Foreign Aid toward the Millennium*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996.
12. Hufbauer, G. C., Schott, J. J., and Elliott, K. A. *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy*. Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, 1985.
13. Pollins, B. M. *Does trade still follow the flag?* In: *American Political Science Review*, No. 83 (pp. 465-480). Washington DC: American Political Science Association, 1989.
14. Rana, Kishan. *Bilateral Diplomacy*. Msida: Diplo Foundation, 2002.
15. Rose, Andrew K. *The Foreign Service and Foreign Trade: Embassies as Export Promotion*. In: *The World Economy*, Vol. 30, no. 1, 2007, pp. 22-38.
16. Saner, Raymond and Lichia Yiu. *International Economic Diplomacy: Mutations in Post-Modern Times*. Discussion Papers in Diplomacy. The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', 2003.
17. Satow, Sir Ernest Mason (edited by Lord Gore-Booth). *Satow's Guide to Diplomatic Practice*. Fifth edition. London and New York: Longman, 1994.
18. Simoniti, Iztok. *Diplomatsko pravo*. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede, 1994.
19. Vukadinović, Radovan. *Teorije vanjske politike*. Zagreb: Politička kultura, 2005.

Military Aspects of International Relations

Davor Ćutić*

In the last 20 years significant changes have occurred in international relations. The fall of the Berlin wall can be viewed as the beginning of a new era, and since then nothing has been the same. Big countries disintegrated in a short period of time. Defence and Security challenges have changed dramatically. This in turn affected the role of military attachés, changing their role in a way that they became involved in a higher level of cooperation in the field of defence and security. Defence attachés are now an important link in bilateral cooperation among bilateral partners, members of alliances and organisations working for the benefit of cooperation as well as confidence and security building measures.

1. Introduction

Over the past 20 years there have been significant changes in international relations. The fall of the Berlin wall marked the beginning of a new era. Countries from the Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia achieved independence and sovereignty. New relations, both bilateral and multilateral, began to emerge on the international stage. New realities on the international scene stipulated a new approach to international cooperation. Countries that belonged to the opposed alliances until recently became friends and allies almost overnight, bonded by mutual interests and security challenges. Modern times and quick changes in the surrounding require a suitable response. In international relations the manner of communication and cooperation in the field of diplomacy is changing. Accordingly, the work method, position and role of military diplomacy are also changing.

2. The Old Role of Military Diplomacy

The development of military diplomacy, as well as the role and tasks of military delegations in the past century, mainly boiled down to various forms of intelligence activities. Actually, the entire period of the Cold War stipulated the primary role of

* PhD, civil servant, an expert on international relations and defence diplomacy, Ministry of Defence, Zagreb, Croatia

intelligence activity for diplomacy in general, which practically brought to their equation.¹ Furthermore, although the possible sequence should be different, in practice, only after the role of the intelligence officer was the military attaché a sort of link, between the Ministry of Defence of his country and the ministry of defence of the receiving country, and beside this, an advisor to the head of the diplomatic representative body for military issues.²

Such a sequence of priorities is clear taking into account the relations of mistrust that prevailed even among allied countries. The state of affairs was as such because alliances were of limited duration and lasted until the achievement of a limited and agreed upon goal. It was often the case that allies would change even during conflicts.

3. Defence Diplomacy

Through the 90's a new approach to military diplomacy was developed. The role of military attachés became ever more broadened, so as to expand beyond that of an armed forces officer who followed the state of affairs in the armed forces of the receiving country. An ever greater emphasis was placed on cooperation with the ministry of defence and the policy level, so that the title of Defence Attaché was generally accepted in a large number of countries. Therefore the main form of work in defence diplomacy is a combination of diplomatic and military *tools*. Activities in defence diplomacy include:

- Providing military advice and assistance to countries conducting reforms in the defence sector,
- Establishment of mixed civilian and military missions in conflict areas or after conflicts, and
- Development of new controls for armament and disarmament as well as confidence and security building measures and responses to needs in conflict areas or following conflicts.³

To provide forces to meet the varied activities undertaken by the MOD to dispel hostility, build and maintain trust and assist in the development of democratically

¹ Ogorec M., *Prilagođenost vojno diplomatske izobrazbe potrebama suvremene vojne diplomacije, Obrambeno i sigurnosno obrazovanje u 21. stoljeću* (Adaptation of military diplomatic education to the needs of contemporary military diplomacy, Defence and security education in 21st century), Zbornik radova, Centar za sigurnosne studije, Fakultet političkih znanosti, Sveučilište u Zagrebu (Proceedings, Center for Security Studies, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Zagreb), 2009, pp. 61-68.

² Bilandžić M., *Diplomacija i obavještajna aktivnost* (Diplmacy and intelligence activities), MUP RH (Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Croatia), Zagreb, 1998, p. 41.

³ Defence Attachés, DCAF Backgrounder, 07/2007, DCAF, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.

accountable armed forces, thereby making a significant contribution to conflict prevention and resolution.

UK MOD⁴

Defence diplomacy, to a great measure, is derived from the needs of western European countries and the USA to provide assistance to countries in conflict, to halt hostilities, and in post conflict periods, to provide assistance in transition and creation of a lasting peace. The United Kingdom was the leader in defence diplomacy. They were the first to mention the concept in the Strategic Defence Review from 1998, speaking of the role of the attaché. After the attack on September 11th, 2001, the United Kingdom developed a new Strategic Defence Review titled the New Chapter.

It was here that the importance of defence diplomacy was stressed in responding to the causes of conflicts and terrorism, as well as the benefit gained from their wider approach. Through the role of defence diplomacy, defence attachés from the UK have an important role in the anti-terrorist policy of their country.⁵

Security cooperation and the war against terrorism have increased the strategic importance of military attachés. Having in mind the wide scope of activities in the coordination of US armed forces deployment in the fight against the Taliban in Afghanistan and the support for the training and equipping program in Georgia, military attachés provide great assistance to the commanders of combat units as operators and reporters. Notwithstanding transformation, military attachés have four main missions that are intertwined: advising ambassadors; representing their ministries of defence in the receiving country; reporting about the state of affairs in the receiving country; and management of security cooperation programs.⁶

Over time forms of bilateral and multilateral cooperation developed in which defence attachés have had a big and significant role. Defence attachés are the key links in cooperation between bilateral partners in the fields of defence, security and wider. In this sense, they approach the tasks of *civilian* diplomacy.⁷ It can be said that military diplomacy was in support of civilian diplomacy, ensuring

⁴ Ministry of Defence Policy Paper No.1 Defence Diplomacy, Ministry of Defence of UK, December 2000.

⁵ Idem.

⁶ Shea, T., *Transforming Military Diplomacy*, Joint Force Quarterly, July 2005 Available at: http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0KNN/is_38/ai_n15631266/

⁷ Ogorec Marinko, *Prilagođenost vojno diplomatske izobrazbe potrebama suvremene vojne diplomacije Obrambeno i sigurnosno obrazovanje u 21. stoljeću* (Adaptation of military diplomatic education to the needs of contemporary military diplomacy, Defence and security education in 21st century), Zbornik radova, Centar za sigurnosne studije, Fakultet političkih znanosti, Sveučilište u Zagrebu (Proceedings, Center for Security Studies, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Zagreb), 2009, pp. 61-68.

information of military and security importance so that civilian diplomacy may act within its segment.

Defence diplomacy is more and more moving in parallel with civilian diplomacy. The reason for this is the ever greater scope, type and amount of activities that require specific knowledge which cannot be gained through short briefings, information or courses. Activities in the field of defence diplomacy require the engagement of high ranking military personnel who have gained knowledge, skills and capabilities of military expertise through their careers which are today the key to success for armed forces representatives in the field of defence diplomacy.

Defence attachés are not the only armed forces representatives of a given country that fill the role of military diplomats. Today all members of the armed forces are deployed to work in international organizations, headquarters and commands, who participate in international missions and operations, who take part in seminars, conferences and workshops, or who are sent to various forms of education at military-education institutions of partner countries.

Today, we can freely say that practically all events taking place in the life of a country are connected to defence and security. Every social activity affects security and security affects various activities. That is why there are terms such as economic security, IT security, energy security...

4. New Trends in Defence (Military Diplomacy)

Challenges that appear daily in the field of defence and security require a flexible approach to planning and the conduct of activities in the domain of defence and security. Today we can recognise the following forms of activities and cooperation in the field of defence that are not exclusively related to the duties of defence attachés but wider, as a defence attaché represents a link connecting partners in the realization of various activities:

High-level strategic security dialogues, **Cooperation** in fields that are not traditionally related to security, **Regional** cooperation in the field of defence and security, and **Exchanges** of those attending military education programmes.

The defence attaché represents several countries – In the context of creating smaller or larger alliances and the establishment of a greater degree of cooperation between bilateral partners the situation has arisen where the defence attaché of one country has the authority to represent one or more other countries in certain activities.⁸

⁸ This is the case with Nordic countries through the - Memorandum of understanding between the Ministry of Defence of the Kingdom of Denmark, the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Finland, the Ministry of Defence of the Kingdom of Norway, and the government of the Kingdom of Sweden concerning Nordic coordinated arrangement for military peace support (NORDCAPS) - regulated relations and forms of cooperation in the military field.

Joint assistance activities – Ministries of defence, through defence attachés in partner countries, develop forms of cooperation and assistance toward third countries.

Specialists – In the field of Security Sector Reform, with an aim to create better interoperability, a partner country, on the basis of evaluations by the defence attaché or request by the host nation, sends an expert for a defined period of time.⁹

Embedded military personnel – Partner countries in confidence and security building measures exchange officers for work in specific organizations in the ministry of defence and/or armed forces, who perform the same work they would in the organizational body in the ministry of defence and/or armed forces of their own country.¹⁰

Joint assistance in the reconstruction of fallen states – Bilateral partners, with mutual forces, prepare and conduct building projects for various facilities needed by the local population in a given country of interest to both partners (schools, hospitals, bridges, roads, wells, etc.).

Arms industry – The trade in weapons and equipment (as well as the development of technologies between partner countries) with an aim to save money and build trust, have been regulated in arms industry.

Joint exercises – Responding to national interests, armed forces participate in missions and operation where they cooperate on the terrain with members of armed forces from other countries who are also participating in missions and operations. For the purpose of better mutual action on the terrain, suitable military exercises are conducted with an aim to achieve the proper level of mutual capabilities and to achieve compatibility.

Military Capacity Building¹¹ – Sending military experts and specialists who provide expert advice and recommendations, and who participate in the building of the military establishment – in countries where the military organization needs to be built or reorganized.

The Military Training Assistance Program (MTAP) – A part of reforms in the defence sector is also the adjustment of the armed forces and in this the individual units that need to adopt new tactical actions that are suitable to new challenges so that, in cooperation with the armed forces of partner countries when participating in international missions and operations, they may be compatible and speak the same language in the use of forces.

⁹ This does not concern deployment for a shorter period for the sharing of experiences through a presentation, seminar or advice. In this case partner countries send experts for a longer period of time that work in an organizational body that needs expert assistance and performs advisory tasks on a daily basis as an active example of work on a given issue.

¹⁰ They often work in the field of international cooperation where in a full capacity they represent the armed forces of the host nation they are deployed to.

¹¹ Danish Defence Agreement 2010-2014, Copenhagen, 24 June 2009.

As an additional quality the following additional programmes are being developed:
Arms control – Inspection team exchanges that conduct oversight and control of means, weapons and weapon systems.

Ship visits – Naval ships of partner countries dock at harbours. During visits small exercises are conducted between the two navies. Meetings with members of local administration and government are held while citizens are allowed to tour the ships.

Air shows – Air forces form separate acrobatic flying groups that perform at civil-military manifestations where their flying abilities are demonstrated.

5. Conclusion

Over the past twenty years, particularly after September 11th, 2001, attack and since the beginning of the global economic crisis, many countries have sought solutions in the field of defence that enable the maintenance of capabilities for national and international needs. In doing so defence attachés made the first contacts with representatives of partner countries investigating possibilities and forms of cooperation. In time the forms of cooperation broadened and deepened. Today, in a number of countries, cooperation has been raised to a high level. Cooperation between partners on the bilateral and multilateral plans surpasses the classic role of the military attaché, defence attaché or military advisor. Cooperation in the field of defence diplomacy is ever wider and ever deeper. In the future bilateral and multilateral cooperation will be continued in an upward trend in which forms of cooperation will intertwine and complement each other building a security environment full of trust. Civilian diplomacy will still be diversified from defence and military diplomacy. It will develop in a parallel system in some manner but also mutually build a secure environment for life, standards and advancement of national civilian society.

The role of defence diplomat representatives is changing. Following changes in the security environment, bilateral relations and financial limitations, the process of downsizing the number of defence representatives in the delegations of diplomatic missions or the discontinuation of defence-military diplomatic missions is under way. The redefinition of the military diplomatic network is being conducted by allocating defence missions in a given region with several co-accreditations. To the greatest measure this is related to countries that are members of international organizations (NATO and EU) which are members of sender countries and host countries, that do not have particularly strong developed bilateral relations between ministries of defence and armed forces. On the other hand the presence of military diplomatic representatives is stressed in countries outside the circle of membership in euro Atlantic integrations.

Undoubtedly, this is a time of transition in which the optimal solutions will be found for the role of defence diplomacy in the future. Taking into account the dynamics of events taking place in international relations, varying solutions are possible. However, it is certain that the times of classic defence diplomacy and diplomacy aimed at bilateral relations between two systems of national defence have ended. New trends suggest a defence diplomacy that can be called “bilateral for the multilateral purpose” in which two partner countries guide their mutual efforts in establishing relations in the field of defence, in providing assistance and sharing knowledge, all through a mutual approach toward third countries, regions or even continents.

References:

1. Bilandžić, M. *Diplomacija i obavještajna aktivnost* (Diplomacy and intelligence activities), MUP RH (Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Croatia), Zagreb, 1998.
2. Danish Defence Agreement 2010-2014, Copenhagen, 24 June 2009.
3. *Defence Attachés*, DCAF Backgrounder, 07/2007, DCAF, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.
4. Kristen Gunness (CNA Corporation) *China's Military Diplomacy in an Era of Change*, Paper prepared for the National Defence University symposium on China's Global Activism: Implications for U.S. Security Interests, National Defence University Fort Lesley J. McNair, June 20, 2006.
5. Ministry of Defence Policy Paper No. 1 *Defence Diplomacy*, Ministry of Defence of the United Kingdom, December 2000.
6. Ogorec M. *Prilagođenost vojno diplomatske izobrazbe potrebama suvremene vojne diplomacije*, Obrambeno i sigurnosno obrazovanje u 21. stoljeću (Adaptation of military diplomatic education to the needs of contemporary military diplomacy, Defence and security education in 21st century), Zbornik radova, Centar za sigurnosne studije, Fakultet političkih znanosti, Sveučilište u Zagrebu, (Proceedings, Center for Security Studies, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Zagreb), 2009.
7. Ogorec, M. *Vojno-diplomatska praksa* (Military-diplomatic practice), Golden marketing, Zagreb, 2005.
8. Ong Simon Rear Admiral, Ministry of Defence Singapore, Comdt SAFTI institute at the 5th ARF Meeting of Heads of Defence Universities, Colleges, Institutions in Tokyo from 27 to 31 August 2001 http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back/journals/2001/Vol27_3/2.htm
9. Shea, T. *Transforming Military Diplomacy*, Joint Force Quarterly, July 2005 - Available at: http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0KNN/is_38/ai_n15631266/

APPENDICES

14th CEI Dubrovnik Diplomatic Forum 2011

Programme
List of Participants
Family Photo

15th CEI Dubrovnik Diplomatic Forum 2012

Programme
List of Participants
Family Photo

16th CEI Dubrovnik Diplomatic Forum 2013

Programme
List of Participants
Family Photo

Activities of the Diplomatic Academy, MFEA, Croatia

Dubrovnik Diplomatic Forum (1998-2015)
International Francophone Diplomatic Seminars (2002-2015)



**14th CEI DUBROVNIK DIPLOMATIC FORUM
'EU and Its Neighbours: Prospects and Challenges'
Dubrovnik, Croatia, 2-4 June 2011**

PROGRAMME

Day 1: Thursday, 2 June 2011

08:30 – 09:00 Registration of the Participants
Centre for Advanced Academic Studies (CAAS),
Don Frana Bulića 4

09:00 – 10:15 Opening of the 2011 CEI Dubrovnik Diplomatic Forum

Opening session and welcome addresses:

Ms Vlasta Brunsko, Head of the CAAS Office, Dubrovnik

Mr Niko Šalja, Deputy Mayor, City of Dubrovnik

H.E. Dr Gerhard Pfanzelter, Secretary General, CEI Executive Secretariat, Trieste

Prof Dr Joseph Mifsud, President of the EMUNI University, Piran

Mr Frano Matušić, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Croatian Parliament,
Zagreb

H.E. Davor Vidiš, Director General for Neighbouring Countries and South-Eastern Europe,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration (MFAEI), Zagreb

Keynote Address of the Vice President of the European Parliament Hon. Gianni Pittella on 'European Neighbourhood Policy: the EP View'

10:15 – 11:00 Family photo in the courtyard & Coffee break

Book Promotion:

*'European Diplomacy: Regional Cooperation, Lifelong Learning and Diplomacy Training'
'Ruđer Bošković au service de la diplomatie de la République de Raguse'*

11:00 – 12:30 PLENARY SESSION:

Moderators: Prof Dr Lisen Bashkurti, Ms Vlasta Brunsko,
H. E. Dr Hans Winkler

11:00 – 11:20 What Do the Black Sea Strategy and the Union for the
Mediterranean Have in Common – H. E. Dr Hans Winkler,
Director, Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, Austria

11:20 – 11:40 EU, Mediterranean Relation and Current Crises –
Prof Dr Lisen Bashkurti, President, Albanian Diplomatic
Academy, Tirana

11:40 – 12:00 Russia - EU Relations – Prof Dr Tatiana Zvereva, Senior
Researcher, Diplomatic Academy, MFA, Russia

12:00 – 12:30 Comments and discussion

12:30 – 14:15 *Lunch*

14:30 – 17:00 WORKING SESSION & DIPLOMATIC WORKSHOP

14:30 – 17:00 Working Session:

Moderators: Prof Dr Ilan Chet, H.E. Dr Guido Lenzi, Ms Nives Malenica,
Mr Ivan Velimir Starčević

Union for the Mediterranean Today - Prof Dr Ilan Chet,
Deputy Secretary General of the Union for the Mediterranean

Union for the Mediterranean and Croatia - Ms Nives Malenica, Coordinator
for the Union for the Mediterranean, MFAEI, Croatia Implications of the
Intervention in Libya on the ENP - H. E. Dr Guido Lenzi, Italy

The Arab Revolutions in Motion: Challenge and Opportunity
for the ENP – Dr Daniela Zaharia, Institute for Diplomatic Studies,
University of Bucharest

Europe in Postmodern Peace Operations – Mr Ivan Velimir
Starčević, MFAEI, Croatia

15:30 – 16:00 *Coffee break*

Comments and discussion

14:30 – 17:00 Diplomatic Workshop - EU Prospects and Challenges
Moderators: H.E. Dr Mladen Andrić, Prof Dr Nabil Ayad, Prof Dr Joseph Mifsud,
 H.E. Dr Gerhard Pfanzelter
- Introduction by moderators and discussion with junior diplomats.

15:30 – 16:00 *Coffee break*

19:30 – 20:30 *Dinner*

20:30 – *Vind'honneur of the Mayor of Dubrovnik – Rector's Palace*

Day 2: Friday, 3 June 2011

09:00 – 12:30 PLENARY SESSION
Moderators: H.E. Osama Tawfik Badr, H.E. Dr Bernd Fischer,
 H.E. Dr Hans Winkler

09:00 – 09:30 Interregional Cooperation against the Backdrop of the Energy
 Turnaround in Germany - H.E. Dr Bernd Fischer, German
 Ambassador in Zagreb, Croatia

09:30 – 10:00 Egypt's Resolution, Frequently Asked Question – Junior
 Diplomats of the Institute of Diplomatic Studies, MFA, Cairo

10:00 – 10:30 Comments and discussion

10:30 – 11:00 *Coffee break*

11:00 – 11:30 The Role of Diplomacy in Bridging the Cultural Gap – Prof Dr Nabil
 Ayad, London Academy of Diplomacy, University of East Anglia, UK

11:30 – 12:20 Comments and discussion

12:30 – 14:00 *Lunch*

14:15 – 17:00 WORKING SESSION: Integration Policies and Diplomatic Training
Moderators: H.E. Dr Mladen Andrić, Prof Radu Carp, Prof Dr Joseph Mifsud,
 Dr Oleksandr Poltoratsky

Euro-Mediterranean Diplomatic Training – Prof Dr Joseph Mifsud,
 President, EMUNI

Regional and Inter-Regional Diplomatic Training –
 H.E. Dr Mladen Andrić, Croatia

Improving the Eastern Partnership: a View from Moldova –
H.E. Alexandru Codreanu, Moldavian Ambassador to Croatia, Budapest
Eurointegration Policy of Ukraine and Social Modernization
– Dr Oleksandr Poltoratsky, Associate Professor, Diplomatic Academy,
MFA, Kiev

Diplomatic Training: Some Polish Experiences – Mr Dariusz Wisniewski,
Director, Centre for Professional Development, MFA, Warszawa

Comments and discussion

Coffee break

17:20 – 19:00 <i>Sightseeing of Dubrovnik – Guided Tour</i>

19:30 – 20:30 *Dinner*

Day 3: Saturday, 4 June 2011

09:00 – 11:15 **PLENARY SESSION**

Moderators: H.E. Dr Svjetlan Berković, Mr Hrvoje Kanta, Ms Lenche
Mitevska-Avramova

09:00 – 09:40 Diplomacy of the Republic of Dubrovnik – H.E. Dr Svjetlan Berković,
Croatian Ambassador in Ljubljana, Slovenia

09:40 – 10:20 EU and State Administration Reforms – Mr Davor Ljubanović,
State Secretary, Ministry of Administration, Zagreb, Croatia

10:30 – 11:15 *Comments and discussion & Coffee break*

10:30 – 11:15 **Closing Session of the 2011 CEI Dubrovnik Diplomatic Forum**

Moderators: H.E. Dr Mladen Andrić, Prof Dr Nabil Ayad, H.E. Osama Tawfik Badr,
Ms Vlasta Brunsko, Prof Dr Joseph Mifsud

Brief summaries on the contents and findings of the Forum sessions presented by junior diplomats, with final remarks of the organisers of the Forum, including additional comments of other participants, as well as with the ceremony of presenting the Certificate of Attendance to the junior diplomats.

12:30 – 14:00 Lunch

(Free time)

Departure of the participants



14th CEI DUBROVNIK DIPLOMATIC FORUM
‘EU and Its Neighbours: Prospects and Challenges’
Dubrovnik, Croatia, 2-4 June 2011

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

CEI Member States

Albania

Prof Dr Lisen Bashkurti, President, Albanian Diplomatic Academy, Tirana
Dr Ilir Kulla, Albanian Diplomatic Academy, Tirana
Mr Alban Permeti, Assistant to the President, Albanian Diplomatic Academy, Tirana
Ms Almona Bajramaj, MFA, Tirana

Austria

H.E. Dr Hans Winkler, Director, Diplomatic Academy of Vienna

Belarus

Mr Vladimir Koronets, Third Secretary, Desk Officer for Croatia, MFA, Minsk

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Mr Hrvoje Kanta, Minister Counselor, Head of the Office for Diplomatic Training, MFA, Sarajevo
Ms Snežana Višnjić, MFA, Sarajevo

Croatia

H.E. Dr Mladen Andrić, Director, Diplomatic Academy, MFAEI, Zagreb
H.E. Dr Svetlan Berković, Croatian Ambassador to Slovenia, Ljubljana
Ms Vlasta Brunsko, Head of the CAAS Office, Dubrovnik
Mr Davor Ljubanović, State Secretary, Ministry of Administration, Zagreb
Ms Nives Malenica, Coordinator for the Union for the Mediterranean, MFAEI, Zagreb

Mr Frano Matušić, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Croatian Parliament, Zagreb

Ms Petra Radojević, Third Secretary, Diplomatic Academy, MFAEI, Zagreb

Mr Ivan Velimir Starčević, Minister Plenipotentiary, MFAEI, Zagreb

Mr Niko Šalja, Deputy Mayor, City of Dubrovnik

Prof Dr Ksenija Turković, Vice Rector for International Relations, University of Zagreb

H.E. Davor Vidiš, Director General for Neighbouring Countries and South-Eastern Europe, MFAEI, Zagreb

Mr Boris Dumančić, Third Secretary, MFAEI, Zagreb

Ms Jacinta Kusić, Third Secretary, MFAEI, Zagreb

Mr Domagoj Marić, Assistant, MFAEI, Zagreb

Czech Republic

Mr Josef Zrzavecky, Deputy Head of the Mission, Embassy of the Czech Republic in Zagreb

Italy

H.E. Dr Guido Lenzi (ret.), MFA, Rome

Macedonia

Ms Lenche Mitevska-Avramova, State Counsellor for National Priorities, MFA, Skopje

Ms Elena Georgievska, Desk Officer, Directorate for the European Union, MFA, Skopje

Moldova

H.E. Mr Alexandru Codreanu, Moldavian Ambassador to Croatia, Budapest

Montenegro

Mr Filip Kalezić, Third Secretary, Directorate for Multilateral Affairs, MFA, Podgorica

Poland

Mr Dariusz Wisniewski, Director, Centre for Professional Development, MFA, Warszawa

Mr Arkadiusz Toś, Assistant of European Policy Department, MFA, Warszawa

Romania

Prof Radu Carp, Director General, Romanian Diplomatic Institute, MFA, Bucharest

Ms Alexandra Benea, Director of Professional Training, Romanian Diplomatic Institute, MFA, Bucharest

Dr Daniela Zaharia, Scientific Secretary, Institute for Diplomatic Studies, University of Bucharest

Ms Andreea Lapadat, Junior Assistant, Romanian Diplomatic Institute, MFA, Bucharest

Serbia

Ms Mirjana Milosavljević, First Counsellor, Diplomatic Academy, MFA, Belgrade

Ms Bojana Didić, Attaché, Diplomatic Academy, MFA, Belgrade

Slovak Republic

Mr Marian Adam, Desk Officer, MFA Bratislava

Ms Alexandra Lasandova, Desk Officer, MFA Bratislava

Ukraine

Dr Oleksandr Poltoratsky, Associate Professor, Diplomatic Academy, MFA, Kiev

Other Countries

Azerbaijan

Mr Heydar Naghiyev, Attache, Embassy of Azerbaijan in Zagreb, Croatia

Canada - Palestine

Mr Raed Faid Ayad, London Academy of Diplomacy, University of East Anglia

Egypt

H.E. Osama Tawfik Badr, Director, Institute for Diplomatic Studies, MFA, Cairo

Mr Ahmed Khafagy, Institute for Diplomatic Studies, MFA, Cairo

Mr Haytham Ahmed, Institute for Diplomatic Studies, MFA, Cairo

Ms Sherin Mouawad, Institute for Diplomatic Studies, MFA, Cairo

Mr Mina Rizk, Institute for Diplomatic Studies, MFA, Cairo

Germany

H.E. Dr Bernd Fischer, German Ambassador to Croatia, Zagreb

Russian Federation

Prof Dr Tatiana Zvereva, Senior Researcher, Institute of Contemporary International Studies, Diplomatic Academy, MFA, Moscow

Mr Vadim Tkhor, Third Secretary, Diplomatic Academy, MFA, Moscow

Ms Kira Tupitsina, Diplomatic Academy, MFA, Moscow

Switzerland

Prof Mauro Alvisi, President of the ISSEA Research Institute, University of Polytechnic of Lugano

Mr Massimo Silvestri, Director of the ISSEA Research Institute, University of Polytechnic of Lugano

United Kingdom

Prof Dr Nabil Ayad, Director, London Academy of Diplomacy, University of East Anglia

International Organizations and Institutions

Central European Initiative (CEI)

H.E. Dr Gerhard Pfanzelter, Secretary General, CEI Executive Secretariat, Trieste, Italy

Euro-Mediterranean University (EMUNI)

Prof Dr Joseph Mifsud, President, EMUNI University, Piran, Slovenia

Ms Petra Zagoričnik, EMUNI, Piran, Slovenia

European Parliament

Hon. Mr Gianni Pittella, Vice President of the European Parliament

Union for the Mediterranean

Prof Dr Ilan Chet, Deputy Secretary General of the Union for the Mediterranean



14th CEI DUBROVNIK DIPLOMATIC FORUM
'EU and its Neighbours: Prospects and Challenges'
Dubrovnik, Croatia, 2-4 June 2011
FAMILY PHOTO



15th CEI DUBROVNIK DIPLOMATIC FORUM
‘Diplomacy and Intercultural Dialogue’
Dubrovnik, Croatia, 24-26 May 2012

PROGRAMME

Day 1 - Thursday, 24 May 2012

- 08:45 – 09:15 Registration**
Centre for Advanced Academic Studies (CAAS), Don Frana Bulića 4
- 09:15 – 10:15 Opening session of the 2012 CEI Dubrovnik Diplomatic Forum**

Welcome Addresses:

- Ms Vlasta Brunsko, Head of the CAAS Office, University of Zagreb, Dubrovnik
- Professor Nabil Ayad, Rector, London Academy of Diplomacy, University of East Anglia
- Professor Joseph Mifsud, President of the EMUNI University
- H.E. Dr Gerhard Pfanzelter, Secretary General, CEI Executive Secretariat
- Dr Andro Vlahušić, Mayor of the City of Dubrovnik
- Mr Nikola Dobrosravić, Head of the Dubrovnik-Neretva County
- Ms Andreja Metelko-Zgombić, Director-General for EU and International Law and Consular Affairs, MFEA

Keynote Address: Speaker of the Maltese Parliament H.E. Michael Frendo, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Malta on ‘Parliamentary Diplomacy and Cultural Constraints’

Book Promotion:
'Strategic Public Diplomacy'. Proceedings of the 13th Dubrovnik Diplomatic Forum, Zagreb, Diplomatic Academy, MFAE, Croatia, 2012

10:15 – 11:00 *Family Photo & Coffee Break*

11:00 – 12:30 **1st PLENARY SESSION:**

Moderators: Professor Joseph Mifsud, H. E. Dr Gerhard Pfanzelter,
Ms Vlasta Brunsko

11:00 – 11:15 *Anna Lindh Foundation as a Tool for Intercultural Dialogue* – Ms Nives Malenica, Coordinator for the Union for the Mediterranean, MFEA, Zagreb

11:15 – 11:30 *The Role of the Regional Cooperation Council in Promoting Intercultural Dialogue in SEE* – H.E. Jovan Tegovski, RCC Chief of Staff, Sarajevo

11:30 – 11:45 *Diplomacy, Cultural Awareness and Bridging the Cultural Gap* –
Professor Nabil Ayad

11:45 – 12:00 *Intercultural Competence and Decision Making in International Politics*
– Dr Daniela Zaharia, Institute for Diplomatic Studies,
University of Bucharest

12:00 – 12:45 *Comments and discussion*

12:45 – 14:15 *Lunch*

14:30 – 17:00 **DIPLOMATIC WORKSHOP FOR JUNIOR DIPLOMATS**
Moderators: H.E. Dr Mladen Andrić, Professor Nabil Ayad, Professor
Joseph Mifsud, H. E. Dr Gerhard Pfanzelter
- *Introduction by moderators and discussion with junior diplomats*

19:00 – 20:15 *Dinner*

20:30 *Vin d'honneur hosted by the Mayor of Dubrovnik – Rector's Palace*

Day 2 - Friday, 25 May 2012

09:00 – 12:30 **2nd PLENARY SESSION:**

Moderators: Dr Ivan Velimir Starčević, Professor Vlad Nistor, Dr Ranko Vujačić

Keynote Address: *Deputy Secretary General of the Union for the
Mediterranean Professor Ilan Chet*

- 10:00 – 10:30 *Comments and discussion*
 10:30 – 11:00 *Coffee Break*
- 11:00 – 11:15 *Competences and Skills of a Cultural Diplomat* – Professor Joseph Mifsud
- 11:15 – 11:30 *Rethinking Cultural Diplomacy: European Cultural Policy and Intercultural Dialogue* – Dr Martina Borovac Pečarević, MFEA, Zagreb
- 11:30 – 11:45 *Social Media, Diplomacy and Culture* – Professor Daryl Copeland
- 11:45 – 12:00 *Intercultural Dialogue in Peace Missions and Operations* – Dr Ivan Velimir Starčević, MFEA, Zagreb
- 12:00 – 12:15 *Comments and discussion*
- 12:45 – 14:15 *Lunch*
- 14:30 – 17:00 **3rd PLENARY SESSION: Panel discussion**
‘Cultural Diplomacy and Diplomatic Training’
Moderators: Professor Lisen Bashkurti, Dr Martina Borovac Pečarević,
 Professor Joseph Mifsud

Keynote Address: H.E. Dato’ Ku Jaafar Ku Shaari, Director General, Institute of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations (IDFR), Kuala Lumpur

Panelists:

H.E. Dr Badre-Eddine Allali, Moroccan Academy for Diplomatic Studies, Rabat
 Professor Lisen Bashkurti, President, Albanian Diplomatic Academy, Tirana
 Professor Daryl Copeland, London Academy of Diplomacy, University of East Anglia
 Dr Ranko Vujačić, Director, Diplomatic Academy, MFA, Podgorica
 Mr Dariusz Wisniewski, Deputy Director, Centre for Professional Development, MFA, Warsaw

Comments and discussion

- 15:00 – 15:30 *Coffee Break*

17.15 – 19.00 Sightseeing of Dubrovnik – Guided Tour

- 19:30 – 20:30 *Dinner*

Day 3: Saturday, 26 May 2012

09:00 – 11:15 **4th PLENARY SESSION**

Moderators: H.E. Dr Svjetlan Berković, Mr Dariusz Wisniewski, Dr Daniela Zaharia

Keynote Address: President Jorge Sampaio on ‘The UN Alliance of Civilizations: A Soft Power Tool to Address the Challenges of Cultural Diversity in the 21st Century’

09:20 – 09:40 *Public Diplomacy as a Tool of Cultural Dialogue: the Emerging Al Jazeera Balkans* – Dr Jasna Jelisić, Sarajevo School of Science and Technology

09:40 – 10:00 *Diplomacy of the Republic of Dubrovnik* – H.E. Dr Svjetlan Berković, Croatian Ambassador in Ljubljana, Slovenia

10:00 – 10:30 *Comments and discussion*

10:30 – 11:00 *Coffee Break*

11:00 – 12:15 **Closing Session of the 2012 Dubrovnik Diplomatic Forum**

Moderators: H.E. Dr Mladen Andrić, Professor Nabil Ayad, Ms Vlasta Brunsko, Professor Joseph Mifsud, H.E. Dr Gerhard Pfanzelter

Special Address: H.E. Mr Joško Klisović, Deputy Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of the Republic of Croatia

Brief summaries on the contents and findings of the Forum sessions presented by junior diplomats, with final remarks of the organisers and additional comments of other participants, as well as with the ceremony of presenting the Certificate of Attendance to the junior diplomats.

12:30 – 14:00 Lunch

(Free time)

Departure of the participants



15th CEI DUBROVNIK DIPLOMATIC FORUM 'Diplomacy and Intercultural Dialogue' Dubrovnik, Croatia, 24-26 May 2012

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

CEI Member States

Albania

Arbër Bashkurti, Training Coordinator, Albanian Diplomatic Academy, Tirana
Professor Lisen Bashkurti, President, Albanian Diplomatic Academy, Tirana
Ms Jonida Drogu, Third Secretary, MFA, Tirana
Mr Fejzi Lila, Director, Ministry of Economy Trade and Energy, Tirana
Mr Alban Permeti, Assistant of the President, Albanian Diplomatic Academy, Tirana

Belarus

Mr Sergei Balashchenko, Counsellor, MFA Minsk
Mr Vladimir Koronets, Second Secretary, MFA Minsk

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Dr Jasna Jelisić, Department of Politics and International Relations, Sarajevo School of Science and Technology
H.E. Miranda Sidran Kamišalić, Head of Department for International Scientific, Technical, Educational, Cultural and Sport Cooperation, MFA, Sarajevo

Croatia

H.E. Dr Mladen Andrić, Director, Diplomatic Academy, MFEA, Zagreb
H.E. Dr Svtjetlan Berković, Croatian Ambassador to Slovenia, Ljubljana
Dr Martina Borovac Pečarević, MFEA, Zagreb
Ms Vlasta Brkljačić, Adviser to Deputy Minister, MFAE, Zagreb
Ms Vlasta Brunsko, Head of the CAAS Office, Dubrovnik, University of Zagreb

Ms Ivana Burđelez, MA, Director, Centre for Mediterranean Studies, Dubrovnik, University of Zagreb

Mr Nikola Dobrosravić, Head of the Dubrovnik-Neretva County

Ms Indira Dužević-Radić, Diplomatic Academy, MFEA, Zagreb

Ms Antonela Đurđević Bujak, Department for Public Relations, City of Dubrovnik

H.E. Mr Joško Klisović, MA, Deputy Minister of Foreign and European Affairs, MFEA, Zagreb

Ms Adriana Kremenjaš Daničić, President, Europe House Dubrovnik

H.E. Ms Andreja Metelko-Zgombić, Director-General for EU and International Law and Consular Affairs, MFEA, Zagreb

Ms Marta Nakić Vojnović, Minister Counselor, Diplomatic Academy, MFEA, Zagreb

Dr Natalija Oštarijaš, PhD Candidate, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Zagreb

Mr Niki Pečarević, Second Secretary, MFEA, Zagreb

H.E. Mr Zdravko Sančević, Consul, Croatian Consulate General in Caracas, Venezuela

Ms Biserka Simatović, Senior Advisor for EU Funds, Department of Entrepreneurship, Tourism and the Sea, City of Dubrovnik

Dr Ivan Velimir Starčević, Minister Plenipotentiary, MFEA, Zagreb

Dr Andro Vlahušić, Mayor, City of Dubrovnik

Mr Hrvoje Vuković, Third Secretary, MFEA, Zagreb

Ms Wendy Zečić, M.A., Senior Advisor to the President, Zagreb City Assembly

Hungary

Mr Péter Kalotai, Deputy Director, First Secretary, MFA, Budapest

Mr Gyula Somogyi, Third Secretary, MFA, Budapest

Italy

Mr Marco Salaris, First Secretary, Italian Embassy in Zagreb

Poland

Mr Dariusz Wisniewski, Deputy Director, Professional Development Centre, MFA, Warszawa

Mr Pawel Lacki, Attaché, European Policy Department, MFA, Warszawa

Romania

Ms Adina Negrea, Third Secretary, MFA, Bucharest

Professor Vlad Nistor, Director General, Romanian Diplomatic Institute, MFA, Bucharest

Ms Adina Petcu, First Secretary, MFA, Bucharest

Ms Simona Sora, Second Secretary, Diplomatic Training Coordinator, MFA, Bucharest

Dr Daniela Zaharia, Senior Lecturer, Institute for Diplomatic Studies, University of Bucharest

Slovakia

Mr Petar Hulényi, Counselor, Director of the Diplomatic Academy, MFA, Bratislava

Ms Darina Kosegiova, Counsellor, MFA, Bratislava

Slovenia

Mr Andrej Kirm, Third Secretary, Centre for Strategic Studies, MFA Ljubljana

Ukraine

Ms Ievgeniia Kolomeichuk, Attaché, MFA, Kiev

Other Countries**Canada**

Professor Daryl Copeland, London Academy of Diplomacy, University of East Anglia

Indonesia

Mr Syafran Haris, Information, Social and Cultural Section Officer, Indonesian Embassy Zagreb

Mr Lanang Seputro, Deputy Head for Non Diplomatic and Technical Education and Training, MFA, Jakarta

Kosovo

H.E. Mr Ibrahim Gashi, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, MFA, Pristine

Mr Sylë Ukshini, Director of Regional Cooperation, MFA, Pristine

Malaysia

H.E. Dato' Ku Jaafar Ku Shaari, Director General, Institute of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations (IDFR), MFA, Kuala Lumpur

Malta

H.E. Michael Frendo, Speaker of the Maltese Parliament, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Malta, La Valetta

Morocco

H.E. Dr Badre-Eddine Allali, Moroccan Academy for Diplomatic Studies, Rabat

Saudi Arabia

Ms Sara Al Shaeikh, London Academy of Diplomacy, University of East Anglia

United Arab Emirates

Mr Abdulla Bin Ahmad AlShaikh, London Academy of Diplomacy, University of East Anglia

United Kingdom

Professor Nabil Ayad, Rector, London Academy of Diplomacy, University of East Anglia

International Organizations and Institutions**Central European Initiative (CEI)**

H.E. Dr Gerhard Pfanzelter, Secretary General, CEI Executive Secretariat, Trieste

Euro-Mediterranean University (EMUNI)

Professor Joseph Mifsud, President, EMUNI University, Piran

Professor Avraham Ben-Zvi, Head of the Executive Program, Department of International Relations, School of Political Science, University of Haifa

Ms Mohamed Chatouani, External Affairs and Cooperation EMUNI University, Piran

Regional Cooperation Council (RCC)

H.E. Jovan Tegovski, RCC Chief of Staff, Sarajevo

Union for the Mediterranean

Dr Ilan Chet, Deputy Secretary General of the Union for the Mediterranean, Barcelona



15th CEI DUBROVNIK DIPLOMATIC FORUM
'Diplomacy and Intercultural Dialogue'
Dubrovnik, Croatia, 24-26 May 2012
FAMILY PHOTO



16th CEI DUBROVNIK DIPLOMATIC FORUM
‘Innovations and Changing Roles of Diplomacy and Diplomatic Training’
Dubrovnik, Croatia, 23-25 May 2013

PROGRAMME

Day 1 - Thursday, 23 May 2013

08:45 – 09:15 **Registration**
Centre for Advanced Academic Studies (CAAS), Don Frana Bulića 4

09:15 – 10:00 **Opening session of the 2013 CEI Dubrovnik Diplomatic Forum**

Welcome Addresses:

- Ms Vlasta Brunsko, Head of the CAAS Office, Dubrovnik, Croatia
- Professor Nabil Ayad, Director of the London Academy of Diplomacy, UEA, London, UK
- HE Ms Marija Vučković, Deputy Prefect of the Dubrovnik-Neretva County, Croatia
- HE Dr Mladen Andrić, Head of the Diplomatic Academy, MFEA, Zagreb, Croatia

10:00 – 10:45 *Family Photo & Coffee Break*

10:45 – 12:45 **1st PLENNARY SESSION: Innovations and New Trends in Diplomacy**

Moderators: Professor Nabil Ayad, Professor Goran Vlašić, HE Dr Ranko Vujačić

10:45 – 11:25 *Emerging Patterns in Diplomacy* – Professor Nabil Ayad, Director of the London Academy of Diplomacy (LAD), University of East Anglia (UEA)

- 11:25 – 11:50** *Innovations and Contemporary Diplomacy* – H.E. Dr Damir Kušen, Head of Division for Central, Eastern and Southern Europe MFEA, Zagreb
- 11:50 – 12:25** *Global Trends, Innovations and Diplomacy* – Professor Goran Vlašić, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Zagreb
- 12:30 – 12:45** *A Post-Crisis Diplomacy: Czech Experience* – Ms Pavla Havlikova, Deputy Director of the Diplomatic Academy, MFA, Prague
- 12:45 – 12:55** *Current Trends in Diplomatic Training in Ukraine* – HE Mykola Kulnych, Rector of the Diplomatic Academy, MFA, Kyiv
- 12:55 – 13:30** *Comments and discussion*
- 13:30 – 14:45** *Lunch – at the Sesame Restaurant*

15:00 – 17:00	DIPLOMATIC WORKSHOP FOR JUNIOR DIPLOMATS on ‘Innovations and New Roles for Diplomats’
<u>Moderators:</u>	Professor Nabil Ayad, Professor Daryl Copeland, Professor Goran Vlašić - <i>Introduction by moderators and discussion with junior diplomats.</i>

- 17:30 – 19:30** *Sightseeing of Dubrovnik – Guided Tour*
- 20:00 –** *Dinner – at the Sesame Restaurant*

Day 2 - Friday, 24 May 2013

09:00 – 12:30 **2nd PLENNARY PLENARY SESSION: Innovations and Diplomatic Training**

Moderators: Dr Jasna Jelisić, HE Mykola Kulnych, HE Božin Nikolić

<p><u>Keynote Addresses:</u> <i>How to Establish Functional Links between Academic and Diplomatic World in the New Age and Context</i> – Dr Jasna Jelisić, Department of Politics and International Relations, Sarajevo School of Science and Technology</p>

- 09:50 – 10:05** *Standardizing Diplomatic Training Curricula* – HE Božin Nikolić, Director of the Diplomatic Academy, MFA, Belgrade
- 10:05 – 10:25** *Education Standards at the Faculty of International Relations: Training for Future Diplomats* – Dr Olga Malashenkova, Deputy Dean of the Faculty of International Relations, Belarusian State University, Minsk

10:25 – 10:40 *Capacity Building of Development Practitioners from Emerging Donors: Teaching Programme Outline* – Ms Natali Lulić-Grozdanoski, Head of the Division for International Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid, MFEA, Zagreb

10:40 – 10:55 *Comments and discussion*

10:55 – 11:25 *Coffee Break*

Special Addresses: Impact of Innovation in Diplomatic Training – the Case of Malaysia – HE Aminah Hj A Karim, Deputy Director General of the Institute of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations (IDFR), MFA, Kuala Lumpur

12:00 – 12:15 *Impact of Globalisation on Diplomacy* – Professor Daryl Copeland, London Academy of Diplomacy (LAD), University of East Anglia (UEA), London

12:15 – 12:30 *Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy* – Mr Fariz Ismailzade, Executive Vice Rector, Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy (ADA), MFA, Baku

12:30 – 12:45 *Preparing New MA Programme at the Haifa University* – Professor Abraham en-Zvi, School of Political Science, University of Haifa

12:45 – 13:30 *E-Tools for Diplomats* – Minister Plenipotentiary Mr Stefano Baldi, Director of the Diplomatic Institute, Rome, *including comments and discussion – Videolink*

13:30 – 14:45 *Lunch – at the Sesame Restaurant*

15:00 – 17:00 **DIPLOMATIC WORKSHOP FOR JUNIOR DIPLOMATS on ‘Innovations and New Roles of Diplomats’**
Moderators: Professor Nabil Ayad, HE Dr Mladen Andrić, Professor Daryl Copeland
 - *Introduction by moderators and discussion with junior diplomats*

19:30-20:30 *Dinner – at the Sesame Restaurant*

Day 3: Saturday, 25 May 2013

09:00 –11:15 **3rd PLENARY SESSION: Innovations and Diplomacy: Lessons Learned**

Moderators: Dr Daryl Copeland, HE Dr Damir Kušen, HE Dr Hans Winkler

09:00 – 09:45 **Keynote Address:** *Vienna Convention Revisited After 50 Years* – HE Hans Winkler, Director of the Diplomatic Academy in Vienna

09:45 – 10:00 *New Forms and Fields of Diplomacy and Diplomatic Training* – HE Dr Ranko Vujačić, Director of the Diplomatic Academy, MFAEI, Podgorica

10:00 – 10:15 *Some Polish Experiences* – Ms Natalia Gozdowska, Head of the Training Courses Unit, Polish Institute of Diplomacy, MFA, Warsaw

10:15 – 10:30 *Comments and discussion*

10:30 – 11:00 *Coffee break*

11:00 – 12:30 **Closing Session of the 2013 CEI Dubrovnik Diplomatic Forum**

Moderators: HE Dr Mladen Andrić, Professor Nabil Ayad, Ms Vlasta Brunsko, HE Ms Margit Waestfelt

11:00 – 11:30 **Closing Address:** HE Ms Margit Waestfelt, CEI Alternate Secretary General

Brief summaries on the contents and findings of the Forum sessions presented by junior diplomats, with final remarks of the organisers and additional comments of other participants, as well as with the ceremony of presenting the Certificate of Attendance to the junior diplomats who have participated at the 16th CEI DDF.

12:30 – 14:30 *Lunch – at the Sesame Restaurant*

(Free time)

Departure of the participants



**16th CEI DUBROVNIK DIPLOMATIC FORUM
'Innovations and Changing Roles of Diplomacy and Diplomatic Training'
Dubrovnik, Croatia, 23-25 May 2013**

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

CEI Member States

Albania

Mr Enis Uruci, MA, Lector, Albanian Diplomatic Academy, Tirana

Austria

HE Dr Hans Winkler, Director, Diplomatic Academy in Vienna

Belarus

Ms Tatyana Klebcha, Councillor, Central Europe Desk, Department of Europe, MFA, Minsk
Ms Olga Malashenkova, Deputy Dean, Faculty of International Relations, Belarusian State University, Minsk

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Dr Jasna Jelisić, Department of Politics and International Relations, Sarajevo School of Science and Technology
Ms Envera Mahić, Minister Counselor, Head, Department for Diplomatic Training, MFA

Bulgaria

Ms Cvetomira Dimitrova, Senior Expert, Diplomatic Institute, MFA, Sofia

Croatia

HE Dr Mladen Andrić, Head, Diplomatic Academy, Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs (MFEA), Zagreb
Ms Tihana Bohač, Third Secretary, Diplomatic Academy, MFEA
Ms Vlasta Brunsko, MA, Head, CAAS Office, Dubrovnik, University of Zagreb

Ms Indira Dužević-Radić, Second Secretary, Diplomatic Academy, MFEA
HE Dr Damir Kušen, Head, Division for Central, Eastern and Southern Europe, MFEA
Ms Natali Lulić-Grozdanoski, Head, Division for International Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid, MFEA
Dr Dario Malnar, Head, Center for Education, SIA
Professor Goran Vlašić, Faculty of Economics, University of Zagreb
HE Ms Marija Vučković, Deputy Prefect of the Dubrovnik-Neretva County, Dubrovnik
Mr Hrvoje Vuković, MA, Third Secretary, Diplomatic Academy, MFEA

Czech Republic

Ms Pavla Havrlíková, Deputy Director, Diplomatic Academy, MFA, Prague

Hungary

Ms Leonóra Gulyas, Attaché, Desk Officer for Albania, MFA, Budapest

Italy

Mr Stefano Baldi, Minister Plenipotentiary, Director, Diplomatic Institute, Rome
(*Videolink*)

Montenegro

Ms Bojana Aleksić, Third Secretary, Desk Officer at the General Directorate for Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration (MFAEI), Podgorica
Ms Ana Dragić, Adviser, Diplomatic Academy, MFAEI
Dr Ranko Vujačić, Director, Diplomatic Academy, MFAEI

Poland

Ms Natalia Gozdowska, Head, Training Courses Unit, Polish Institute of Diplomacy, MFA, Warsaw

Romania

Ms Simona Botezatu, Third Secretary, MFA, Bucharest
Ms Daia Cristina Olivia, First Secretary, Department for Diplomatic Training, MFA

Serbia

Ms Zorka Keković, Second Secretary, Cabinet of the State Secretary, MFA, Belgrade
HE Božin Nikolić, Director, Diplomatic Academy, MFA

Slovakia

Ms Dana Reháková, Attaché, MFA, Bratislava

Slovenia

Ms Anja Fabiani, Minister Plenipotentiary, MFA, Ljubljana
Ms Polonca Smole, First Secretary, MFA

Ukraine

HE Mykola Kulnych, Rector, Diplomatic Academy, MFA, Kyiv

Others**Azerbaijan**

Mr Fariz Ismailzade, Executive Vice Rector, Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy, MFA, Baku

Central European Initiative (CEI)

HE Ms Margit Waestfelt, CEI Alternate Secretary General, Trieste, Italy

Hanns Seidel Foundation

Ms Aleksandra Markic Boban, Head of the Office, Zagreb, Croatia

Israel

Professor Avraham Ben-Zvi, Head of the Executive Program, Department of International Relations, School of Political Science, University of Haifa

Malaysia

HE Ms Aminah Hj A Karim, Deputy Director General, Institute of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations (IDFR), MFA, Kuala Lumpur

Palestinian National Authority

Mr Zaki R. A. Qudaih, First Secretary, European Affairs Department, MFA

Mr Omar J. O. Faqih, First Secretary, European Affairs Department, MFA

Mr Ahmed O. M. Mousa, Second Secretary, Embassy of Palestine in Cairo

Ms Safa Rabah Yahia Muhalwes, Minister's Cabinet, MFA

United Kingdom

Professor Nabil Ayad, Director, London Academy of Diplomacy (LAD), University of East Anglia (UEA), London

Professor Daryl Copeland, LAD, UEA – Canada

Ms Rose Lozi, MA Student, International Business and Diplomacy, UEA – Jordan



16th CEI DUBROVNIK DIPLOMATIC FORUM
'Innovations and Changing Roles of Diplomacy and Diplomatic Training'
Dubrovnik, Croatia, 23-25 May 2013
FAMILY PHOTO

DUBROVNIK DIPLOMATIC FORUM
Dubrovnik, Croatia
(1998-2015)

- 2015: DIPLOMACY AND DIPLOMATIC TRAINING: NEW APPROACHES TO DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE**
- 2013: INNOVATIONS AND CHANGING ROLES OF DIPLOMACY AND DIPLOMATIC TRAINING**
- 2012: DIPLOMACY AND INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE**
- 2011: EU AND ITS NEIGHBOURS: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES**
- 2010: STRATEGIC PUBLIC DIPLOMACY**
- 2009: MODERN EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY AND DIPLOMATIC TRAINING**
- 2008: DIPLOMATIC TRAINING AND REGIONAL COOPERATION**
- 2007: LIFE-LONG LEARNING AND DIPLOMACY**
- 2005: CULTURAL PROMOTION AND DIPLOMACY**
- 2003: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND MEDIA III**
- 2003: ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY: NEW CHALLENGES AND HOW TO COPE WITH THEM**
- 2002: DIPLOMACY AND BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT IN COUNTRIES IN TRANSITION**
- 2002: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND MEDIA II**
- 2001: ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY IN COUNTRIES IN TRANSITION**
- 2000: DIPLOMACY IN THE ERA OF GLOBALISATION**
- 2000: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND MEDIA**
- 1999: DIPLOMACY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT**
- 1998: THE ROLE OF DIPLOMACY IN COUNTRIES IN TRANSITION WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON EDUCATION AND TRAINING**

INTERNATIONAL FRANCOPHONE DIPLOMATIC SEMINARS = **SEMINAIRES
INTERNATIONAUX DIPLOMATIQUES FRANCOPHONES**
Dubrovnik (2002-2010) and Zagreb (2011-2015), Croatia

This series of annual international francophone seminars is a part of the cooperation programme with the International Organisation of the Francophonie which is co-organised by the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Republic of Croatia and the Embassy of the French Republic in the Republic of Croatia as well as the Embassy of the Kingdom of Belgium in the Republic of Croatia, with expert support of the ENA Centre for European Studies.

Cette série de séminaires internationaux diplomatiques francophones est organisée dans le cadre de la coopération de l'Académie diplomatique du Ministère des Affaires étrangères et de l'Intégration européenne de la République de Croatie avec l'Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, l'Ambassade de France en Croatie ainsi qu'avec l'Ambassade du Royaume de Belgique en Croatie et avec le soutien du Centre des études européennes de l'ENA.

- **2015:** CLIMATE CHANGE: A CHALLENGE FOR EUROPEAN DIPLOMACIES? = *CHANGEMENT CLIMATIQUE: UN DEFI POUR LES DIPLOMATIES EUROPEENNES?*
- **2014:** TOWARDS INTEGRATION INTO THE EUROPEAN UNION: NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES FOR THE CANDIDATE COUNTRIES = *VERS L'INTEGRATION DANS L'UNION EUROPEENNE: STRATEGIES DE NEGOCIATION POUR LES PAYS CANDIDATS*
- **2012:** THE EVOLUTION OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION SINCE THE CRISIS = *L'EVOLUTION DE LA GOUVERNANCE ECONOMIQUE ET FINANCIERE DE L'UNION EUROPEENNE DEPUIS LA CRISE*
- **2011:** DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS IN EUROPE: EMERGENCE OF NEW ACTORS AND EVOLUTION OF INFLUENCE STRATEGIES = *LES RELATIONS DIPLOMATIQUES EN EUROPE: EMERGENCE DE NOUVEAUX ACTEURS ET EVOLUTION DES STRATEGIES D'INFLUENCE*
- **2010:** COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY (CFSP) = *LA POLITIQUE ETRANGERE ET DE SECURITE COMMUNE (PESC)*
- **2009:** EU AREA OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM AND SECURITY – CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS = *LES ENJEUX ET LES PERSPECTIVES DE L'ESPACE EUROPEEN DE JUSTICE, DE LIBERTE ET DE SECURITE*
- **2008:** EU ACTIVITIES IN THE AREAS OF ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE = *L'ACTION DE L'UE DANS LES DOMAINES DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT, DE L'ENERGIE ET DU CHANGEMENT CLIMATIQUE*
- **2007:** EU FINANCIAL FRAMEWORK AND ITS PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE POLICIES = *LE CADRE FINANCIER DE L'UNION EUROPEENNE ET SES DEUX PRINCIPALES POLITIQUES D'AIDE FINANCIERE*
- **2006:** LEGAL TOOLS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION = *LES OUTILS JURIDIQUES DE L'UNION EUROPEENNE*
- **2005:** CFSP AND ESDP = *LA PESC ET LA PESD*
- **2004:** INSTITUTIONAL FUTURE OF THE EU = *L'AVENIR INSTITUTIONNEL DE L'EUROPE*
- **2003:** EU AND MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS = *L'UNION EUROPEENNE DANS LES NEGOCIATIONS MULTILATERALES*
- **2002:** CFSP – COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY = *PESC – LA POLITIQUE ETRANGERE ET DE SECURITE COMMUNE*

